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The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate prima facie epistemic 
justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant philosophical support in recent 
years. The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies my belief that I’ve been wronged 
putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how we receive 
immediate and defeasible justification for our evaluative beliefs. With many notable 
advocates in the literature, this justificatory thesis of emotion is fast becoming a central facet 
in how we conceive of the emotions’ epistemic role with respect to our everyday lives.  
 
Interestingly, however, despite the fact that the justificatory thesis is fundamentally an 
epistemological proposal, comparatively little of the philosophical literature has been 
dedicated to exploring the epistemological avenues through which emotions might be capable 
of delivering such an epistemic yield. Accordingly, the central purpose of this thesis is to 
provide a novel and thorough analysis of how emotional experience might be capable of 
playing this justificatory role. Here, I present and evaluate three broad models of emotional 
justification: emotional dogmatism, emotional reliabilism, and agent-based views. Emotional 
dogmatist views, I argue, fail in virtue of being vulnerable to over-generalisation worries and 
problematic commitments to the contents of emotional awareness. Emotional reliabilism, 
while possessing the resources to avoid some objections, is vulnerable to worrisome 
clairvoyance-style challenges which establish the insufficiency of emotional reliability for 
epistemic justification. Finally, having learned our lessons from the shortcomings of these 
views, I argue that an agent-based theory grounded in the development of learned emotional 
competences provides the most plausible account of how emotional experience can 
epistemically justify evaluative belief. This discussion, I believe, will both illuminate 
contemporary discussions of the justificatory thesis of emotion found in the literature, and 
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Chapter 1  
Introducing the Justificatory Thesis of Emotion 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Emotional experience is a significant constituent of our mental lives. Our emotional reactions 
and experiences perform a variety of valuable roles throughout the course of our lifetimes. 
Emotions mark and characterise our relationships with others, instigate and sway our 
processes of decision-making, prompt moral assessments and judgments of ourselves and 
those around us, facilitate our aesthetic engagement with the arts, and so forth. Given the 
power, salience, and ubiquity of emotional influence, then, it is unsurprising that the 
experience of emotion has attracted significant philosophical attention in recent years.  
 
One particularly interesting dimension of the emotions’ significance is their epistemic import. 
Emotional experience seems to illuminate the evaluative world around us. We frequently 
form evaluative beliefs about surrounding objects and states of affairs on the basis of our 
emotional experiences. I might believe that, say, an offhand remark made by my colleague is 
offensive in light of my anger in response to it, or that the view from the summit of Ben 
Lomond is beautiful on the basis of my experience of awe before it, or that a particular joke is 
amusing on the basis of my experience of amusement, and so forth. Our beliefs about values, 
like the admirable, the disgusting, the contemptible, the amusing, the enviable, etc. thereby 
appear to be intimately tied up with and influenced by our emotional experiences.  
 
Now, assuming that one of our epistemic goals is to form justified beliefs about value, an 
immediate question that arises here is whether the emotions’ influence over the formation of 
our evaluative beliefs is, on balance, for better or for worse. Does perceiving value through 
the emotional lens tend to help or hinder our pursuit of justified evaluative belief? Does the 
influence of anger, say, typically aid in or frustrate the formation of justified evaluative 
beliefs about what is offensive? In recent years, the tide has been turning in favour of positive 
answers to these questions. Increasingly, many have endorsed the idea that emotional 





justification for our evaluative beliefs. Accordingly, the specific view that will be evaluated 
in this dissertation is what will be referred to as the justificatory thesis of emotion:1 
 
The Justificatory Thesis of Emotion (JTE): emotional experience is capable of lending 
immediate prima facie epistemic justification to evaluative belief. 
 
Put roughly, what JTE amounts to is the claim that emotional experiences have the ability to 
act as defeasible reasons in favour of an agent’s holding the relevant evaluative belief. On 
this view, my emotional experience of anger towards my colleague’s offhand remark is 
capable of defeasibly justifying my evaluative belief that the remark was offensive; my guilt 
in response to my breaking a promise to a friend is capable of defeasibly justifying my 
evaluative belief that my actions were morally wrong.  
 
Many philosophers have endorsed JTE as a significant component of their account of the 
epistemological value of emotional experience.2 Tappolet (2016), for instance, states that “it 
appears plausible to claim that when you feel the emotion of fear, say, this not only prompts 
you to believe that what you are afraid of is fearsome, but you are also prima facie justified in 
believing that what you are afraid of is fearsome” (p. 168). Likewise, Döring (2003) argues 
that “an emotion… resembles a sense-perception in having an intentional content that is 
representational… as a consequence, an emotion can justify a belief” (p. 215), while Elgin 
(2008) suggests something close to JTE insofar as she argues that emotional experiences are 
“initially tenable” in virtue of the fact that “an agent, in the grip of an emotion, has a 
tendency to credit its deliverances” (p. 34). 
 
There are a number of reasons as to why JTE, if true, is an important claim. The first of 
which is that JTE stands in opposition to a sceptical view concerning the epistemic capacities 
of the emotions, namely, the view that emotional experiences cloud our evaluative perception 
and make us epistemically worse-off than we would be if we were free from emotional 
influence.3 If it is the case that emotional experience instead constitutes a defeasible reason 
for holding particular evaluative beliefs, then JTE supports the conclusion that emotions are 
 
1 I’m borrowing this label from Pelser (2011) and (2014).  
2 Although, see Brady (2013) for notable criticism of the thesis.  
3 Notable philosophical instances of similar sceptical views include the Stoics’ assertion that emotions 
(suitably qualified) “imply false judgments” (Graver 2007, p. 5) or the Kantian idea that affective 





best considered as being part and parcel of the rational agent’s cognitive architecture, rather 
than psychological pollutants that impede our epistemic inquiries. This is an interesting 
claim, given the traction the sceptical view seems to have in folk discourse about the 
emotions. 
 
Second, JTE has a certain explanatory power. Recall that Elgin takes emotions to be 
experienced as “initially tenable” by the subject undergoing the experience. According to 
Elgin, we’re ordinarily inclined to give credence to the beliefs formed on the basis of 
emotional experiences.4 If JTE is true, this makes sense of the trust we place in our emotions. 
Third, JTE can provide us with a non-mysterious epistemology of value. In illustration of this 
point, contrast JTE with rational intuitionist views, according to which we come to have 
justified evaluative beliefs through the faculty of evaluative intuition.5 In accordance with 
such a view, one might argue that my evaluative belief that deliberately causing harm is 
morally wrong is justified simply in virtue of my grasping the self-evidence of that 
proposition. Now, one common objection facing these accounts is that positing rational 
intuition as the root of our evaluative epistemology objectionably hinges our possession of 
justified evaluative belief on a mysterious and unsubstantiated faculty.6 By contrast, JTE 
need not posit any kind of strange evaluative faculty in order to explain how our evaluative 
beliefs come to be justified; the explanatory question is answered simply and naturally by 
appeal to emotional experience. Indeed, bestowing emotional experience with justificatory 
power not only provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to how our 
evaluative beliefs can enjoy positive justificatory status, but, given the putative importance of 
justification for the acquisition of further epistemic goods, JTE may also be able to deliver a 
substantive epistemic yield which extends beyond justified belief and plausibly into the 
domain of evaluative knowledge and understanding.7  
 
Finally, and on a related note, the focus of JTE on the immediacy of the justification 
conferred by emotional experience is significant given that it putatively provides us with a 
way out of pernicious sceptical worries pertaining to the acquisition of justified evaluative 
belief. If, instead, emotional experience could only transfer justification to evaluative belief 
 
4 Döring (2007) and Pelser (2011) also make this point.  
5 See, for example, Ross (1930) and Audi (1998).  
6 One particularly notable version of this argument is Mackie’s (1977) ‘Argument From Queerness’.  
7 This point assumes that a belief’s being epistemically justified is in some way necessary (but not 





mediated by the possession of the subject’s other justified evaluative beliefs, then it seems 
that we would open the door to sceptical concerns about how those evaluative beliefs end up 
being justified. Allowing emotional experience to serve as an experiential justificatory 
bedrock for evaluative belief, so to speak, allows us to sidestep these sceptical worries (more 
on this immediacy point in §1.3).  
 
So, thus far, we can recognise JTE as a popular view within the philosophy of emotion which 
enjoys a number of theoretical advantages. However, if the thesis is to be plausible, there 
remains an essential question which must be answered, namely, the question of how 
emotional experience is capable of justifying evaluative belief. Interestingly, despite the fact 
that JTE is fundamentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little of the 
philosophical literature has been dedicated to exploring the epistemological avenues through 
which emotions might be capable of delivering such an epistemic yield. That is, little has 
been done to explicitly isolate and explore what it is about emotional experience that bestows 
it with the ability to justify evaluative belief. I aim to close this gap in the literature by 
offering a novel and thorough analysis of various accounts of emotional justification, i.e. 
accounts as to how and when emotional experience can immediately and defeasibly justify 
evaluative belief.8 
 
Put specifically, the purpose of this dissertation is to present and evaluate three broad 
epistemological models of emotional justification: dogmatist approaches, reliabilist 
approaches, and agent-based (or virtue epistemological) approaches. Roughly speaking, 
emotional dogmatism is the view that emotional experience can immediately and defeasibly 
justify evaluative belief in virtue of its possession of an epistemically significant phenomenal 
character. Emotional reliabilism, on the other hand, states that the emotions’ justificatory 
ability is rooted in the reliability of forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional 
experience. Finally, agent-based views identify features of the emoter herself, such as her 
intellectual character traits or reliable cognitive faculties, as those things which bestow her 
emotional experiences with justificatory power. In what follows, I will argue that dogmatist 
and reliabilist approaches to emotional justification are not capable of providing us with a 
 
8 My use of ‘emotional justification’ to refer to the justificatory power of emotion with respect to 
evaluative belief is not to be confused with the discussion of emotions themselves being justified (see 
Echeverri (2019) for an in-depth discussion of emotional justification in this latter sense). ‘Emotional 





satisfactory explanation as to how emotional experience can justify evaluative belief. Instead, 
I will argue in favour of a particular agent-based view which places epistemic significance on 
the development of learned emotional competences.  
 
In pursuit of these goals, there are a number of preliminary issues that must be addressed. 
The question of whether and how emotional experience is capable of playing the justificatory 
role specified above will naturally be contingent on a number of further questions, such as 
what we take the structure and nature of emotional experience, epistemic justification, and 
evaluative belief to be. In what follows, I will lay the groundwork for the assumptions that I 
will be making and the debates that will be bracketed in order to pave the way for the 
forthcoming discussion. I will then conclude the chapter by further clarifying the structure of 
the dissertation and presenting a detailed chapter-by-chapter plan.  
 
1.2 Preliminaries: Emotional Experience 
 
Before we begin our epistemological investigation into the justificatory prospects of 
emotional experience, there’s one particularly obvious question that must first be addressed. 
Namely, what is an emotional experience?  
 
First, let me be clear that by ‘emotional experience’, I intend to capture the phenomenon of 
occurrent emotional episodes rather than longstanding emotional dispositions, sentiments, or 
moods. Philosophers of emotion tend to agree that these occurrent emotional experiences 
involve the following features.9 First, paradigmatic emotional experiences are felt 
experiences. That is, they have a phenomenal character (i.e. a something-that-it-is-like to 
undergo the experience), and tend to bring about a range of bodily feelings and physiological 
changes.10 Second, emotional experiences are typically experienced passively. We often 
describe ourselves as being overcome by anger, or grief, or joy; it doesn’t seem to be the case 
that we will our emotional experiences into existence. Third, as Döring notes above, 
emotions are intentional mental states. That is, emotions are not experienced as directionless 
episodes, but are rather are about specific objects and events. To be more specific, emotional 
 
9 See Roberts (1988) for a helpful elucidation of these features.  
10 Although, this varies across different emotion-types. The intellectual pleasure of solving a puzzle, 
for instance, may not involve physiological feelings in the same way or to the same extent that, say, 





experience represents the world as being a certain evaluative way, and can be assessed in 
terms of accuracy conditions accordingly. Fourth, and finally, emotions are often experienced 
alongside specific evaluative judgments and action tendencies. The anger that I experience in 
response to my colleague’s offhand comment, for example, will typically come alongside the 
evaluative judgement that the contents of the comment were harmful or incendiary, and the 
behavioural tendency to confront or reprimand the colleague.11  
 
The primary point of contention amongst philosophers of emotion is identifying precisely 
what an emotional experience is. In other words, there’s a crucial question of which of these 
features, if any, the emotional experience is identical to and which of these features are 
merely concurrent with the experience. Feeling theorists, for example, identify the emotional 
experience with the felt component. More specifically, feeling theorists argue that the 
emotion is identical to physiological feelings or perceptions of bodily change.12 On such a 
view, my emotion of anger is identical to the feelings of bodily change that I undergo after 
having heard my colleague’s comment, e.g. a quickening heartbeat, a flush of heat, tensed 
muscles, various visceral sensations, etc. Judgementalists, on the other hand, prioritise the 
cognitive features of emotional experience and identify the emotion with evaluative 
judgment(s),13 such that my anger is to be understood as identical to a particular kind of 
evaluative judgment that the comment was harmful or offensive. Perceptual theorists, by 
contrast, advocate on behalf of the view that emotional experiences are best understood as 
perceptual experiences of value.14 On this account, my experience of anger is best understood 




11 Of course, this is not always the case. We can, and seemingly often do, experience emotions which 
appear to conflict with our considered evaluative judgments (e.g. a recalcitrant fear of a house spider 
that I judge to be harmless). Likewise, emotions can be experienced in the absence of any obvious 
behavioural inclinations or tendencies (e.g. perhaps an experience of surprise at a particularly 
noteworthy piece of news, or an experience of pride after finishing a particularly difficult task).   
12 See James (1884) for one of the most notable presentations of such a view, and Prinz (2004) for a 
modern defence of a revised feeling theory. 
13 See Solomon (1988) and Nussbaum (2001) for nuanced defences of the judgementalist view.  
14 See Tappolet (2016) and Döring (2007). Perceptual theories are typically motivated by drawing 
certain parallels between perceptual and emotional experiences, i.e. perceptual and emotional 
experiences both seem to be intentional and passively experienced mental states which instantiate 





In this dissertation, I am not concerned with taking a stance on the substantive question of the 
nature of emotional experience. In the interest of keeping my discussion open to a variety of 
views on the nature and structure of emotional experience, I will not assume or defend any 
particular account which attempts to answer the metaphysical question of what an emotional 
experience is. For the purposes of the dissertation, however, note that a key assumption that I 
will be making is that emotional experience has intentional content (i.e. represents evaluative 
properties) and phenomenological character. I take these to be fairly uncontroversial 
assumptions that are made by many in the literature.15 
 
1.3 Preliminaries: Epistemic Justification 
 
JTE proposes that emotional experience acts as a source of immediate and prima facie 
epistemic justification for evaluative belief. In this section, I’ll provide a brief elucidation of 
these epistemological concepts. 
 
First and foremost, the justification that we’re interested in here is specifically epistemic.16 
Epistemic justification is a property that is possessed by certain beliefs. Very loosely 
speaking, attributing the property of epistemic justification to a belief is similar to evaluating 
that belief as being supported by good reason(s) or evidence. As a further qualification, note 
that the kind of epistemic justification primarily at issue here is propositional as opposed to 
doxastic justification. That is, we’re interested in the question as to how and when emotional 
experience can constitute support for believing a particular evaluative proposition, rather than 
the question of whether a given subject appropriately believes an evaluative proposition on 
the basis of their emotional experience. 
 
Second, it is important to distinguish between mediate and immediate justification. To 
illustrate, suppose that I have a visual experience of a small insect perched on my shoulder. 
 
15 Note, however, that Deonna and Teroni (2012a) endorse an attitudinal view of emotional 
experience which is incompatible with the claim that emotions have evaluative properties as their 
intentional content.  
16 Epistemic justification can come apart from other types of justification, such as moral or prudential 
justification. I might be morally justified in believing that, say, my friend won’t break her promise to 
me (assuming that there are strong moral reasons to have faith in one’s friends), but not epistemically 
justified if I lack evidence in favour of her trustworthiness. Alternatively, I might be prudentially 
justified in believing that, say, my illness will subside (assuming that there are strong prudential 






As a result of this visual experience, I then come to form the corresponding belief that there 
is a small insect on my shoulder. Generally speaking, visual experiences are taken to confer 
immediate justification to belief insofar as that justification exists independently of any of the 
subject’s other justified beliefs. In other words, the justification conferred by my visual 
experience of the insect does not depend on my having the justified belief that, say, my visual 
system is reliable at tracking small insects, or that I’m not in a sceptical brain-in-the-vat 
scenario, and so forth. On the other hand, compare this with a scenario in which my friend 
tells me that there’s a small insect on my back. In this case, the insect is beyond my 
perceptual field such that I can’t see or feel it for myself. Thus, my belief that there’s a small 
insect on my back is plausibly only mediately justified given that my justification for this 
belief does depend on my having other justified beliefs, e.g. that my friend is a reliable 
testifier, that she has no reason to lie to me about the presence of small insects, that her visual 
faculties tend to function correctly, and so forth. What’s important for our purposes is JTE’s 
claim that emotional experience is capable of conferring immediate justification to evaluative 
belief. That is, similar to the visual case mentioned above, my experience of anger can justify 
my evaluative belief that my colleague’s comment was offensive independently of my 
possessing any other justified beliefs concerning, for example, the reliability of my emotional 
and auditory systems.17 
 
Third, and finally, note that the type of justification putatively conferred by emotional 
experience is qualified as prima facie (or defeasible) rather than ultima facie justification. 
Reconsider the visual example above. My visual experience of the insect on my shoulder 
plausibly confers prima facie justification to my belief that there is an insect on my shoulder 
in light of the fallibility of visual systems. Our visual experiences can, and sometimes do, get 
things wrong. This justification conferred by my visual experience may be quashed by 
defeating evidence, such as my having recently ingested a hallucinogenic, my being in bad 
lighting, and so forth. If, however, there is no defeating evidence, then my belief about the 
small insect would plausibly be ultima facie justified (i.e. justified all-things-considered) on 
 
17 One objection that may be raised here is that emotional experiences are precluded from conferring 
immediate justification in light of their dependence on cognitive bases, i.e. prior mental states like 
perceptions, beliefs, memories, imaginative states, and so forth. Given limitations of space, I won’t 
discuss this objection here (although  I address a similar point in §3.3.1), but see Cowan (2018) and 
Milona and Naar (2020) for detailed discussions of this challenge. It’s important to note that neither 
take this challenge to be capable of barring emotional experience from conferring generative or 





the basis of my visual experience. JTE is only concerned with the possibility of emotional 
experiences conferring prima facie justification to evaluative belief in light of the seemingly 
analogous fallibility of our emotional systems.  
 
1.4 Preliminaries: Evaluative Belief 
 
So, thus far, we have two components of JTE spelled out. Emotional experience, as I’ll 
understand it, is occurrent, intentional, and bears phenomenal character. Moreover, the kind 
of epistemic justification that we’re interested in is propositional, immediate, and defeasible. 
Let me finish these preliminary considerations with some comments on how evaluative belief 
will be understood throughout this thesis.  
 
Throughout most of the forthcoming discussion, I will not be making any assumptions about 
the structure of evaluative belief other than the straightforward conception of an evaluative 
belief consisting in a propositional attitude attributing a particular evaluative property (or 
properties) towards a particular object or state of affairs. My evaluative belief that my 
colleague’s comment was offensive, then, represents the comment as instantiating the 
property of ‘offensiveness’.  
 
Now, naturally, a question might arise here concerning the metaphysics of value concepts and 
properties. Recall from our initial discussion in §1.1. that there seems to be a close 
connection between our evaluative beliefs and our emotional responses. Drawing from this 
connection, one plausible view concerning the nature of evaluative concepts and properties is 
that they’re essentially response-dependent, i.e. they cannot be understood without reference 
to the responses of observers.18 This response-dependence claim can be spelled out in a 
variety of different ways. One might think that evaluative properties merely causally elicit 
particular emotional responses, such that a state of affairs is shameful if and only if that state 
of affairs elicits responses of shame in observers under certain conditions. If such a simple 
subjectivism strikes the reader as implausible, however, it might be thought that evaluative 
 
18 One interesting thing to note is that endorsing a response-dependent construal of evaluative 
concepts need not preclude one from being a realist about the nature of certain evaluative properties 
picked out by those concepts. In other words, it’s possible to advocate on behalf of a view where the 
evaluative concept ‘admirable’ cannot be explained without reference to the admiration responses of 
observers, but the evaluative property ‘admirable’ is itself fully objective and non-relational. See, for 





properties do not merely causally elicit certain emotional responses, but instead dispose 
ordinary observers to experience certain emotional responses under certain conditions. 
Alternatively, others opt for the view that evaluative properties do not just cause or dispose 
but merit certain emotional responses.19 Call this latter view neo-sentimentalism.20     
 
I am not going into this discussion with any pre-existing view in mind as to which of these is 
the correct view of the nature of evaluative concepts and properties. While Chapter 2 (§2.4) 
will comment on the compatibility of neo-sentimentalism with a particular version of JTE 
(namely, a dogmatist view which states that emotional experience brings epistemically 
significant phenomenological awareness of evaluative properties), I do not intend for the 
plausibility of the arguments made in this thesis to substantially hinge on any particular 
preconception of the metaphysics or ontology of value.   
 
1.5 The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Now that we’ve addressed the relevant preliminary questions, let me spell out the structure of 
the forthcoming discussion. To reiterate, the aim of this thesis is to clarify and evaluate three 
broad views of emotional justification. In Chapter 2, I begin by presenting the first view: 
emotional dogmatism (ED). According to ED, S’s emotional experience is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying their evaluative belief that e (where e signifies a 
proposition which attributes an evaluative property to a particular object or event) insofar as 
it makes it seem to S that e. This view is based on a phenomenal conservative (PC) account 
of experiential justification, according to which an experience is capable of justifying one’s 
belief that p insofar as it makes it seem to one that p. I then argue that ED fails in virtue of 
lacking the theoretical resources to exclude problematic cases from enjoying its epistemic 
yield.  
 
I then suggest that a restricted emotional dogmatist view (RED), based on Chudnoff’s 
restricted phenomenal conservative account, is better placed as a model for our investigation 
into the prospects of an emotional dogmatist view. According to this view, S’s emotional 
experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying their evaluative belief e 
 
19 Note that Chapter 2 (§2.4) will summarise a very brief argument against mere causal and 
dispositional theories of value and in favour of neo-sentimentalist views.  





insofar as it both (i) makes it seem to S that e and (ii) makes it seem as if S is aware of a 
truth-maker for e. Having identified RED as the target view, I then defend this account from 
an objection particularly salient in the literature, namely, that evaluative properties are not 
suitable objects of emotional awareness. I argue that RED has a (prima facie) plausible story 
to tell with respect to evaluative properties being both direct and indirect objects of emotional 
awareness, such that the account has the resources to provide a response to this worry.  
 
Having built a strong philosophical foundation for the account, Chapter 3 then proposes what 
I take to be the most serious objection facing the view. Namely, I argue that RED’s inclusion 
of the truth-maker condition raises a troubling dilemma for the account. Either RED 
identifies evaluative properties themselves as truth-makers for evaluative propositions, in 
which case the view will continue to over-generalise, or it identifies the conjunction of non-
evaluative properties which gives rise to the relevant evaluative property as the truth-maker, 
in which case the view ends up being objectionably restrictive. Either way, RED is 
generating the wrong result. I then conclude the chapter, and thus our investigation into the 
prospects of a dogmatist approach to emotional justification, by rejecting two alternative 
instantiations of the restricted emotional dogmatist thesis: Receptive Seemings Emotional 
Dogmatism (RSED) and Knowledge-How Emotional Dogmatism (KHED). 
 
In Chapter 4, I then present the second contender for a plausible approach to explaining 
emotional justification: emotional reliabilism (ER). According to ER, S’s emotional 
experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying their evaluative belief e 
insofar as S’s forming e on the basis of that emotional experience is a reliable process of 
belief formation. The motivation for this view is twofold. First, it carries compelling weight 
in the literature, and, second, it putatively avoids the kinds of problems faced by the 
dogmatist approach. Having motivated and clarified the reliabilist view, I then defend it 
against several objections. Most notably, I defend ER against what I take to be the most 
conspicuous objection facing it in the literature, namely, that emotional experience is 
significantly unreliable such that it cannot constitute a reliable belief-forming process with 
respect to an agent’s evaluative beliefs. By considering and rejecting what I take to be the 
three most plausible arguments in favour of this unreliability, I argue that there is no 






In Chapter 5, again, having built ER into the most philosophically robust version it can be, I 
level a further objection against the view which I take to highlight a significant problem for 
the reliabilist approach to emotional justification, namely, that reliably forming true 
evaluative beliefs on the basis of one’s emotional experiences is insufficient for the 
justification of those beliefs. This objection takes the form of an emotional analogue to 
traditional clairvoyance cases levelled against reliabilist epistemologies. Having done so, I 
then rebut two possible modifications of the emotional reliabilist thesis, Evidentialist 
Emotional Reliabilism (EER) and Agent Emotional Reliabilism (AER), and conclude our 
investigation into the prospects of a reliabilist approach to emotional justification.  
 
In Chapter 6, I begin by taking stock of my discussion thus far and constructing various 
desiderata for a plausible theory of emotional justification that we can glean from the 
weaknesses of the dogmatist and reliabilist approaches. From these desiderata, I present the 
third class of views to be considered in this dissertation, namely, agent-based views of 
emotional justification, i.e. virtue epistemological views which hinge the justificatory power 
of emotional experience on features of the emoter herself. Within this class, I identify two 
broad species of agent-based views: virtue responsibilist views and virtue reliabilist views. I 
argue that, in light of the shortcomings of virtue responsibilism, a competence-based virtue 
reliabilism inspired by the work of Sosa is best placed for an investigation into the prospects 
of an analogous view of emotional justification. On this note, I present and motivate Carter’s 
Emotional Competence (EC) view, according to which S’s emotional experience is capable 
of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if (i) that 
experience is formed via the exercise of her generative emotional competence, and (ii) e is 
formed via the exercise of her doxastic emotional competence.  
 
In spite of the view’s attractions, I then argue that EC requires further development in virtue 
of a generality-style ambiguity in the scope of emotional competences. Put roughly, I argue 
that EC is silent as to whether: (1) one possesses emotional competence overall, (2) one 
possesses emotional competences localised to particular emotion-types, or (3) one possesses 
emotional competences localised to particular emotion-types which are experienced in 
response to particular eliciting scenarios. I argue that clarifying this ambiguity is essential for 
evaluating the plausibility of the view given that, without a clear understanding of the scope 






In light of this concern, I propose that emotional competence ought to be localised to 
particular emotion-types experienced in response to particular eliciting scenarios. My reason 
for this is that, in my view, the most plausible way of explaining the development of 
emotional competence is by reference to processes of emotional learning which are localised 
to particular emotion-types and eliciting scenarios. Put roughly, I propose that a subject, 
through repeated experience with and exposure to a particular kind of eliciting scenario, 
comes to develop a localised emotional competence with respect to that eliciting scenario by 
emotionally learning that this scenario instantiates a particular evaluative property. I then 
suggest that this analysis prompts a revised construal of EC, according to which a subject S’s 
emotional experience which attributes evaluative property E to object O is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying S’s evaluative belief that O is E if and only if (i) S has 
the emotion as a result of her having emotionally learned that O is E, and (ii) S forms the 
belief that O is E on the basis of that emotion. I then defend this view by further clarifying 
the processes and significance of emotional learning, highlighting a unique selling point of 
the view with respect to a compelling insight from feminist philosophy, and summarising 
how the view meets the desiderata previously identified for a plausible theory of emotional 







A Dogmatist Approach  
 
2.1. Introductory Remarks 
 
Recall from the previous chapter that one central feature of emotional experience is that it 
instantiates phenomenal properties. In other words, just as there is something-that-it-is-like to 
taste coffee, or to see red and orange leaves on the ground, there is something-that-it-is-like 
to be indignant towards an unjust political policy, or proud upon achieving a significant goal, 
or distraught at the passing of a loved one, and so forth. The first account of emotional 
justification that this dissertation will consider identifies emotional phenomenology as the 
source of the emotions’ ability to epistemically justify evaluative belief.  
 
We can find support for this idea from various suggestive comments made by philosophers in 
the recent literature. Goldie (2004), for example, argues on behalf of an account of emotional 
experience “where the feelings involved are at center stage, playing a centrally important 
epistemic role in revealing things about the world” (p. 92). On a similar note, Tappolet 
(2016) argues that emotional experiences uniquely “allow us to be aware of certain features 
of the world” (p. 18), while Johnston (2001) claims that the epistemic import of affective 
experiences is rooted in their providing us with “affective disclosure” (p. 213) of evaluative 
properties. The focus of these claims on notions of ‘feelings’, ‘awareness’, and ‘affective 
disclosure’ certainly seems at least suggestive of the fact that these authors, among others, 
take the phenomenal properties instantiated by emotional experience – the something-that-it-
is-like to undergo emotional experience – to bear epistemic significance.    
 
In light of this support, then, how might we build a view of emotional justification based on 
the phenomenological character of emotional experience? One plausible way of doing so is to 
look to the wider philosophical domain of experiential justification; to look for a prima facie 
plausible account which bestows experiences with the power to immediately and defeasibly 
justify the relevant beliefs in virtue of bearing a specific kind of phenomenal character, and 
mould our theory of emotional justification on such an account. In this regard, one 





justification, namely, phenomenal conservatism.21 According to phenomenal conservatism, 
an experience that makes it seem to you that p immediately and defeasibly justifies you in 
believing that p. On this account, if your visual experience makes it seem to you that there is 
an orange on the desk, then, absent defeating evidence, you have immediate justification for 
believing that there is an orange on the desk; if your intuitive experience makes it seem to 
you that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five, then, absent defeating evidence, 
you have immediate justification for believing so.  
 
Perhaps, then, we can draw up an emotional analogue of PC such that an emotional 
experience that makes it seem to you that e (where e signifies a proposition attributing an 
evaluative property to an object or event) immediately and defeasibly justifies you in 
believing that e. Call this view emotional dogmatism.22 The purpose of this chapter is to 
begin an investigation into the prospects of an emotional dogmatist view by both: (i) 
clarifying emotional dogmatism and constructing the most plausible version of the view, and 
(ii) defending this version against a particularly conspicuous objection levelled against it in 
the literature.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §2.2, I begin by further elucidating the 
phenomenal conservative view and presenting the analogous emotional dogmatist thesis. In 
§2.2.1, I then argue that a liberal view which requires only that an experience bears a 
‘seeming’ phenomenal character fails in virtue of being too permissive with respect to the 
kinds of experiences which end up getting ruled into the account. In §2.3, I then suggest that 
a more restrictive account of phenomenal conservatism, which requires something further in 
addition to this seeming character, is better placed to be a plausible model for an analogous 
emotional dogmatist view. Having set out restricted emotional dogmatism as the target view, 
§2.4 then presents a common objection levelled against the view, namely, the objection that 
evaluative properties are not suitable objects of emotional awareness. I will argue that this 
objection fails; that the restricted emotional dogmatist has two prima facie plausible stories to 
 
21 I appeal to phenomenal conservatism here, rather than phenomenal dogmatism, in light of the 
former constituting a broader model of experiential justification. Phenomenal dogmatism is typically 
discussed as referring to the immediate justificatory power of perceptual experience specifically, 
rather than also including experiences such as intuitive experiences, introspective experiences, and so 
forth. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I take it that we can use either phenomenal 
conservatism or phenomenal dogmatism to set up the possibility of an analogous emotional view.  





tell with respect to evaluative properties figuring into the contents of emotional awareness. 
Accordingly, §2.4.1 concentrates on explaining how evaluative properties can be direct 
objects of emotional awareness, while §2.4.2 sets out an account of how they can be indirect 
objects of emotional awareness. I then provide concluding remarks in §2.5. 
 
2.2. Basic Emotional Dogmatism 
 
Let us understand phenomenal conservatism as follows: 
 
Phenomenal Conservatism (PC): if it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of 
defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. 
(Huemer 2007, p. 30) 
 
Now, there are a few things to note here. First of all, PC is an internalist view of epistemic 
justification insofar as it identifies factors internal to the agent (i.e. an agent’s seeming states) 
as sole epistemic justifiers, as opposed to factors external to the agent, such as a belief’s 
being produced by a reliable process. Secondly, identifying the source of an experience’s 
justificatory power in its bearing the character of ‘seeming to S that p’ is to identify it in the 
experience’s phenomenal character, i.e. the something-that-it-is-like to undergo the 
experience. Thirdly, ‘seemings’ (or ‘appearances’) are typically taken to be non-doxastic 
propositional attitudes. That is, my visual experience can make it seem to me, say, that the 
Müller-Lyer lines are of different lengths, despite my belief that they are the same length. 
Cashing out exactly what these non-doxastic propositional attitudes amount to is difficult, 
and is typically best illustrated by drawing a distinction between two different types of 
experience. Compare, for example, my having a visual experience of an orange on the desk 
with my believing that there is an orange on the desk. Intuitively, so the thought goes, there is 
a significant phenomenal difference between my having the visual experience and my having 
the belief.  
 
Different variants of PC diagnose this phenomenal difference in broadly similar ways. 
Huemer (2001), for example, describes visual experiences as instantiating the phenomenal 
property of ‘forcefulness’ (p. 77), insofar as in the visual experience of the orange, ‘it seems 
to one that something satisfying the content of the experience actually exists, here and now’ 





the orange – ‘makes it feel as though, by enjoying that episode, you can thereby just tell that 
that content obtains’ (p. 357). Tucker (2010), on a similar note, argues that these visual 
experiences bear the phenomenal quality of ‘assertiveness’ (p. 530), where this is to be 
understood as the experience, in some sense, delivering something of an assurance that the 
content of the experience is true. What all three of these claims have in common is that they 
all allude to the apparent fact that my visual experience truly seems to recommend to me that 
there is an orange in a way that my merely believing that there is an orange doesn’t appear to 
do; the former insists that I accept the content of my experience as true, whereas the latter 
doesn’t appear to do so in the same way. However these variants choose to characterise this 
distinctive phenomenal character, this seemingness, the essential commonality of these 
accounts is that they all take it to be what bestows visual experience with the power to 
immediately justify belief.  
 
Insofar as we’re interested in building an account of emotional justification on the basis of 
this view, we can extend PC over to emotional experience as follows:  
 
Emotional Dogmatism (ED): if S’s emotional experience makes it seem to her that e 
(where e signifies a proposition which attributes an evaluative property to an object or 
event), then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of 
justification for believing that e.  
 
On this view, just as my visual seeming experience of the blue mug can immediately and 
defeasibly justify my belief that there is a blue mug, my emotional seeming experience of 
awe towards a painting can immediately and defeasibly justify me in believing that the 
painting is awesome or beautiful. 
 
This view of emotional justification is attractive for a number of reasons. First, note that 
general PC views are praised in virtue of their ability to provide us with a simple and intuitive 
explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for our beliefs about the sensible 
world; we’re justified in believing what we do because of the way the world appears to us in 
our experience. Analogously, for emotional dogmatists, we’re justified in our evaluative 
beliefs about the world because of the way it appears to us in our emotional experience. 
Moreover, recall from Chapter 1 (§1.1) that an attractive feature of the general justificatory 





experience, it was able to dispel sceptical worries concerning our access to justified 
evaluative belief. On a similar note, PC is thought to provide us with an antidote to 
pernicious sceptical worries pertaining to the justificatory status of our everyday beliefs about 
the sensible world given that epistemic justification comes at a low price for PCs. All that’s 
required for epistemic justification is that our experiences bear the right sort of ‘seeming’ 
character. Insofar as ED is built on the foundations of PC, it seems as though it can provide 
an analogous remedy for sceptical worries pertaining to the justificatory status of our 
everyday evaluative beliefs, and thereby putatively strengthens the original attraction of the 
justificatory thesis of emotion.  
 
2.2.1. Objection: An Over-Generalisation Problem 
 
However, in spite of these advantages, there is an immediate worry with identifying an 
experience’s justificatory power in its bearing the character of ‘seeming to S that p’. Namely, 
the theory appears to be too liberal with respect to the types of experience it bestows with 
immediate justificatory power; it lacks the theoretical tools to exclude experiences which we 
would not consider to be capable of conferring immediate justification from enjoying its 
epistemic yield. A popular way of presenting this challenge is in terms of the following 
example from Markie (2005):  
 
Suppose that we are prospecting for gold. You have learned to identify a gold nugget 
on sight but I have no such knowledge. As the water washes out of my pan, we both 
look at a pebble, which is in fact a gold nugget. My desire to discover gold makes it 
seem to me as if the pebble is gold; your learned identification skills make it seem 
that way to you. According to [PC], the belief that it is gold has prima facie 
justification for both of us. (p. 356 – 357) 
 
Markie’s challenge constitutes a serious threat for PC. The possibility of rogue desires 
causing and manipulating the content of seemings, and thereby having an influence over 
which of our beliefs enjoy immediate justification, is worrisome for any theory which 
attributes such epistemic significance to seeming states. Indeed, consider an emotional case. 
To borrow an example from Brady (2013), suppose that I’m on the hiring committee for a 
new job, and upon interviewing a particular candidate, I find myself experiencing a negative 





the job (p. 87). It would be implausible to claim that this emotional experience alone is 
capable of immediately justifying my belief that the candidate is duplicitous on the basis of 
its bearing seeming phenomenal character. However, insofar as PC and ED only identify 
unqualified seemings as the relevant justification-conferring states, it appears as though the 
views do not have the resources to exclude cases like those above. It cannot be true that it is 
only in virtue of an experience bearing this ‘seeming’ character that it is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying the relevant beliefs, or else we would have to concede 
that Markie’s gold prospector’s wishfully-produced seeming that the pebble is gold is 
afforded the same justifying role as the skill-produced seeming of the mineral expert, or that 
the suspicious interviewer’s belief is justified on the basis of their rogue emotional seeming. 
Thus, these over-generalisation cases are problematic for theories that invest positive 
epistemic status in seeming states alone.  
 
The staunch defender of dogmatism may resist this conclusion, however. In response to cases 
like those above, it is always open to proponents of the view to bite the bullet and allow that, 
in virtue of their bearing the right kind of seeming character, experiences like these are, in 
fact, capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying belief. That is, defenders of PC and ED 
might be perfectly happy to concede that their theory generalises to experiences like that of 
Markie’s gold-prospector or the suspicious interviewer respectively, but deny that this is 
particularly problematic. It may be counterintuitive to those who are not naturally inclined to 
internalist views, but this isn’t a decisive objection insofar as the views can plausibly 
diagnose the intuitive oddness of these cases in other ways, e.g. by pointing to the fact that it 
is only defeasible and not ultima facie justification that is conferred by these experiences and 
that our intuitions are not sufficiently fine-grained to track the difference between the two, 
and to the fact that this justification is easily and often defeated, and so forth. Thus, PC and 
ED appear to have a relatively straightforward escape clause such that they can disarm 
worries concerning the apparent profligacy of the accounts. 
 
This form of bullet-biting strikes me as implausible for two related reasons. To illustrate, 
consider the following case. Imagine a weak-willed agent who finds themselves living within 
a community of racists, all of whom harbour xenophobic beliefs towards those from a 
different ethnic background to themselves. Out of a strong desire to fit in with this group, our 
weak-willed agent actively engages with these xenophobic beliefs. She listens to racist 





figures, and so forth. Over time, she comes to adopt these beliefs herself, such that she forms 
a network of biases towards particular ethnic groups. As such, upon encountering a person 
that belongs to such a group, she habitually and systematically has the seeming that this 
person is acting suspiciously.  
 
Here’s the first reason that bullet-biting is undesirable. It strikes me as plausible to suggest 
that these xenophobic seemings are attributable to the agent herself and, specifically, to her 
desire to integrate into her community. She created and is responsible for the formation of 
those seemings. Now, ED, in virtue of its commitment to the claim that it is defeasible and 
not ultima facie justification conferred by experience, has the resources to explain why the 
agent’s xenophobic seemings do not justify her in believing that the person from a particular 
ethnic group is acting suspiciously only if she has an awareness of her experience’s etiology. 
That is, the justification conferred by the xenophobic seeming is defeated by her awareness of 
the fact that the seeming is ultimately attributable to her and her desires.23 However, it also 
seems plausible that, as time passes and she successfully integrates into the community, she 
comes to forget the source of these xenophobic seemings, i.e. her desire to integrate into her 
community. Her racist beliefs become such an entrenched part of her cognitive architecture 
that she no longer questions them nor their origin. ED, then, appears to generate the strange 
result that the agent is not experientially justified in her belief that the person is suspicious at 
a time t1 where she is aware that her desire is the origin of the xenophobic experiential 
seemings, but she is justified on the basis of those seemings at a time t2 where she has 
forgotten that this is the case. This strikes me as counterintuitive. It is odd to suggest that 
forgetting something can enhance the positive epistemic status of a belief, especially when 
that belief is causally traceable and attributable to an agent’s epistemically dubious desire. 
Thus, ED, even with its defeat clause, seems to be getting the wrong result here.24  
 
 
23 Huemer (2013), in defence of a phenomenal conservative view, argues that an experience’s 
problematic etiology is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the relevant belief only 
when the subject has an awareness of that etiology.  
24 One might object that a case like this, i.e. a case in which an agent has no defeaters for the content 
of her xenophobic seemings, is unrealistic, given the many reasons that racist individuals typically 
have for doubting the accuracy of their xenophobic responses. In response, let me clarify that I don’t 
intend for this counterexample to be representative of many real life cases, nor does it need to be in 
order for it to be successful. All that needs to obtain in order for the point to go through is that it 
meets the conditions for ED, and, yet, it seems counterintuitive to bestow justificatory power to the 
xenophobic seemings. For what it’s worth, however, it’s not obvious to me that this case is 





Now, I take it that there are two ways in which the defender of ED might respond. First, the 
dogmatist may argue that, while there is something intuitively problematic about this case, 
it’s not obvious that the problem pertains to the presence of epistemic justification. That is, 
one might contend that what our intuitions are actually tracking in this case is the agent’s 
moral blameworthiness, or zetetic failings pertaining to her process of poor epistemic inquiry. 
If these failings are the source of our intuition that there is something amiss with this case, 
then the emotional dogmatist is let off the hook insofar as there’s not actually anything 
problematic about bestowing her emotional seemings with justificatory power at t2. 
 
I take it that the best strategy for establishing that there is an epistemic failing here (and, 
specifically, one pertinent to the presence of epistemic justification) is to consider an 
analogous case in which there are no obvious moral or zetetic failings which plausibly hijack 
the intuition that there’s something amiss with bestowing justificatory power to the emotional 
seemings. If we neutralise these non-justificatory failings and there’s still something 
problematic about the epistemic result, then we have good reason to believe that this case 
does constitute an over-generalisation worry for ED. On that note, consider the following: 
 
Wishful Affection: Suppose that, through a powerful desire to be liked by everybody, 
I come to believe that a person has strong affection for me whenever they remember 
my name. Consequently, I habitually experience the emotional seeming of joy 
whenever anybody refers to me by name; it emotionally seems to me that this referral 
is a very good thing for me. At a time t1, when I am aware of these seemings’ causal 
origin in my wishful thinking, they don’t justify my evaluative belief that this event is 
good for me. At a later time t2, when I have forgotten the etiology of these seemings, 
they do justify my evaluative belief.   
 
Now, this Wishful Affection case shares the same general structure as the original over-
generalisation case for ED. Plausibly, however, there’s no obvious moral failing in this case. 
Moreover, it strikes me as unlikely that the issue at play is a zetetic worry pertaining to my 
poor process of epistemic inquiry given that I’m plausibly not conducting an inquiry when I 
have the emotional seeming of joy after somebody refers to me by name. According to 
Friedman (2019), a necessary condition for a subject to count as an inquirer, and to thereby 
have their process of inquiry subject to zetetic norms of assessment, is that they possess an 





contemplative as to what the answer is. In this case, it’s not obvious that I have the goal-
directed activity of pursuing an answer to the question as to what any given individual’s 
attitude is towards me; I just have the psychologically immediate experience of joy whenever 
a person refers to me by name, given my beliefs about what that referral means and my 
powerful desire to be liked. So, if a subject isn’t morally or zetetically blameworthy in a case 
like this, but there still seems to be something counterintuive about allowing their evaluative 
belief to be justified by their emotional seemings, then this seems best explained in terms of 
the subject’s specific epistemic failing, such that bestowing their emotional seemings with 
justificatory power constitutes an over-generalisation problem for ED.  
 
A second argument that the dogmatist might make in response to the over-generalisation case 
specifically concerns the worry that, for ED, forgetting key defeating evidence can improve 
the epistemic status of one’s evaluative belief. To dispel this counterintuitive result, the 
dogmatist might appropriate argumentative resources from discussions of forgotten evidence 
and defeat in the epistemology of memory literature. One particularly relevant discussion 
concerns Huemer’s (1999) proposal of the following diachronic view of phenomenal 
conservatism:  
 
A belief is justified full stop if and only if one had an adequate justification for 
adopting it at some point, and thenceforward one was justified in retaining it. (p. 351).  
 
This view is proposed partially in response to cases of forgotten defeat that are typically 
levelled against synchronic views of internalist justification. In these cases, a subject forms a 
belief that p via epistemically irrational means, such as wishful thinking. At a time t1, when 
the subject is aware of this, her belief that p is unjustified. However, as time passes, the 
subject forgets the means through which she arrived at p, and retains p in memory at t2. The 
worry is that many synchronic views will deliver the result that p is justified at t2 given that, 
at this time, the subject’s defeater for p is lost to memory. Huemer’s diachronic phenomenal 
conservatism attempts to avoid this result by claiming that a belief is overall justified if and 
only if the subject was once justified in adopting that belief, i.e., the subject’s past mental 
states matter for the present justificatory status of one’s belief. Given that, in the forgotten 
defeat case, the subject was never justified in adopting p because of its formation via 
irrational means, Huemer’s view avoids the counterintuitive result. Returning to the case at 





view like Huemer’s, perhaps one can argue that the xenophobic subject is not justified in her 
evaluative belief that the person is acting suspiciously at t2 because the evaluative belief was 
not justified at t1, given her then-awareness of her emotional seemings’ etiology.  
  
Here’s the problem with this response. Even if diachronic views of this sort turn out to be 
plausible,25 reasoning drawn from these discussions in the epistemology of memory cannot 
get a foothold on this over-generalisation case for ED given that, here, nothing is being 
retained in memory. Recall that, in the forgotten defeat cases pertinent to diachronic views 
like Huemer’s, the subject forgets the defeating evidence but retains the belief that p via 
memory. The problem is that, in ED’s over-generalisation case, the subject does not 
memorially retain the same belief that the person is acting suspiciously from t1 to t2. Rather, 
at t2, the subject has another emotional seeming experience which causes the belief which, 
crucially, is distinct from the belief formed at t1. Because memory is playing no role here, 
plugging in a view like Huemer’s will not be sufficient to dispel the counterintuive result 
delivered by ED, nor can it absolve the dogmatist of the over-generalisation charge.  
 
Thus far, then, we have a forgotten-defeater-based reason as to why bullet-biting in response 
to over-generalisation challenges is problematic. A second reason as to why such bullet-
biting is worrisome pertains to the relationship between justified belief and rational action. 
One plausible principle prevalent in contemporary epistemology is that rational action is 
governed by some sort of epistemic norm.26 That is, the question of whether an agent acts 
rationally is in some sense dependent on the quality of their epistemic position at the time of 
action. Suppose, for instance, that I have an important flight scheduled for 3pm and I spend 
the entirety of my morning lazing around, unconcerned by the approaching departure time. 
Bewildered by my nonchalance, my partner confronts me at 1pm and asks why I’m not 
already on my way to Edinburgh airport. I explain that it’ll only take thirty minutes to drive 
to the airport, and a further fifteen to make my way through security, but they’re 
unconvinced. “You don’t know that it’ll only take thirty minutes,” they might tell me. 
Plausibly, they might stress that I can’t know, nor am I justified in believing, that there won’t 
be heavy traffic, or road diversions, or painfully slow queues at security. In this case, 
 
25 However, see Moon (2012a) and Smithies (2019) for arguments against diachronic moves of this 
type.  
26 Although, see Simion (2018) for the view that it is not an epistemic norm that governs action in 





intuition seems to suggest that I shouldn’t be lazing around instead of making my way to 
Edinburgh because my epistemic base for doing so does not meet a sufficient standard.  
 
While many endorse some instantiation of this unspecified principle, epistemologists disagree 
on what this norm actually is. Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) have suggested a knowledge 
norm of rational action, according to which you can “treat the proposition that p as a reason 
for acting only if you know that p”(p. 577). On this view, I can treat the proposition ‘it’ll take 
thirty minutes to drive to the airport and fifteen to get through security’ as a reason for 
continuing to laze around only if I know that this is the case. Since I cannot know that this is 
the case, I cannot rationally use this proposition as a reason for my action. Alternatively, 
some have elected to endorse a weaker epistemic standard, focusing on a norm of justified 
belief for rational action and practical reasoning, rather than knowledge.27  
 
Now, for our purposes, all that matters is that there plausibly is some epistemic norm (or a 
non-epistemic norm with epistemic content) that governs rational action, and that the 
presence of epistemic justification matters for that norm to obtain. Returning to the 
xenophobe case, then, here’s the second reason that bullet-biting in response to over-
generalisation cases is problematic. ED, insofar as it attributes justified belief to the weak-
willed agent (when she lacks an awareness of the etiology of her experience), risks 
rationalising her actions on the basis of her xenophobic emotional seemings.28 That is, 
assuming there is some sort of epistemic norm which governs action, and assuming that 
justified belief is at least necessary for this norm to obtain, ED does not only epistemically 
license harmful belief but also potentially harmful action. If the epistemic norm is justified 
belief, then ED straightforwardly puts the agent in a sufficient epistemic position to deploy 
the propositional content of her xenophobic experiential seemings in her practical reasoning. 
If the norm is knowledge, then although ED doesn’t stretch quite so far as to make it 
permissible for her to act, it still substantively contributes to her being in a sufficient 
epistemic position for action insofar as justified belief is putatively necessary for knowledge 
and thereby for the epistemic norm to obtain. The ease with which ED can rationally license 
(or at least contribute towards licensing) harmful action on such thin epistemic grounds 
strikes me as a serious mark against the view. Thus, insofar as biting the bullet and conceding 
 
27 See Littlejohn (2012) and Fantl and McGrath (2002) for different versions of this view.  





that ED easily generates justification to cases like the xenophobic seemings opens the door to 
normatively licensing vicious action (via epistemically licensing harmful belief), I take it to 
be a worrisome response.   
 
Now, again, there are a couple of ways in which the dogmatist might respond to this 
argument. The first and most straightforward of which is to deny that there is any sort 
epistemic norm which governs rational action. If a belief’s being justified in no way 
influences whether it is rational to act on the basis of that belief, then there is no licensing 
problem for ED. This strikes me as a difficult argument to make. The dialectical weight in 
contemporary epistemology certainly seems to be in favour of the existence of such a norm, 
and, consequently, the defender of ED would have to both reject a commonly held view and 
explain away that intuition that some sort of epistemic warrant is required for rational action. 
While not an impossible task, it carries a significant theoretical cost.  
 
A second means of responding to the objection may come from the dogmatist arguing that 
even if bestowing justification to a belief in some way positions that agent to rationally act on 
the basis of that belief, ED bestows only a small degree of justification. Recall from our 
initial formulisation of PC that an experience’s bearing the right sort of seeming character 
confers to the subject “at least some degree of justification for believing that p.” Using this as 
our basis for ED, then, one might argue that the epistemic justification conferred by 
experiential (and, specifically, emotional) seemings to belief is so thin such that it provides 
only marginal rational support for acting. ED, therefore, does not substantively license 
harmful action, but rather certain actions enjoy only minimal rational support as a by-product 
of the view.  
 
This also strikes me as an undesirable move. One reason for this is that in order for ED’s 
rationalisation of harmful action to be intuitively non-problematic, the justification conferred 
by emotional seemings must be so minimal such that it raises the question of why it’s 
worthwhile having in the first place. Presumably, one important desideratum for a plausible 
account of justification is that it delivers a robust enough notion of epistemic justification to 
belief such that we can then secure further epistemic goods, such as knowledge and 
understanding. Indeed, recall from Chapter 1 (§1.1) that one of the central motivations for 
endorsing the justificatory thesis of emotion is that it may constitute a naturalised account as 





understanding, i.e. via the justification of our evaluative beliefs by emotional experience. If it 
is the case that ED can promise only a weak degree of justification, then it looks like a 
dogmatist approach to emotional justification will fail to satisfy this desideratum. 
 
In summary, then, if identifying only unqualified emotional seemings as epistemic justifiers 
results in an overly permissive account of justification, and if endorsing such an account 
results in both counterintuitive and unsavoury implications, as I’ve argued here, then ED in 
its current form is not a plausible account of emotional justification. Emotional dogmatists 
must look elsewhere for a plausible epistemic framework for their view.  
 
2.3 A Restricted Emotional Dogmatism 
 
Now, returning our attention to PC, a fairly straightforward move for the defender of the view 
to make in response to cases like Markie’s is to impose restrictions on the kinds of 
experiences that can immediately justify belief; to draw up a phenomenal conservative view 
which attempts to be more theoretically austere and precise so as to exclude the kinds of 
cases mentioned above. One example of a view particularly salient in the literature is that of 
Chudnoff’s. Chudnoff, while taking it to be the case that certain experiences possess an 
epistemically significant phenomenal character, pushes the need for a more refined 
theoretical definition of this phenomenal character in order for us to properly investigate its 
epistemic implications. Chudnoff thus proposes that this phenomenal character is better 
understood in terms of what he calls presentational phenomenology:  
 
Presentational Phenomenology: What it is for an experience of yours to have 
presentational phenomenology with respect to p is for it to both make it seem to you 
that p and make it seem to you as if this experience makes you aware of a truth-maker 
for p. (Chudnoff 2013, p. 37) 
 
Here, Chudnoff sets out two conditions which must be met in order for an experience to have 
presentational phenomenology. The first condition Chudnoff specifies is plausibly 
understood as picking out the same phenomenal property gestured towards by Tucker and the 
other various PC accounts detailed in the previous section.29 That is, an experience 
 





possessing the property of making it seem to you that p is the same as an experience 
possessing the property of asserting or insisting to you that p obtains. The more interesting 
component of Chudnoff’s analysis, then, is the truth-maker condition. On Chudnoff’s view, 
it’s not sufficient for my visual experience to make it seem to me, say, that there is a wasp on 
my sleeve in order for that experience to have presentational phenomenology with respect to 
that proposition, rather it must also be the case that my experience makes it seem to me as if I 
am visually aware of an item in my environment that corroborates that proposition, i.e. the 
wasp perched on the sleeve of my jumper. There are a couple of important things to note 
here.  
 
First, Chudnoff identifies three central aspects of awareness in order to illuminate what 
exactly seeming-awareness of a truth-maker consists in. Suppose, for example, that I am 
aware of a small house spider on the wall. According to Chudnoff, it is a necessary condition 
that, in order for me to be aware of the spider, the spider at least partly ‘contributes towards 
determining the phenomenal character of [my] experience’ (Chudnoff 2018, p. 288). That is, 
the spider itself at least partly causally influences the something-that-it-is-like for me to 
undergo the visual experience of the spider. Moreover, it is a further condition of my having 
awareness of the spider that the phenomenology of my visual experience discriminates the 
spider from the range of background objects; I would not be aware of the spider if the 
phenomenology of my visual experience could not discriminate the spider from the other 
items in my visual field (if the spider was camouflaged amongst black polka-dot wallpaper, 
for instance). A final condition for my being aware of the spider is that I am able to ‘entertain 
simple demonstrative thoughts’ (p. 288) about the spider. Simply put, awareness of an object 
facilitates the ability to form thoughts which directly pick out the object itself, as opposed to 
picking out the object under certain descriptions or conceptualisations. While these are 
conditions imposed on general instances of awareness, they can be transposed to instances of 
seeming awareness insofar as all that is required for an instance of seeming awareness is that 
my experience seems to me as though it meets these conditions. 
 
Second, note that presentational phenomenology is relativised. That is, it is not the case that 
certain experiences possess presentational phenomenology as a global phenomenal property 
consistent across all intentional contents, but rather that certain experiences possess 
presentational phenomenology localised to particular propositions. Suppose that you kindly 





the visual experience of a cup. I can see the shape, colour, and approximate volume of the 
cup, though I cannot see its contents. It is only on the basis of your testimony that I believe 
that the cup is filled with coffee. On Chudnoff’s view, my visual experience has 
presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition ‘there is a cup on the table’ 
(i.e. my experience both makes it seem to me that there is a cup on the table and makes it 
seem as if I am aware of a truth-maker for this proposition), but it does not have 
presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition ‘there is coffee in the cup’. 
This is because the contents of the cup are occluded from my vision; my visual experience 
thereby does not make it seem as if I am aware of a truth-maker for this proposition.  
 
Chudnoff’s phenomenological view then motivates a corresponding epistemological thesis, 
according to which it is only when an experience possesses presentational phenomenology 
with respect to p that it is capable of lending immediate and defeasible justification to the 
belief that p. This epistemological thesis will be referred to here as presentationalism: 
 
Presentationalism: if an experience [immediately] justifies you in believing that p… it 
does so in virtue of instantiating the property of having presentational phenomenology 
with respect to p. (Chudnoff 2012, p. 65) 
 
On Chudnoff’s view, it is only when my visual experience has presentational phenomenology 
with respect to, say, the proposition ‘there is an orange on the table’ that my experience can 
immediately and defeasibly justify my belief that there is an orange on the table. 
Presentationalism, then, can be understood as a version of PC restricted to experiences which 
instantiate the property of having presentational phenomenology.  
 
There are many reasons to endorse this particular restricted phenomenal conservative 
account. One of the central motivations for accepting the view is that the notion of 
presentational phenomenology chimes well with various informal and metaphorical 
characterisations of the epistemically significant phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience offered by phenomenal conservatives in the literature, while providing a 
putatively more rigorous and theoretically robust diagnosis of this character.30 For instance, 
 
30 Interestingly, appeal to a phenomenological view similar to presentationalism can also be found in 
the epistemology of memory. Namely, Hoerl (2001) distinguishes between propositional and episodic 





Chudnoff’s truth-maker condition appears to map onto suggestions such as O’Shaughnessy’s 
(2003) claim that ‘whenever a person perceives‐that p, he both believes that p and perceives 
something which is relevant to p's truth‐value’ (p. 319) or Tollhurst’s (1998) claim that 
seemings are experienced as ‘being revelatory of real features of the world’ (p. 299). The 
focus here on perceiving an object or feature in the world pertinent to the truth value of the 
relevant proposition seems at least suggestive of something close to Chudnoff’s 
characterisation of the truth-maker condition. Moreover, we can note that the presence of this 
condition determines that Chudnoff’s account is better able to explain away over-
generalisation cases. In Markie’s gold prospector case, for example, Chudnoff can explain 
why my mere desiring that the pebble is gold is not sufficient for my experience to justify me 
in believing that the pebble is gold, i.e. my experience does not make it seem as if I am aware 
of a truth-maker for the proposition ‘the pebble is gold’ in light of the fact that my visual 
experience cannot make me aware of a truth-maker for the pebble’s chemical composition.  
 
Now, in light of this development, let’s return to the emotions. We can transpose the 
theoretical machinery of presentational phenomenology over to the case of emotional 
experience in order to construct the following restricted account of emotional dogmatism:  
 
Restricted Emotional Dogmatism (RED): S’s emotional experience is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if the 
experience (i) makes it seem to her that e, and (ii) makes it seem as if she is 
emotionally aware of a truth-maker for e.31 
 
On this view, it is not sufficient for my experience of awe to make it seem to me as though 
the painting is beautiful in order for it to have immediate justificatory power with respect to 
the relevant evaluative belief. Rather, my awe must also make it seem as if I am emotionally 
aware of a truth-maker with respect to the proposition ‘the painting is beautiful’.  
 
 
mind in such a way that it solves at the same time for what happened and for what puts her in a 
position to know what happened, namely that she was around to witness the event in question” (p. 
332). Crucially, for Hoerl, this ability involved in the exercise of episodic memory is facilitated by a 
specific kind of phenomenological awareness. The emphasis on a memorial phenomenological 
awareness of the world as it was seems suggestive of something close to Chudnoff’s truth-maker 
condition on presentationalism. Thanks to Fabrice Teroni for pointing my attention to this similarity.  
31 Cowan (2016) briefly discusses this view, characterising it instead as the emotions possessing 





One particularly interesting thing to note here is that RED’s inclusion of the truth-maker 
condition fits nicely with the comments provided by Goldie, Tappolet, and Johnston in §2.1. 
Recall that in their respective descriptions of the epistemic power of emotions, Goldie 
described emotional feelings as being capable of “revealing things about the world”, while 
Tappolet suggested that emotional experiences “allow us to be aware of certain features of 
the world”. Again, the suggestion here that emotional experiences provide us with some sort 
of unique awareness about things out there in the world seems to closely match RED’s 
requirement of emotional experiences making it seem as if we’re aware of truth-makers for 
evaluative propositions, i.e. things out there that make evaluative propositions true. Indeed, 
regarding Johnston and his account of “affective disclosure”, he explicitly uses the language 
of truth-makers insofar as he claims that “affect discloses evaluative truth-makers” (2001, p. 
206), and that this (at least partially) explains what he terms the “epistemic authority” (p. 
205) of affective experiences. In light of how well the comments of these notable authors fit 
with RED, I take the view to enjoy significant support from contemporary philosophers of 
emotion as well as from philosophers of perception and experiential justification.  
 
To sum up, by including the truth-maker requirement, RED chimes well with views about the 
epistemic import of emotional phenomenology in the surrounding literature, inherits the 
general advantages of the basic ED account and receives support from a putatively more 
theoretically robust epistemological framework which avoids the pitfalls of PC. It is for these 
reasons that I will take RED as the most promising version of the emotional dogmatist 
view.32 The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with defending RED against an 
objection commonly levelled against it in the literature.  
 
2.4 Objection: Evaluative Properties and Emotional Awareness 
 
To reiterate, in order for my experience of awe to immediately and defeasibly justify my 
belief that a particular painting is beautiful, the experience must make it seem as if I am 
aware of a truth-maker for this proposition (in addition to making it seem to me that the 
painting is beautiful). Very plausibly, the truth-maker for this proposition is the evaluative 
 
32 I will, however, consider alternative instantiations of a restricted emotional dogmatist view in 





property of ‘beauty’ putatively instantiated by the painting.33 In light of this, one common 
challenge levelled against emotional dogmatist views of this sort is that evaluative properties 
are not suitable objects of emotional awareness. If this is the case, then emotional experience 
cannot make it seem as if we are emotionally aware of truth-makers for evaluative 
propositions and, consequently, cannot bear immediate justificatory power according to RED.  
 
Let us begin elucidating this objection by considering emotional seeming awareness. Recall 
that, in Chudnoff’s elucidation of presentational phenomenology (which constitutes the 
epistemological groundwork for RED), three conditions are specified for an agent’s seeming 
awareness of an object. That is, S has seeming awareness of an object q if and only if it seems 
to S that: (i) q at least partly contributes to determining the overall phenomenal character of 
S’s experience, (ii) S’s experience differentiates q from the range of background objects, and 
(iii) S’s experience enables S to form demonstrative thoughts about q.  
 
Now, my visual experience of the painting plausibly meets the conditions imposed on 
instances of seeming awareness, i.e. the visual experience seems to differentiate the painting 
from background objects, it seems to enable me to entertain demonstrative thoughts about the 
painting, etc. It is therefore plausibly correct to say that my visual experience has 
presentational phenomenology, and is thereby capable of justifying my belief that there is a 
painting. But recall that presentational phenomenology is localised to particular propositions. 
That is, importantly, the fact that my visual experience has presentational phenomenology 
with respect to the proposition ‘there is a painting’ does not mean that it has presentational 
phenomenology with respect to the proposition ‘the painting is beautiful’. In order for my 
emotional experience to have presentational phenomenology with respect to this proposition, 
and thereby be capable of possessing the justificatory power we’re interested in here, it must 
make it seem as if I’m aware of a truth-maker for the evaluative proposition, i.e. the 
evaluative property of ‘beauty’ instantiated by the painting. Thus, my experience of awe must 
make it seem to me that: (i) the property ‘beauty’ at least partly contributes to the 
determining the overall phenomenal character of my awe, (ii) my awe differentiates the 
 
33 Brogaard and Chudnoff (2016) appear to assume that truth-makers for evaluative propositions are 
the evaluative properties putatively instantiated by the object or state of affairs in question. For the 
purposes of this chapter, this is an assumption that I will follow. However, as we’ll see in Chapter 3 





beauty from the range of background objects, and (iii) my awe enables me to form 
demonstrative thoughts about the beauty of the painting.  
 
How might my experience be capable of doing this? One way to understand it is analogous to 
the way in which visual experience introduces colour properties as objects of visual 
awareness.34 Many have been tempted to draw a likeness between colour properties and 
evaluative properties on the basis of their both being plausibly identified as response-
dependent properties. That is, just as the property of ‘redness’ cannot be understood without 
reference to the perceptual experience of observers, the property of ‘beauty’ cannot be 
understood without reference to the emotional experience of observers. In light of this 
similarity, then, it has been suggested that, just as visual experience can make us aware of 
colour properties, emotional experience can make us aware of evaluative properties.  
 
The problem with this suggestion, and, indeed, the heart of the objection, is that it rests on an 
implausible account of what evaluative properties consist in. Colour properties are typically 
identified as dispositional properties, i.e. properties defined in terms of their being disposed 
to elicit certain responses in certain observers. ‘Redness’, for example, is typically defined as 
a property which is disposed to elicit visual experiences of redness among certain observers 
(i.e. observers in the absence of a malfunctioning sensory apparatus or bad lighting, for 
example). Evaluative properties, however, are not typically taken to be plausibly analogous to 
colour properties insofar as they are not plausibly understood as mere causal or dispositional 
properties of this sort. That is, an object’s being ‘beautiful’, say, is not plausibly understood 
as its being disposed to elicit responses of awe in certain observers in virtue of this view’s 
failing to account for the normative aspect of value. Rather, it is thought that an object’s 
instantiating the evaluative property of ‘being beautiful’ or ‘being amusing’ merits or makes 
fitting particular attitudes in response to the object, namely, awe and amusement respectively. 
Many take it to be implausible that the question of what is valuable can be distilled down to a 
brute psychological question concerning the attitudes that an object typically elicits in 
observers.  
 
This difference between colour and evaluative properties leads us to the crux of the objection: 
evaluative properties, in virtue of their bearing this normative dimension, are not capable of 
 





being the objects of emotional awareness. My emotional experience of awe cannot make me 
aware (or even seem to make me aware) of the painting meriting responses of awe in virtue 
of the putative fact that whether an object merits or makes fitting a particular response is not 
something that I can be aware of via emotional feelings or phenomenology. This is the 
central objection facing RED in the literature. Brogaard and Chudnoff (2016) summarise the 
challenge as follows: 
 
Suppose you fear a seen snake... You experience the snake. And you represent the 
snake as responsible for the bodily and mental turmoil. So far it seems you are just 
aware of truth-makers for propositions such as that there is a snake with a certain look 
moving a certain way, that you feel such and such unpleasant sensations and have 
such and such alarming thoughts. Are you also aware of an evaluative property of the 
snake, say fearsomeness or threateningness? Perhaps you attribute this property as 
part of the intentional content of your emotional response. But it is implausible that it 
is an object of awareness. The reason is that the property consists in the snake 
meriting and not just causing a certain range of bodily and mental changes in you. 
Whether the snake does merit those changes is not something that lies on the surface 
to be taken in by experience. (p. 70) 
 
Here, Brogaard and Chudnoff identify this normative dimension of evaluative properties as 
the feature which bars them from being suitable objects of awareness. This idea is a familiar 
one in the philosophy of emotion. On a very similar note to Brogaard and Chudnoff, Dokic 
and Lemaire (2013) argue that it is “wildly implausible” (p. 236) to claim that emotional 
experience is capable of reflexively presenting itself (and its content) as fitting or unfitting. 
Relatedly, Deonna and Teroni (2012a) also assert that “When we undergo emotions, we seem 
to be entirely directed ‘outwards’ to the world and its properties, and in no way ‘inwards’ to 
responses that would be appropriate in the circumstances” (p. 101). 
 
Summarising the discussion above, then, we can formulate the objector’s argument as 
follows:  
 
(1) We cannot be (seemingly) aware of normative properties via emotional feelings. 





(3) Therefore, we cannot be (seemingly) aware of evaluative properties via emotional 
feelings. 
(4) Evaluative properties are truth-makers for evaluative propositions.  
(5) As (3), we cannot be (seemingly) aware of evaluative properties via emotional 
feelings.  
(6) Therefore, we cannot be (seemingly) aware of truth-makers for evaluative 
propositions via emotional feelings.  
(7) If we cannot be (seemingly) aware of truth-makers for evaluative propositions via 
emotional feelings, then emotions cannot immediately and defeasibly justify 
evaluative beliefs.  
(8) Therefore, emotions cannot immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative beliefs.   
 
Thus, the defender of RED faces a serious problem. In order for emotional experience to 
immediately and defeasibly justify one’s evaluative belief, it must have presentational 
phenomenology with respect to the relevant evaluative proposition. Consequently, it must 
make it seem as if one is aware of a truth-maker for the evaluative proposition. However, 
insofar as the truth-makers for evaluative propositions are plausibly taken to be the evaluative 
properties instantiated by the relevant object or event, emotional experience cannot make it 
seem as if we are aware of these truth-makers in virtue of the fact that evaluative properties 
essentially involve a normative aspect. Therefore, in virtue of the nature of evaluative 
properties, and the corresponding limits of emotional awareness, RED fails.  
 
In responding to this objection, and for the sake of argument, let us assume that evaluative 
properties are normative in the way assumed by the objector, i.e. that evaluative properties 
cannot be assimilated to mere dispositional or causal properties. The question now becomes 
whether defenders of RED have a plausible story to tell with respect to these evaluative 
properties being capable of being the objects of emotional awareness. I propose that they do. 
Or, more specifically, I propose that the objection paints too simplistic a picture with respect 
to awareness of evaluative properties. There are two crucial assumptions within the objector’s 
argument: (i) evaluative properties cannot be direct objects of emotional awareness, and (ii) 
evaluative properties must be direct objects of emotional awareness in order for us to be 
emotionally aware of truth-makers for evaluative propositions. By evaluative properties being 
‘direct’ objects of awareness, I mean the idea that evaluative properties can figure into 





As such, I take there to be two options open to the defender of RED. Firstly, corresponding to 
(i), they can argue that evaluative properties can be direct objects of awareness. Secondly, 
corresponding to (ii), they can argue that even if evaluative properties cannot be direct objects 
of awareness, they can be indirect objects of awareness, such that RED still has a story to tell 
with respect to us being aware of truth-makers for evaluative propositions. Here, I will 
elucidate each of these options in turn.  
 
2.4.1. Evaluative Properties as Direct Objects of Awareness 
 
Now, as stated above, Brogaard and Chudnoff and Dokic and Lemaire take it to be 
straightforwardly true that emotions cannot make us aware of evaluative properties as 
properties which make fitting certain emotional responses. My fear of the snake cannot make 
me aware of the snake meriting or making appropriate emotional responses of fear, nor can it 
reflexively present itself as appropriate.35 Indeed, recall that Dokic and Lemaire go as far as 
to describe the latter claim as “wildly implausible”. However, it’s not clear that this is true. 
That is, it’s not obvious that emotional experience can never contain self-referential content 
pertaining to its own epistemic appropriateness. If it is the case that emotional experience is 
capable of containing such content, then evaluative properties can be direct objects of 
emotional awareness, and emotional experience can make it seem as if we are aware of truth-
makers for evaluative propositions.  
 
For ease of explanation, call the kind of emotional content that we’re interested in self-
referential epistemic content. We can locate support for the claim that emotional experience 
is capable of bearing such content from a range of sources. Take the metaethical literature, 
for example. As an early advocate for a version of the fitting attitude analysis of value, 
Brentano (1969) argues that our moral knowledge of what is good is ultimately derived from 
our having particular emotional experiences. That is, the good is that which we experience 
pro-attitudes towards which are experienced as being correct. These positive emotional 
attitudes are elucidated as follows: 
 
When we ourselves experience such a love we notice not only that its object is loved 
and capable of being loved, and that its privation or contrary hated and capable of 
 





being hated, but also that the one is worthy of love and the other worthy of hate, and 
therefore that the one is good and the other bad. (p. 22, italics added) 
 
Importantly, Brentano takes this normative element to be present in the experiential content 
of the emotion. That is, being aware of the emotional experience as correct and warranted by 
the object is a part of the emotional experience’s phenomenological character. Alternatively, 
as a more contemporary example, Todd (2014) paints a picture of emotional phenomenology 
which builds in something like seeming awareness of fittingness conditions:  
 
The claim I wish to defend is that although emotions do not have objective fittingness 
conditions, it can appear to us that they do, where this appearance of objectivity is 
subject to degree and best thought of in terms of a spectrum, ranging from the least 
objective-seeming to most objective-seeming responses. (p. 99, italics added) 
 
Although Todd isn’t explicitly clear about how we can be seemingly aware of these 
fittingness conditions in the experience of the emotion, it is clear that he takes it to be the 
phenomenological character of the experience that bears at least a substantial part of the 
fittingness content insofar as he takes it to be the case that “the relative fittingness of 
emotions will be more or less reflected in emotional phenomenology” (p. 102). From these 
examples, then, we can see that there is some support for the idea that the phenomenological 
character of emotional experience can bring awareness of its own epistemic fittingness.36 In 
order to appease the objector, however, we need a clear account as to how emotional 
experiences can make us (seemingly) aware of themselves as epistemically merited with 
respect to their object. That is, we owe the objector as explanation as to how emotional 
experience can bear this normative dimension in its phenomenology, and why we have good 
reason to suppose that this is true.  
 
One of the few specific accounts on the market as to how we can spell out this self-referential 
epistemic content can be found in Mitchell’s work. Mitchell (2017) argues that emotions, in 
virtue of being valenced in a specific way, contain an awareness as to the “epistemic 
 
36 There are alternative accounts which I take to plausibly bestow (albeit implicit) support to this idea. 





appropriateness” (p.77) of the emotional response to object or event in question. Let me first 
summarise Mitchell’s view before clarifying it and defending it against objections.  
 
Mitchell begins this line of thought with the claim that emotions possess what he terms 
“valence opacity” (p. 72). That is, emotional experience, unlike sense perceptual experience, 
is not phenomenally transparent insofar the phenomenal content of the experience is not 
exhausted by the object of the experience. When I reflect on my fear of the snake, I do not 
just reflect on the snake, but also on the emotional experience itself, or, more specifically, the 
affective component of the experience. My visual experience of a book, on the other hand, is 
phenomenally transparent. To put it in terms of a common metaphor, my visual perception 
constitutes a clear lens through which I ‘see’ the object or event in question. My visual 
experience itself brings no phenomenal features to the experience and I cannot attend to the 
visual experience itself. Emotions, however, constitute a lens tainted by valenced feelings of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness, approval or disapproval, favour or disfavour, etc.  
 
From this claim, Mitchell then argues that these valenced attitudes that constitute an essential 
part of the emotion are typically felt as appropriate in response to the features of the object 
of the emotional experience. That is, I do not just experience my fear of the snake as 
involving felt disapproval towards the snake and its features, but I experience this felt 
disapproval as epistemically appropriate to or merited by the features of the snake, such as its 
venom, sharp fangs, etc. Mitchell elucidates this idea, and the central motivation for 
endorsing it, as follows:  
 
So, the claim is that awareness of the epistemic appropriateness of one's felt valenced 
attitude, to what are experienced as content‐external evaluative properties of the 
emotion's object [i.e. evaluative properties experienced as being possessed by the 
object independently of my having the particular emotional experience] is essential to 
those emotional experiences which are intrinsically rationally intelligible to us. 
Without experiencing the relevant value property, say danger, and in virtue of this 
experiencing one's felt disapproval as epistemically appropriate – as a merited uptake 
or registering of that value property – that fear would not be immediately rationally 






For Mitchell, then, emotional experience must contain an awareness of itself (or, more 
specifically, the felt valenced attitudes contained within the emotion) as epistemically 
appropriate with respect to the object of the emotion, otherwise we would be unable to make 
sense of our emotional experiences as immediately as we do. The claim, then, is that feelings 
of (dis)approval experienced as epistemically appropriate to the emotional object are 
necessary for the emotional experience to be immediately rationally intelligible to the 
observer. Moreover, given that many, if not most, of our emotional experiences are rationally 
intelligible to us, this seems to suggest that these valenced attitudes with self-referential 
content pertaining to the epistemic appropriateness of the emotion are fairly commonplace.  
 
So, with this initial summary in place, why endorse Mitchell’s valence-based account of self-
referential epistemic content? Recall from earlier that the basic phenomenological thesis that 
emotional experience is capable of phenomenologically self-referring to its own epistemic 
appropriateness is not obviously a fringe view. We saw that Brentano and Todd made claims 
which support this thesis. Importantly, I take it we can also identify threads of support for the 
more specific idea that the emotions’ opacity (compared to the transparency of sense 
perceptual experience) is at least indicative of their capacity for self-referential epistemic 
content from other authors. Cowan (2016), for example, makes a similar point, suggesting the 
following:  
 
My suggestion is that the emotions’ opacity may be thought to fit well with the 
suggestion that emotions possess NS content [i.e. self-referential content pertaining to 
their epistemic fittingness or appropriateness to the object of the emotion], i.e., if 
some emotions have NS content then it wouldn’t be surprising that subjects refer, at 
least partly, to the emotion itself. (p. 25 – 26) 
 
While Cowan doesn’t make the stronger and more specific claim that Mitchell does, i.e. that 
the emotions’ valenced opacity constitutes their self-referential epistemic content, it’s clear 
that this suggestion maps onto the general idea behind Mitchell’s phenomenological thesis. 
Moreover, as Mitchell notes, Poellner (2016) argues that emotions, insofar as they involve 
felt disapproval or approval to their objects, are experienced as “intelligibly motivated by the 
features of the object itself” (p. 266), which seems very close to what Mitchell has in mind. 
Thus, I take it that the fact that others have proposed views which share very similar 





phenomenological thesis, to be good evidence to believe that the objector in §2.4 moves too 
quickly insofar as they reject offhand the idea that there is any space in an emotional 
experience for self-referential content.  
 
So, thus far, Mitchell’s account looks like a potential candidate for a feasible answer to our 
objector. If we have good grounds for supposing that Mitchell’s thesis is plausible, then we 
have good grounds for supposing that emotional experience is capable of possessing self-
referential epistemic content, such that emotional experience can directly make us aware of 
evaluative properties, and thereby make it seem as if we’re aware of truth-makers for 
evaluative propositions. Mitchell’s view has a lot of moving parts, however, and requires 
some further elucidation in order to make it as plausible as it can be. In what follows, I will 
attempt to clarify Mitchell’s account and defend it against some immediate objections.  
 
First of all, there’s a question of what it means to experience the felt valenced attitudes 
contained within the emotional experience as appropriate with respect to their object. For 
Mitchell, this is a particular kind of experienced causation. Crucially, Mitchell takes it to be 
the case that when I undergo an experience of fear towards the snake, I do not just experience 
the fear and then reflectively judge the fear to be caused by the snake, but rather I actually 
experience my fear as being seemingly caused by or as an apparent effect of the snake.37 
Now, of course, experiencing an emotion or felt valenced attitude as being merely caused by 
the object is not sufficient for that emotion or attitude to be experience as appropriate with 
respect to the object – further detail is needed here to bridge the normative gap.  
 
While it’s not entirely clear how appropriateness considerations get built into this 
experienced intentional causality, here’s what I take Mitchell’s explanation of this to be. 
Emotional experience, as we’ve seen, attributes an evaluative property to the object of the 
experience. My fear of the snake, for example, paints the snake in a particular evaluative light 
insofar as it attributes the property of ‘fearsomeness’ to the snake. Moreover, as Mitchell 
notes (and our objector will likely stress), normative reasons for experiencing certain 
emotions repose on evaluative properties.38 The fearsomeness of the snake provides 
normative reasons for observers to experience fear towards the snake. Putting all of this 
 
37 Mitchell appears to take this to be an uncontroversial feature of emotional phenomenology; see 
(2017, p. 58)  





together, then, Mitchell takes it to be the case that in experiencing fear towards the snake, I 
both experience my fear as being caused by the snake and as responding to normative reasons 
in favour of experiencing fear, and this is what explains the fact that the felt valenced 
attitudes involved in the emotional experience are experienced as epistemically appropriate 
with respect to the object.39 
 
As a second point for clarification, and relatedly to the previous point, recall that the central 
reason Mitchell cites for believing that these felt valenced attitudes are capable of being 
experienced as epistemically appropriate is that these experienced attitudes are necessary for 
emotional experiences to be immediately rationally intelligible to their subjects. Let us shed 
further light on this notion. What it means for an emotional experience to be immediately 
rationally intelligible is for that experience to non-doxastically ‘make sense’ to the subject in 
the moment that it occurs. That is, the experience is not perplexing for the subject insofar as 
the experience strikes her as rational or fitting with respect to the evaluative features of the 
object in a way that is independent of her having any post hoc reflective beliefs about the 
fittingness of the experience.  
 
To illustrate, contrast the following two cases. In the first case, suppose that I, a seasoned 
presenter, have been scheduled to give an academic presentation to an audience of my peers, 
all of whom I’ve known for a very long time. Moreover, there are virtually no stakes in the 
matter; the worst that can happen is that I forget the material and face some light-hearted 
teasing in the pub afterwards. In spite of this, I find myself experiencing crippling bouts of 
nervousness several minutes before the presentation begins. I realise, however, that this 
anxiety is the result of my having drank an entire pot of espresso an hour earlier. Now, in the 
second case, suppose that I, a very junior academic, have been scheduled to give a 
presentation to an audience of experts. The stakes are very high; the worst that can happen is 
that I forget the material and leave a very sour impression on people whose opinions of me 
matter for my future career prospects. Similarly to the first case, I find myself experiencing 
crippling bouts of nervousness several minutes before the presentation begins. I realise that 
this anxiety is the result of these high stakes.  
 
39 One might worry that this view has the implication that emotions are objectionably capable of 
becoming self-justifying. Mitchell appears to take the fact that the evaluative property attributed to the 
emotional object is experienced as being “content-external” is sufficient to allow him to sidestep the 






Now, in both cases, my experience of anxiety makes sense to me; my feelings of nervousness 
in both scenarios are intelligible and non-perplexing insofar as I have a satisfactory causal 
story which explains the experience. However, it is only in the second case that my anxiety 
enjoys immediate rational intelligibility in the sense that Mitchell has in mind. Recall from 
earlier that experiencing the felt valenced attitudes within the emotional experience as 
appropriate amounts to experiencing a particular kind of normatively-charged intentional 
causality with respect to the object of the experience, i.e. the felt valenced attitudes are 
experienced as appropriate with respect to the object insofar as they are experienced as both 
being caused by the object and responding to normative reasons in favour of experiencing 
those attitudes (and these normative reasons repose on the putative evaluative property 
attributed to the object by the emotion). Only in the second case do I experience my anxiety 
as making sense in terms of it being appropriately caused the object of the experience painted 
in a particular evaluative light, i.e. the high-stakes presentation. In the first case, while my 
anxiety is intelligible to me, it is not intelligible to me because I experience it as 
epistemically appropriate with respect to the object of the experience painted in a particular 
evaluative light, i.e. the low-stakes presentation.   
 
At this point, it is important to note here that Mitchell’s claim is not that all of our emotional 
experiences involve felt valenced attitudes experienced as epistemically appropriate to the 
object of the emotion, such that all of our emotional experiences enjoy immediate rational 
intelligibility. Mitchell invites us to consider instances of phobias as such cases in which 
these feelings of (dis)approval are not experienced as epistemically appropriate to the object, 
such that my emotional experience is rationally unintelligible: 
 
Consider a certain type of arachnophobic whose felt disapproval (repulsion) towards a 
spider might not be experienced as merited by evaluative features of the object – as 
epistemically appropriate to it in this sense – but merely as habitually caused by it. 
What is partly characteristic of such cases is that the felt valenced attitude – and so 
the fear – is rationally unintelligible to the subject with respect to features of the 
object – hence we tend to describe them as emotional pathologies, and this is due to 






So my phobic fear of a harmless insect, for example, does not partly consist in an awareness 
of my valenced attitude, i.e. felt disapproval or disfavour, as being epistemically merited with 
respect to the features of the non-poisonous insect. Rather, the felt disapproval is experienced 
as only being caused by the object. Mitchell takes this experiential difference to be the reason 
why we tend to describe such as experiences as instances of phobic or pathological fear, 
rather than intelligible fear.  
 
Here's one problem that might be raised in response to this claim. The objector may press the 
question of whether there is really an experiential or qualitative difference between phobic 
and intelligible fear, or, more broadly, between emotions that involve felt attitudes 
experienced as epistemically appropriate, and those that don’t. Take another recalcitrant 
emotion case, for example. Suppose that, after having dreamed that my friend broke a 
promise to me, I experience anger towards them for the rest of the day. The anger is 
recalcitrant insofar as it both conflicts with and persists in the face of my opposing conscious 
evaluative judgment, namely, that my friend has not wronged me given that the transgression 
didn’t actually happen. Now consider an instance in which, in reality, my friend does break a 
promise to me, such that I experience non-recalcitrant anger towards them for the rest of the 
day. Presumably, on Mitchell’s account, the latter experience of anger involves a felt 
disfavour towards the object of my emotion (i.e. my friend’s actions) which I experience as 
epistemically appropriate with respect to the evaluative properties of the object. On the other 
hand, Mitchell’s view seems to rule that my recalcitrant anger involves felt disfavour which I 
do not experience as epistemically appropriate with respect to the emotion’s object. One 
might argue, however, that there is no felt difference between the recalcitrant and the 
intelligible anger. In the moment that they occur, both experiences of anger have the same 
phenomenological character. If there is no qualitative difference between my recalcitrant 
anger and my intelligible anger, then this seems suggestive of the fact that, contrary to 
Mitchell’s view, the experience of epistemic appropriateness is not a part of the emotion’s 
phenomenology, nor intrinsic to the emotional experience itself.  
 
In response to this objection, let’s first look more closely at how an advocate of Mitchell’s 
account might diagnose the recalcitrant case. Recall that, in ordinary cases, we experience the 
felt valenced attitudes contained within emotional experiences as epistemically appropriate 
insofar as we experience them as responding to normative reasons in favour of experiencing 





to the object by the emotional experience. Now, as we’ve seen, Mitchell suggests that in 
phobic cases (and presumably recalcitrant cases), the felt valenced attitudes are not 
experienced as epistemically appropriate with respect to the object of the emotion. One 
reason for this may be that the felt valenced attitude is not experienced as responding to 
normative reasons in favour of experiencing the emotion because the presence of the 
conflicting evaluative judgment constitutes a defeater for the normative pressure ordinarily 
exerted by evaluative properties. So, in fearing the harmless insect, my emotional experience 
attributes the property of ‘fearsomeness’ to the insect, but the felt disfavour is not 
experienced as responding to normative reasons in favour of experiencing fear because my 
evaluative judgment that the insect is not fearsome defeats those reasons conferred by the 
evaluative property putatively possessed by the insect. Put another way, the phobic or 
recalcitrant emotional experience instantiates intentional causality (i.e. is experienced as 
being caused by the object), but lacks the normative dimension to this intentional causality 
that is present in ordinary emotional experiences. Hence, the felt disfavour is not experienced 
as epistemically appropriate, and my fear does not enjoy immediate rational intelligibility.  
 
Let me explain how this helps us in response to the objection. Certainly, there are many 
phenomenological similarities between recalcitrant (or phobic) emotional experiences and 
what we can call ‘ordinary’ emotional experiences for our purposes. Mitchell’s account, as 
elucidated above, can explain this. That is, both recalcitrant and ordinary emotions are 
experienced as being caused by their objects, and as attributing evaluative properties to their 
objects. The only phenomenological dissimilarity between the two is that recalcitrant 
emotions are not experienced as responding to normative reasons in favour of experiencing 
that emotion. It seems plausible to me that this will not manifest itself as a strikingly salient 
experiential difference. Thus, Mitchell’s account does not carve out significant and 
objectionable phenomenological space between these two experiences.  
 
Having said that, the account does seem to entail a small experiential difference between 
recalcitrant and ordinary emotions insofar as, presumably, experiencing felt valenced 
attitudes (and thereby emotions) as appropriate and not experiencing them as appropriate are 
states with different qualitative flavours.40 This does not strike me as problematic, nor as 
 
40 Perhaps there is an interesting difference between not experiencing a valenced attitude as 
appropriate and experiencing the attitude as not appropriate. That is, in the first case, the feeling of 





misdiagnosing the phenomenal character of recalcitrant and ordinary emotional experiences. 
Emotional experiences that we believe (or even know) to be missing the evaluative mark do 
seem to be experienced differently than those that we take ourselves to have no reason to 
doubt. The defeater that comes with a conflicting evaluative judgment seems to embed itself 
in the phenomenology of the recalcitrant emotional experience. There’s nothing that 
interferes with ordinary emotional experiences in the same way. As such, because I take it to 
be plausible that there is a small phenomenological difference between recalcitrant and 
ordinary emotional experiences, and because Mitchell’s account does not entail an 
implausibly severe experiential difference between the two (which I take the force of the 
objector’s point to be), I do not think this objection spells significant trouble for Mitchell. 
 
Now, with these notions of felt valenced attitudes experience as appropriate and immediate 
rational intelligibility in mind, why think that these felt valenced attitudes, experienced by the 
subject as epistemically appropriate to the object, are necessary for immediately rationally 
intelligible emotional experiences? One possible explanation for this is to return to the 
apparent fact that many of our emotional experiences are not mystifying to us in their 
occurrence. Typically, we’re not perplexed by our emotional experiences, such that we don’t 
feel the need to search for motivating reasons as to why we feel the way we do. Our 
emotions, in ordinary cases, make sense to us, and they do so without us having to engage in 
reflective reasoning after we’ve undergone the experience. Indeed, it would be 
psychologically implausible to suggest that we need to undergo the post hoc reflective 
reasoning in order for our emotional experiences to appear intelligible to us. So, if it’s not the 
case that conscious cognitive mediation is what (typically) makes our emotional experiences 
rationally intelligible, and if many of our emotional experiences are rationally intelligible, the 
putative fact that emotional experiences themselves have this capacity built in insofar as they 
essentially involve felt valenced attitudes seems to be a good reason for thinking that these 
felt valenced attitudes are necessary for rational intelligibility.  
 
A final objection one might level against the account at this point is that emotional 
experience bearing self-referential epistemic content is not the best explanation for the 
putative fact that most of our emotional experiences appear to us to be rationally intelligible. 
 
of experienced inappropriateness. I will understand the first to be what Mitchell meant, given the 





Indeed, one might argue that our emotional experiences are typically non-perplexing for us 
because of the wealth of experience we have with respect to typical emotion-eliciting 
scenarios.41 That is, instead of requiring the presence of self-referential epistemic content in 
order to explain why our emotional experiences typically do not prompt us to search for 
motivating reasons as to why we feel what we do, we can appeal to the simpler explanation 
that we come to learn which emotions are appropriate by gradual acquaintance with 
particular formative emotional contexts, i.e. those which de Sousa (1987) terms ‘paradigm 
scenarios’. These scenarios, roughly, are typically experienced in our infancy and involve the 
subject experiencing instinctive responses (e.g. crying, smiling, etc.) towards particular 
objects and events in a given situation. The subject then comes to relate their experience to 
the particular features of the situation-type and thereby comes to grasp emotion concepts 
insofar as they associate their emotional experience with the eliciting scenario. Future 
judgments concerning the appropriateness of the relevant emotional experiences are then 
made on the basis of how closely the token situation at hand resembles the relevant paradigm 
scenario. Drawing on this, then, we can say that our emotional experiences are typically 
immediately rationally intelligible to us insofar as we take them to share the relevant features 
with their eliciting paradigm scenarios. There’s no need to posit self-referential epistemic 
content to explain rational intelligibility.  
 
In response to this point, I take it that the relevance of paradigm scenarios to immediate 
rational intelligibility need not actually be an objection to the account. Indeed, I take it that 
there’s a plausible version of the paradigm scenario story that is entirely compatible with 
Mitchell’s view. Let us grant that we come to grasp emotion concepts (and concepts of 
emotional appropriateness) at least partly via acquaintance with paradigm scenarios. 
Moreover, recall that Mitchell takes the felt valenced attitudes of (dis)favour to be 
experienced as appropriate with respect to the object of the emotion insofar as they are 
experienced as responding to normative reasons which repose on the evaluative property 
attributed to the object by the emotion, and that this feeling of appropriateness is what gives 
some of our emotional experiences immediate rational intelligibility. It seems plausible that 
the influence of paradigm scenario acquaintance enters the picture at the level of property 
attribution, i.e. my emotional experience attributes the evaluative property of ‘fearsomeness’ 
 
41 Elgin (2008) suggests something along these lines, claiming that our ability to readily distinguish 
between appropriate fears and phobias reflects a “sophisticated understanding of when and to what 





to the snake in virtue of the situation’s resemblance to the paradigm scenario for fear, and I 
experience the felt disfavour towards the snake as appropriate insofar as it is experienced as 
responding to the normative reasons in favour of feeling fear that repose on the evaluative 
property of ‘fearsomeness’ attributed to the snake. My acquaintance with the paradigm 
scenario is thereby playing some role in my fear being immediately rationally intelligible to 
me, but it is still the phenomenology of the valenced attitude that is the central vehicle for the 
immediate intelligibility of the experience. The advantage of this is that it can accommodate 
the importance of formative paradigm scenarios of emotion and the influence of later 
association with such scenarios without having to rely on the presence of psychologically 
improbable cognitive mediation and inference in the emotional heat of the moment.42  
 
In summary, then, Mitchell’s proposal seems to be a fruitful resource from which the 
defender of RED can harvest a means of responding to the original objection. That is, the 
putative fact that emotional experiences can and do make us aware of the valenced attitudes 
contained within them as being epistemically appropriate with respect to the features of the 
emotion’s object appears to provide evidence against both Brogaard and Chudnoff’s and 
Dokic and Lemaire’s brute claim that notions of appropriateness (or fittingness, or merit) 
cannot be incorporated into emotional awareness. Thus, if emotions can make us aware, or 
seemingly aware, of themselves as appropriate emotional responses with respect to certain 
objects, then the gap between emotional awareness and normative evaluative properties can 
be bridged, and the possibility of emotional experience making us aware of evaluative 
properties can salvage some plausibility. Importantly, my aim here has not been to provide 
the reader with irrefutable grounds for believing that Mitchell’s account is true. For the 
purposes of answering the objector in §2.4, I have only endeavoured to show that it is not 
obvious that self-referential epistemic content cannot be built into the phenomenological 
character of emotional experience; that the defender of RED has the theoretical resources 
available to her to answer this objection by appealing to something like Mitchell’s account.  
 
 
42 For what it’s worth, I am very receptive to the possibility of learning mechanisms like those 
involved in de Sousa’s paradigm scenarios account playing a significant role in the ability of 
emotional experience to immediately justify belief. I will not discuss this specific topic any further 
here, given my immediate focus on the phenomenological objection facing RED, but note that I will 
detail my own account of immediate emotional justification which appeals to learning mechanisms 





It is entirely possible, of course, that the defender of RED is averse to advocating such a 
view. There may be some reason why emotional experience, in principle, cannot contain self-
referential epistemic content. In what follows, I suggest an alternative route to answer the 
objector.  
 
2.4.2 Evaluative Properties as Indirect Objects of Emotional Awareness 
 
Alternatively, the defender of RED can argue that we can be aware of evaluative properties 
indirectly insofar as we can be aware of evaluative properties in virtue of being aware of 
other properties. Let me explain.  
 
Firstly, consider the following passage from Tappolet (2016):  
 
It is quite right that evaluative properties are not dispositional properties. Being 
admirable, say, is not merely being such as to cause admiration. There are many 
things that cause admiration, but are not admirable. The question, then, is why 
emotions cannot inform us about evaluative properties understood in non-
dispositional terms. After all, sensory experiences can inform us about non-
dispositional, or primary, properties. We see shapes, for instance, and shapes can 
figure in the content of perception without requiring informational enrichment. So, if 
one allows that primary properties such as shapes can figure in perception in the 
absence of informational enrichment, there appears to be no reason to doubt that 
evaluative properties can do so as well. (p. 44) 
 
Here, in response to Dokic and Lemaire, Tappolet points out that we ordinarily consider 
many non-dispositional properties, e.g. shape, size, etc., to be suitable objects of awareness. 
If, then, evaluative properties are non-dispositional properties, then we are at least warranted 
in considering the possibility that evaluative properties can be suitable objects of awareness.43  
 
Now, consider the way in which our visual perception makes us aware of properties of shape, 
for instance. Plausibly, we can be visually aware of shape properties in virtue of being aware 
 
43 Soon after this passage, Tappolet explicitly considers the possibility that the normativity of 
evaluative properties bars them from being objects of awareness. She dismisses this on the grounds 





of colour properties. When I have the visual experience of a note-pad as being rectangular, 
for instance, I am visually aware of the note-pad instantiating this shape property on the basis 
of my being able to demarcate the note-pad from other objects in my visual field, and at least 
part of this ability consists in my visually experiencing various properties of colour, such as 
hue, tint, shade, and so forth. To put it another way, shape properties are accessible in my 
visual awareness because of my discriminatory abilities, and my discriminatory abilities 
essentially involve my being visually aware of dispositional properties such as colour. To 
generalise, then, there are cases in which awareness of non-dispositional properties at least 
partially depends on awareness of other properties.  
 
The defender of RED may be able to transpose this line of thinking over to the case of 
evaluative properties as truth-makers for evaluative propositions. That is, if there are 
circumstances in which we can be aware of non-dispositional properties in virtue of being 
aware of other properties, then perhaps we can be aware of evaluative properties in virtue of 
being aware of non-evaluative properties. Reconsider the snake case, for example. It might be 
thought that analogously to the way in which I am aware of the shape properties in virtue of 
being aware of the dispositional colour properties, I am indirectly aware of the evaluative 
property of the snake, i.e. the snake’s meriting responses of fear, in virtue of being 
emotionally aware of the non-evaluative properties which constitute the fearsome-making 
features of the snake, e.g. the piercing fangs, the quick aggressive movements, etc.  
 
To make sense of this latter claim, the defender of RED may appeal to the idea that emotional 
experience can make us seemingly aware of an object’s non-evaluative properties which give 
rise to the evaluative property, which is, in turn, the truth-maker for the relevant evaluative 
proposition. To put it in terms of Elgin’s (2008) suggestion, for example, the defender of 
RED might point to the fact that emotional experience enables me to “discern a pattern in 
what I would otherwise take to be separate facts” (p. 44) in order to support the idea that 
emotional experience can make me aware of, say, the properties which constitute the 
fearsome-making features of my situation before the snake. Or, on a similar note, consider 
the following remarks about emotional phenomenology from D’Arms (2005): 
 
It is in the nature of [emotional] experiences to present themselves as sensitivities to 
something outside them. And what they present themselves as sensitivities to is a 





a threat to one’s safety, for instance. A little introspection makes it obvious, I think, 
that feelings of shame, fear and so on just aren’t about the advisability, or morally 
permissibility, of feeling precisely that way. They are about a feature of the 
circumstance in virtue of which this is a fitting way to respond. (p. 10 – 11) 
 
D’Arms’ comments here seem to suggest that he takes emotional experiences to not just 
perform a functional role of highlighting evaluatively relevant patterns of non-evaluative 
properties, but also that emotions are experienced as being such indications or ‘sensitivities’. 
Moreover, note that D’Arms takes it to be introspectively clear that emotional experiences 
make us aware of features in virtue of which it is fitting to have certain emotional 
experiences. This, combined with Elgin’s support, appears to be good grounds for believing 
that emotional experiences, even if they cannot put us directly in touch with evaluative 
properties (i.e. properties which merit or making fitting certain emotional responses), at least 
uniquely aid in our awareness and apprehension of the pattern or conjunction of non-
evaluative properties which give rise to the relevant evaluative property for the particular 
evaluative proposition in question. Therefore, in virtue of my emotional experience making 
me aware of the properties which constitute the fearsome-making features of the snake, the 
defender of RED may argue that my emotional experience indirectly makes me aware of the 
evaluative property of ‘fearsomeness’, such that it makes me aware of a truth-maker for the 
relevant evaluative proposition.  
 
To summarise, §2.4.1 - §2.4.2 has been concerned with defending RED on the grounds that 
the original objection stated at the beginning of the section relies on too simplistic a view of 
emotional awareness and evaluative properties. I have argued that there are potential stories 
that RED can tell with respect to emotional experiences making us aware of evaluative 
properties which merit particular emotional responses. The argumentative burden shifts back 
to the objector. If they wish to push the objection, then they must rule out the explanations of 
evaluative properties figuring into emotional awareness that I’ve suggested here.  
 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to construct and make tenable a version of emotional 
dogmatism which identifies the emotions’ phenomenal character as the root of their ability to 






§2.1 began by highlighting the fact that various authors in the philosophy of emotion appear 
to attach epistemic import to the phenomenological character of emotional experience, i.e. the 
something-that-it-is-like for the subject to undergo the experience. I then suggested that, in 
light of this, a plausible contender for an attractive account of emotional justification is a 
view based on phenomenal conservatism (PC). From this, we began with emotional 
dogmatism (ED), according to which S’s emotional experience immediately and defeasibly 
justifies her in believing e if and only if that experience makes it seem to her that e.  
 
In §2.2, I set out both PC and ED in more detail, and then argued in §2.2.1 that these basic 
views ought to be rejected insofar as they problematically over-extend epistemic justification 
to beliefs which cannot intuitively enjoy positive justificatory status. I argued that it is 
implausible for the defender of these views to bite the bullet in response to these over-
generalisation cases for two reasons. The first of which is that the PC generates 
counterintuitive results with respect to epistemic defeat and awareness of an experience’s 
problematic etiology, while the second is that ED runs the risk of licensing harmful action via 
licensing harmful beliefs.  
 
In light of these considerations, §2.3 then suggested that Chudnoff’s restrictive account of PC 
may provide a better epistemological framework for our corresponding emotional dogmatist 
view. From Chudnoff’s theory, I constructed an analogous restrictive emotional dogmatist 
view (RED) which affords emotional experience immediate and defeasible justificatory 
power with respect to an evaluative belief e insofar as it both makes it seem to one that e and 
makes it seem as if one is emotionally aware of a truth-maker for e.  
 
In §2.4, I then presented a common challenge levelled against views of this sort, namely, the 
objection that evaluative properties, as truth-makers for evaluative beliefs, cannot be present 
in emotional awareness in virtue of containing a normative dimension. We cannot be 
emotionally aware of evaluative properties, so the objection goes, because emotional 
experience cannot present itself as being epistemically merited by the object in question. I 
argued that this objection can be countered by two responses. The first of which claims that 
emotional experience can contain self-referential epistemic content, and thereby bring direct 
awareness of evaluative properties (§2.4.1), while the second claims that emotional 





plausible story about emotional awareness of evaluative properties as truth-makers for 
evaluative propositions.   
 
In summary, RED looks to be in good stead. In the next chapter, however, I will show that, 
despite its success in response to this challenge, RED faces two further objections which 







The Problem with Restricted Emotional Dogmatism 
 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
Thus far, I have aimed to construct a restricted emotional dogmatist (RED) view on the basis 
of Chudnoff’s account of immediate experiential justification, and I have defended it as a 
particularly plausible instantiation of an emotional dogmatist view. Recall that we’re 
understanding RED as follows: 
 
Restricted Emotional Dogmatism (RED): S’s emotional experience is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if the 
experience: (i) makes it seem to her that e, and (ii) makes it seem as if she is 
emotionally aware of a truth-maker for e. 
 
By building our account on Chudnoff’s view – which I have argued is plausibly taken to be a 
precisification of many phenomenal conservative (PC) views found in the literature – we 
arrive at an emotional dogmatist account which both preserves the spirit and retains the 
theoretical advantages of liberal views, while putatively being sufficiently specific to rule out 
problematic cases. I have also argued that RED is capable of withstanding a familiar 
objection levelled against it in the literature, namely, the objection that evaluative properties, 
in virtue of bearing a normative dimension, are not suitable objects of emotional awareness. 
 
However, in spite of RED’s success up to this point, there are further, more serious 
challenges facing the defender of the account. One of the central aims of this chapter is to 
present what I take to be the most significant objection facing the view, i.e. the objection that 
there is no plausible way of spelling out what truth-makers for evaluative propositions consist 
in. After establishing this, and explaining why this failure gives us good cause to reject RED 
altogether, I then survey and reject alternative instantiations of a restricted emotional 
dogmatist view. In highlighting the severe shortcomings of these emotional dogmatist 
accounts, I thereby endeavour to build an inductive case for the conclusion that the 
phenomenal character of emotional experience cannot be what makes it capable of 






Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows. In §3.2, I present a novel and 
powerful objection facing RED: namely, the objection that the inclusion of the truth-maker 
condition raises a troubling dilemma for the view: either RED identifies evaluative properties 
themselves as the truth-makers for evaluative propositions (§3.2.1), in which case the view 
will continue to over-generalise, or it identifies the relevant conjunction of non-evaluative 
properties as the truth-maker (§3.2.2), in which case the view ends up being objectionably 
restrictive. In light of the failure of RED, §3.3 then considers the plausibility of two 
alternative instantiations of restricted views, before concluding that neither of them are 
capable of faring any better than RED. I provide concluding remarks in §3.4 by reflecting on 
the vices of emotional dogmatist views in order to illuminate where we ought to look next for 
a plausible view of emotional justification.  
 
3.2. Objection: The Dilemma of Evaluative Truth-Makers 
 
Here, I argue that RED’s inclusion of the truth-maker condition spells serious trouble for the 
view. Specifically, I argue that RED faces a dilemma as to what seeming awareness of truth-
makers for evaluative propositions consists in. To illustrate, reconsider Brogaard and 
Chudnoff’s example of an experience of fear towards an approaching snake. In order for that 
experience of fear to immediately and defeasibly justify the evaluative belief that the snake is 
fearsome, the emotional experience must both make it seem to you that the snake is fearsome 
and make it seem as if you’re emotionally aware of a truth-maker for that evaluative 
proposition. The question that I’m interested in here is the question of what that truth-maker 
is.   
 
Recall from the previous chapter that explicit analyses of RED, such as the one provided by 
Brogaard and Chudnoff, seem to assume that the relevant truth-maker for an evaluative 
proposition is the evaluative property putatively instantiated by the object of the emotional 
experience. However, RED, as it has been expressed thus far, is in fact silent as to whether 
the truth-maker consists in the evaluative property of fearsomeness itself, say, or whether it 
consists in the non-evaluative properties instantiated by the snake that give rise to the 
evaluative property of fearsomeness, i.e. the sharp fangs, the aggressive movements, and so 
forth. Call these ‘the evaluative property reading’ and ‘the non-evaluative property reading’ 
of the truth-maker condition respectively. The problem is that neither of these options looks 





argue that both render RED a problematic and unsatisfactory account as to how emotional 
experience can immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief. 
 
Before doing so, however, let me first clarify how this objection both relates to and differs 
from the challenge discussed and rebutted in the previous chapter. Recall that the worry in 
§2.4 was that RED ought to be rejected on the grounds that it builds phenomenologically 
unrealistic contents into the scope of emotional seeming awareness. That is, assuming that the 
truth-makers for evaluative propositions are the evaluative properties instantiated by the 
object in question, and assuming that evaluative properties are normative properties which 
merit particular emotional responses, emotional experience cannot make it seem as if we’re 
aware of truth-makers for evaluative propositions in light of the fact that emotional 
experience cannot bring seeming awareness of itself as being merited by the object in 
question. Put another way, this was a phenomenological objection facing RED.  
 
I argued that this phenomenological objection was insufficiently powerful to undermine 
RED. That is, by appealing to a variety of views and explanatory stories as to how evaluative 
properties might directly or indirectly figure into the contents of emotional seeming 
awareness, I argued that the brute rejection of this possibility without due consideration of the 
prospects of these views should not be sufficient to compel us to reject RED out of hand. 
However, that is not to say that I think that conceiving of evaluative properties as the truth-
makers for evaluative propositions is altogether non-problematic. Indeed, I think that the 
more promising route for the objector to take is to focus not on RED’s putative commitment 
to controversial phenomenological assertions, but on its commitments to controversial 
epistemological results; commitments exposed by disambiguating the truth-maker condition.  
 
My reason for this is twofold. First, as we’ve seen, whether one finds Brogaard and 
Chudnoff’s challenge compelling relies on their having the intuition that emotional 
experience cannot bear a very specific kind of self-reflexive phenomenology. This doesn’t 
strike me as a commonly held intuition. Second, and relatedly, it seems at least prima facie 
plausible that our intuitions have significantly more reliability and argumentative traction 
within the domain of epistemological theorising, given the frequency with which 
counterexamples are cited as compelling objections to epistemological views. Our intuitions 
when it comes to specific introspective phenomenological claims, on the other hand, are 





reasons, the remainder of this section will pursue the forthcoming epistemological challenge 
against RED. 
 
3.2.1. Truth-Makers as Evaluative Properties 
 
With this in mind, then, let’s begin with the evaluative property reading of RED’s truth-
maker condition, which can be spelled out as follows: 
 
REDEP: S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying 
her evaluative belief e if and only if the experience both makes it seem to her that e 
and makes it seem as if she’s emotionally aware of the evaluative property putatively 
instantiated by the object.  
 
Now, recall that the inclusion of the truth-maker condition seems to suitably restrict 
phenomenal conservatism in the perceptual case (i.e. recall that Chudnoff’s presentationalism 
seemed to be capable of sidestepping Markie’s gold prospector over-generalisation case). The 
problem for REDEP is that it’s not at all clear that this reading of the truth-maker condition 
restricts emotional dogmatism at all.  
 
Reconsider the case of Brady’s suspicious interviewer. In this scenario, I, as the chair of the 
hiring committee, get a ‘bad feeling’ about the interviewee and consequently have the 
experience of an emotional seeming that the interviewee is duplicitous. Recall from the 
previous chapter (§2.2.1) that, intuitively, this seems like a case in which we shouldn’t allow 
the emotional experience to bear even defeasible justificatory power. Merely having an 
emotional seeming that a person is duplicitous doesn’t seem sufficient to epistemically justify 
one’s belief that they are in fact duplicitous. This was the problem for the basic ED view, and 
the motivation for including the truth-maker condition in our account as a means of 
restricting the net of emotional experiences capable of justifying evaluative belief.  
 
The worry is that REDEP can’t exclude the interviewer’s emotional experience of suspicion 
because their experience satisfies both the seeming condition and the truth-maker condition. 
That is, insofar as the emotional experience already makes it seem to the interviewer that the 
candidate is duplicitous (and they’re not aware of any reason to distrust this seeming), then 





instantiates the property of ‘duplicitousness’. The evaluative property reading of the truth-
maker condition doesn’t seem to be adding any further requirement to emotional dogmatism, 
given that any emotional experience which satisfies the seeming condition will also satisfy 
the truth-maker condition. What else could it mean for an emotional experience to make it 
seem to you that the candidate is duplicitous, other than making it seem as if you’re aware of 
the evaluative property of ‘duplicitousness’ putatively instantiated by the candidate? 
Naturally, then, REDEP will continue to over-generalise to problematic cases precisely 
because, in practice, it’s no different to ED.  
 
At this point, the defender of REDEP may argue that the case, as it stands, is under-described. 
In response to the worry, they might attempt to re-describe the case in order to explain and 
motivate the plausibility of conceding justification here. They may suggest, for instance, that 
my emotional experience is in actual fact picking up on subtle duplicitous-making features of 
the job candidate, i.e. that my having the emotional experience arises out of my perceiving 
certain mannerisms and micro-behaviours reliably indicative of untrustworthiness, such as 
avoiding the gaze of the interview panel, excessive talking, smirking, etc. Thus, picking up 
on the suggestion presented in the previous chapter on indirect emotional awareness of 
evaluative properties (§2.4.2), the defender of REDEP might argue that the emotional 
experience, insofar as it makes it seem as if I’m aware of the property ‘duplicitousness’ 
instantiated by the candidate, is making it seem as if I’m aware of a pattern of non-evaluative 
properties which constitute subtle duplicitous-making features of the candidate. If this is the 
case, then conceding immediate and defeasible justification on the basis of these emotional 
seemings doesn’t seem at all problematic – my emotional awareness in this case is tracking 
epistemically relevant features of the object, such that it seems perfectly plausible that the 
emotional experience is capable of conferring some degree of epistemic justification to my 
evaluative belief.  
 
The problem with this response is that REDEP lacks the ability to distinguish between a case 
like this, i.e. a case in which the emotional seeming awareness of duplicitousness is caused 
by a seeming awareness of a pattern of duplicitous-making features of the candidate, and a 
case in which the emotional seeming awareness of ‘duplicitousness’ is caused by 
epistemically dubious cognitive biases, e.g. suppose that the candidate is a woman and the 
interviewer is unknowingly biased against women. The worry is that, insofar as the 





and the seeming awareness of the evaluative property ‘duplicitousness’ instantiated by the 
candidate – can be grounded in either of these causal explanations, REDEP doesn’t have the 
tools to differentiate the good and bad cases; both types of emotional seemings (i.e. those 
produced by epistemically legitimate means and those produced by epistemically illegitimate 
means) have the same justificatory power. This seems like a bad result. 
 
To further support this point, contrast the following two cases. Suppose that Agent A 
navigates the entirety of her adult life with perfectly calibrated embarrassment responses, 
such that every experience of embarrassment she has picks up on the genuine embarrassing-
making features of her situation. When she commits a social blunder in front of her 
colleagues, for example, her experience of embarrassment tracks the relevant embarrassment-
making features of the situation, such as how her action or remark has transgressed a social 
norm, the obvious discomfort of those around her, the uncomfortable silence that follows her 
social buffoonery, and so forth. On the other hand, suppose that Agent B’s embarrassment 
responses are wildly unstable due to his extremely low self-esteem. He experiences 
embarrassment not only when he makes genuine social blunders, but when the breeze 
dishevels his hair, or when he’s wearing a different coloured shirt to the people around him, 
or when he gently coughs in a quiet room, and so forth. Moreover, let’s stipulate that B never 
second-guesses these embarrassment experiences; that he’s not aware of any reason to 
suppose that they’re missing the mark. His emotional experiences, clearly, are not picking up 
on genuine embarrassment-making features of these situations, and are instead being brought 
about by epistemically dubious background factors. I take it to be very intuitive that a 
plausible account of emotional justification will have the resources to explain why A’s 
emotional experiences of embarrassment are better epistemically placed than B’s.  
 
The problem is that both of these embarrassment types – A’s legitimately produced 
embarrassment and B’s illegitimately produced embarrassment – will meet REDEP’s 
conditions. Just as A’s experience of embarrassment will make it seem that her social blunder 
is embarrassing and make it seem as though her situation instantiates the relevant evaluative 
property, B’s experience of embarrassment will make it seem to him that his wearing a 
different coloured shirt is embarrassing and make it seem as though the event instantiates the 
evaluative property of ‘being embarrassing’. The epistemically relevant emotional 
phenomenology is the same in both of these cases (i.e. REDEP’s conditions are met in both 





power, I contend, is different between A and B. This result seems indicative of the fact that 
REDEP is failing to locate what’s actually doing the justificatory work in emotional 
experience.  
 
Now, one response open to the defender of REDEP here is to suggest that we can suitably 
distinguish between these cases by pointing to a phenomenological difference between those 
emotional seemings produced by epistemically legitimate and illegitimate causes, and 
identify only the former as meeting REDEP’s conditions on emotional justification. That is, 
the defender of REDEP might argue that only emotional experiences like A’s embarrassment 
actually meet the truth-maker condition, and hence are capable of immediately and defeasibly 
justifying the relevant belief.  
 
Accordingly, borrowing from the Mitchell-inspired line of argument presented in the 
previous chapter (§2.4.1), one might argue that the case in which the emotional seemings are 
not legitimately produced does not involve those seemings being experienced as 
epistemically appropriate with respect to the object. If we take emotional seeming awareness 
of evaluative properties (and consequently emotional seeming awareness of truth-makers for 
evaluative propositions) to necessarily require the emotional seemings to be experienced as 
epistemically appropriate or merited by the object of the emotion (in virtue of the normative 
dimension of evaluative properties), then, in cases like B’s embarrassment experiences or the 
illegitimately produced suspicion of the interviewer, the emotional seemings will not make it 
seem as if the subjects are aware of the evaluative property putatively instantiated by the 
object, and thereby will not make it seem as if they’re aware of a truth-maker for the 
evaluative proposition. Therefore, we have an explanation as to why REDEP confers 
immediate justificatory ability to the suspicious emotional seemings produced by legitimate 
observations of the duplicitous-making features of the candidate or A’s experiences of 
embarrassment, but does not afford such power to emotional seemings which are not 
produced by these observations, i.e. because the emotion is experienced as immediately 
rationally intelligible in the former case, but not the latter, and this experiential quality is 
necessary for genuine seeming awareness of evaluative properties.  
 
The problem with this response is that it’s not at all obvious that emotional seemings 
produced by legitimate observations of the non-evaluative properties which give rise to the 





their objects, and that emotional seemings which are not produced by such observations are 
not experienced as epistemically appropriate. That is, the immediate rational intelligibility of 
emotional experiences does not seem to be necessarily determined by the experience’s having 
a proper etiology, i.e. being caused by such legitimate observations of the relevant non-
evaluative properties. It seems quite possible that I can have an emotional experience which 
has an improper etiology, in this sense, which I experience as epistemically appropriate (and 
thereby immediately rationally intelligible) with respect to the object of my emotion. Suppose 
that, having drank several more espressos in the morning than I’m used to, I later react with a 
burst of anger when my friend informs me that they’ll be several minutes to our planned 
meeting. Now, given that I’m ordinarily an even-tempered person, it seems plausible that my 
emotional experience arises not out of legitimate observations about the non-evaluative 
properties of the situation which give rise to the evaluative property, namely, those which 
give rise to the ‘offensiveness’ of her tardiness, but instead arises out of my ingesting 
excessive quantities of a stimulant. However, it strikes me that I’ll likely experience my 
anger as epistemically appropriate with respect to my friend’s tardiness despite my emotional 
seemings not being grounded in the appropriate features of their object.  
 
In light of this, I take there to be good reason to suppose that, similarly, the suspicious 
interviewer’s emotional seemings can be experienced as epistemically appropriate despite not 
being grounded in or caused by legitimate observations of the duplicitous-making features of 
the candidate, or that B’s emotional seemings can be experienced as epistemically 
appropriate despite not being grounded in or caused by legitimate observations of the 
embarrassing-making features of his situation. Hence, appeal to Mitchell’s notion of 
immediate rational intelligibility is unable to provide REDEP with the resources to confer 
justificatory ability to legitimately produced emotional seemings but not to those produced 
illegitimately. So even if the defender of REDEP can mitigate the intuitive implausibility of 
conceding justification in the suspicious interviewer case by pointing to the fact that the 
emotional experience is tracking the relevant duplicitous-making features, this does nothing 
to assuage worries in cases where the experience is not picking up on these features.  
 
So, if the defender of REDEP cannot differentiate between the good and bad cases, what about 
simply conceding over-generalisation to the problematic cases? The problem here is that this 
would mean that REDEP can no longer be considered a substantive improvement on basic ED. 





conceding justification to epistemically dubious experiences. The first is that reliance on an 
agent’s awareness of epistemic defeat to explain the intuition that we shouldn’t attribute full 
justification in these cases generates counterintuitive results, while the second is that freely 
conceding justification risks licensing harmful action via a knowledge or justification norm 
of rational action. Let’s elaborate on these reasons by applying them to the emotional cases at 
hand. Suppose that we concede justification to the suspicious interviewer whose emotional 
experience of suspicion is not caused by legitimate observations of duplicitous-making 
features of the candidate, but by illegitimate cognitive bias. One plausible response the 
defender of REDEP might have here is the appeal to the notion of defeat. That is, they might 
argue that conceding justification is not so implausible given that it’s only defeasible 
justification conferred by the experience. If the suspicious interviewer has an awareness of 
the fact that their suspicion is being generated by epistemically dubious means (i.e. by certain 
illegitimate biases), then the justification conferred by the emotional experience is defeated.  
 
I suggested in the previous chapter that reliance on the defeater clause doesn’t mitigate the 
intuitive implausibility of conceding justification in these cases and indeed generates 
counterintuitive results itself. That is, the defender of REDEP who intends to pursue this line 
of response is confronted with the odd result that the positive justificatory status of the 
suspicious interviewer’s belief that the candidate is duplicitous switches on and off 
depending on whether the interviewer is currently entertaining an awareness of the 
problematic etiology of their experience. Moreover, on a similar note, it seems odd to think 
that we can easily come to have such an awareness of the etiology of our emotional 
experiences. Indeed, as we saw from Elgin in Chapter 1 (§1.1), we often take our emotional 
deliverances at face value. Without an obvious reason to distrust one’s emotional experiences 
(e.g. a conflicting evaluative judgment, significant dissent from trustworthy observers, etc.), 
it seems inaccurate to suggest that the average person engages in reflective reasoning 
concerning the origin of all (or even most) of their emotions as they occur. As such, it seems 
plausible that, in cases like the suspicious interviewer’s, it’s very unlikely that the subject in 
question will have an awareness of the problematic etiology of their emotional experience, 
assuming that such awareness is accessible at all. If this is true, then by consequence it’s also 
very unlikely that justification conferred by illegitimately produced emotional experiences 
will be defeated by the presence of such an awareness. Thus, the notion of defeat brought 
about by awareness of the emotion’s etiology seems unable to diffuse the charge of 






The second reason against freely conceding justification to experiences like the suspicious 
interviewer’s, recall, pertained to the link between epistemic justification and rational action. 
I suggested that, in accordance with a widely held view (i.e. that there is a norm with 
epistemic content which governs rational action), freely bestowing justificatory ability to 
experience runs the risk of licensing harmful action. That is, if an agent’s possessing 
epistemic justification for the relevant belief is at least necessary for the epistemic norm to 
obtain, and thereby for that agent to have rational grounds for the relevant action, then 
REDEP’s leniency with attributing justification spells trouble insofar as it at least substantially 
contributes towards licensing harmful action. Assuming the existence of such a norm (which, 
I’ve argued, is a plausible assumption), the fact that the suspicious interviewer is justified in 
their evaluative belief that the candidate is duplicitous at the very least contributes towards 
their having rational grounds for acting on that belief, i.e. dismissing the candidate as a bad 
fit for the job. This seems like an unpalatable result. So, all in all, if the defender of REDEP 
insists on conceding justification to problematic cases, then they must account for these 
objections.    
 
3.2.2. Truth-Makers as Non-Evaluative Properties 
 
So, if RED’s continued vulnerability to the over-generalisation problem is the result of 
construing truth-makers for evaluative propositions as evaluative properties themselves, and 
if conceding justification in these cases is out of the picture, why not abandon this claim and 
insist instead that the truth-maker for evaluative propositions is the relevant set of non-
evaluative properties that gives rise to the evaluative property? This is the non-evaluative 
property reading of RED’s truth-maker condition, and can be spelled out as follows:  
 
REDNEP: S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying 
her evaluative belief e if and only if the experience both makes it seem to her that e 
and makes it seem as if she’s emotionally aware of the set of non-evaluative 
properties that, if instantiated, would give rise to the relevant evaluative property, and 
so make e true.  
 
The attraction of this reading is that, unlike REDEP, it avoids obvious over-generalisation 





seeming awareness of the candidate’s duplicitousness is caused by their illegitimate bias 
against women. This case would not meet the requirements of REDNEP precisely because the 
interviewer’s emotional experience is not making it seem as if they’re aware of the set of 
non-evaluative properties that would make the proposition ‘the candidate is duplicitous’ true. 
Rather, their experience is being triggered by the combination of their sexist bias and their 
perception of the candidate’s gender. Clearly, mere seeming awareness of the candidate’s 
gender does not amount to seeming awareness of the candidate instantiating particular non-
evaluative properties which would make the proposition ‘the candidate is duplicitous’ true. 
Thus, REDNEP avoids the charge of over-generalisation because it can epistemically 
differentiate between the good case (i.e. the case in which the interviewer’s emotional 
seemings of duplicitousness are caused by their perception of duplicitous-making non-
evaluative features of the candidate), and the bad case (i.e. the case in which the interviewer’s 
emotional seemings of duplicitousness are caused by their perception of the candidate’s 
gender and their bias against women).  
 
The problem, however, is that REDNEP is now too restrictive. If we identify these 
conjunctions of non-evaluative properties as truth-makers, then very few of our emotional 
experiences would be capable of bearing justificatory power. It seems that only very basic 
emotional experiences, like fear of a snake or disgust towards spoiled milk, for example, are 
reliably capable of bringing the required wide-ranging emotional seeming awareness of the 
relevant non-evaluative properties that would make the relevant evaluative proposition (e.g. 
‘the snake is fearsome’, or ‘the spoiled milk is disgusting’) true. Emotional experiences 
which do not figure into this very basic category often don’t bring awareness of the relevant 
non-evaluative properties.44 Consider, for example, an emotional experience of awe towards 
a piece of artwork. It strikes me as plausible that such an experience does not bring full 
seeming awareness of the non-evaluative properties which would make the proposition ‘that 
artwork is beautiful’ true, e.g. the particular arrangement of brushstrokes, the particular blend 
of colours and hues, etc. Or, similarly, take an experience of amusement towards a particular 
state of affairs. It seems plausible that such an experience does not bring seeming awareness 
of the particular amusement-making non-evaluative properties, e.g. the relevant contextual 
 
44 Echeverri (2019) makes a similar point about the limits of awareness when it comes to the non-
evaluative properties which constitute or give rise to the evaluative property in question, arguing that 
there are many relational properties which contribute towards an object exemplifying a given evaluative 





factors which make the situation amusing. Despite the absence of such fine-grained seeming 
awareness in these cases, it seems entirely possible that emotional experiences of this sort are 
capable of providing a positive epistemic contribution to the status of the corresponding 
evaluative beliefs. Thus, robbing these emotions of immediate justificatory power on the 
basis of their not fulfilling the strict phenomenological requirements for REDNEP strikes me 
as bad news for the view.  
 
Here, there are two possible responses available to the defender of REDNEP. The first of 
which is to concede that, understood this way, the view ends up being restrictive but deny 
that this is problematic. Indeed, the defender of REDNEP might stress that the lesson to be 
learned from the over-generalisation problem is that we should be casting a narrow net 
around the emotional experiences capable of bearing justificatory power. We want to rule out 
cases in which emotional seemings look like they’re not grounded in epistemically legitimate 
observations of the relevant non-evaluative properties, and the best way of doing this is to 
impose strict constraints on what counts as emotional seeming awareness of truth-makers. If 
a consequence of this is that relatively complex emotional experiences which do not bring 
seeming awareness of the relevant non-evaluative properties end up getting ruled out of the 
account (insofar as they do not make it seem as if one is emotionally aware of a truth-maker 
for the relevant evaluative proposition), then so be it.  
 
The worry with conceding epistemic austerity here, however, is that one plausible 
desideratum for a compelling version of a justificatory thesis of emotion is that it can account 
for how a broad catalogue of our evaluative beliefs can be justified by emotional experiences. 
If endorsing REDNEP means that we can only consider very basic emotional experiences as 
capable of bearing justificatory ability, then our dogmatist approach to emotional justification 
is failing to provide a satisfactory picture of the justificatory capacity of emotional experience 
insofar as JTE will no longer be able to secure the wide-ranging theoretical benefits identified 
in Chapter 1 (§1.1), i.e. JTE will only be able to explain how some of our evaluative beliefs 
come to be immediately justified, but not others; it will only be able to make sense of the 
trust we have in some emotional experiences, but not others. 
 
Secondly, the objector might argue that in these scenarios – take the amusement case, for 
example – my emotional experience is, in fact, making it seem as if I’m aware of the relevant 





articulate exactly what those properties are. One suggestion in support of this might be 
something like the following. When prompted, i.e. when asked ‘what’s so funny?’, I can 
gesture vaguely towards the features of the situation that make it amusing, such as the 
particular comment made, the context in which it was made, and so forth, even if I can’t 
express the amusing-making minutia. In other words, I’m not at a complete loss as to what it 
is about the situation that makes it amusing, and this is all that’s needed for evidence of 
emotional seeming awareness of the relevant conjunction of non-evaluative properties. 
Therefore, we can tell some story about having emotional seeming awareness of the relevant 
truth-maker in these cases, and REDNEP doesn’t end up being objectionably restrictive with 
respect to the kinds of emotional experiences is bestows with justificatory power.  
 
The problem with this response is that further ambiguity in what emotional seeming 
awareness of truth-makers consists in raises difficult questions for REDNEP. If all that matters 
for emotional seeming awareness of truth-makers is that the experience makes the subject 
capable of gesturing towards the non-evaluative features of the object which would make the 
relevant evaluative proposition true, then it becomes less clear that REDNEP is able to rule out 
problematic cases. Take the suspicious interviewer whose emotional seemings that the 
candidate is duplicitous are caused by sexist bias. Plausibly, their emotional experience of 
suspicion will make them capable of saying something about what seems to make the 
candidate duplicitous (e.g. “there’s just something about their behaviour”), but this still seems 
insufficient for the interviewer to be justified in their belief that the candidate is duplicitous. 
Substantively relaxing the notion of awareness in order to let in cases where the emotional 
experience doesn’t make it seem as if one is aware of (i.e. able to identify) all of the relevant 
non-evaluative properties runs the risk of letting the epistemically illegitimate cases like 
biased suspicious interviewer in through the back door.  
 
Moreover, note that relaxing the notion of awareness in this way is a significant departure 
from our original description of RED insofar as it no longer looks like the property of 
presentational phenomenology is being instantiated by emotional experiences. Recall from 
Chapter 2 (§2.3) that, for Chudnoff, a necessary condition for an experience instantiating 
presentational phenomenology is that the experience enables the subject to entertain 
demonstrative thoughts about the object of their seeming awareness. That is, a necessary 
condition for a subject to possess seeming awareness of an object is that the subject is able to 





object under certain descriptions or conceptualisations. If an emotional experience need only 
enable the subject to vaguely gesture towards the non-evaluative properties of the object 
which would make the proposition true, then it looks like the experience falls short of 
meeting this demonstrative thought condition and thereby falls short of qualifying as 
possessing presentational phenomenological character with respect to the evaluative 
proposition. REDNEP would therefore lose its footing in Chudnoff’s epistemological 
groundwork. Given this result, I take this line of response to be an implausible defence 
against the argument.   
 
In summary, RED is confronted with a troubling dilemma. Either we identify evaluative 
properties themselves as the truth-makers for evaluative proposition (REDEP), in which case 
the view continues to over-generalise to problematic cases, or we identify the relevant set of 
non-evaluative properties as truth-makers for evaluative propositions (REDNEP), in which 
case the view rules out emotional experiences which, plausibly, are capable of immediately 
justifying the relevant evaluative beliefs. If endorsing RED means that we must commit to 
either an objectionably profligate account of emotional justification or instead one which is 
objectionably austere, then RED does not provide a suitable framework for thinking about the 
immediate justificatory power of emotional experiences.  
 
3.3. Alternative Restricted Views 
 
Recall that in the previous chapter, I advanced RED as what I took to be a particularly 
promising instantiation of the emotional dogmatist view. This was because the addition of the 
truth-maker condition allowed RED to match onto suggestive descriptions of the epistemic 
importance of emotional phenomenology in the literature, while also providing an account of 
experiential justification that putatively both inherited the advantages of liberal views and 
painted a more nuanced analysis of the epistemically significant phenomenal character 
possessed by certain experiences. However, we’ve also seen that, insofar as RED attempts to 
qualify basic ED with the truth-maker condition, the view is rendered implausible.  
 
One question the reader might have at this point is whether there exists an alternative 
instantiation of a restricted emotional dogmatist view. That is, if the addition of the 
Chudnoff-inspired truth-maker condition fails to make ED plausible, then perhaps we can 





such a condition, then the prospects of a dogmatist approach to an account of emotional 
justification are positive, even in spite of RED’s failure. In what follows, I will consider two 
alternative suggestions for a restricted view of emotional dogmatism inspired by restricted 
phenomenal conservative accounts provided by McGrath and Markie, and argue that neither 
of these views can provide a plausible framework for an emotional dogmatist view.45 
 
3.3.1 Receptive Seemings Emotional Dogmatism 
 
Recall the gold prospector example which began our discussion of the over-generalisation 
problem back in §2.2.1. In this case, the expert prospector’s perceptual seeming that the 
pebble is gold arises from their learned identification skills, while the wishful prospector’s 
perceptual seeming that the pebble is gold arises not from their expertise but from their desire 
to discover gold. The problem for basic PC, of course, was that it was unable to account for 
the intuitive verdict that, while the expert may be immediately and defeasibly justified on the 
basis of their perceptual seemings, it is implausible that the wishful prospector’s seeming has 
the same justificatory capacity.  
 
In light of such counterexamples, McGrath (2013) aims to construct a restricted version of 
phenomenal conservatism which manages to exclude problematic cases while also striving to 
retain the initial attractions of basic views. On this note, McGrath suggests that what’s going 
wrong in cases like the wishful prospector is that the perceptual seeming has what he refers to 
as a “quasi-inferential” (p. 228) basis, i.e. the wishful prospector’s perceptual seeming that 
the pebble is gold does not arise directly from perception but instead arises via an inference-
like transition or ‘jump’ from the base perceptual seeming that there is a yellowish pebble. 
The relationship between the seemings here is ‘quasi-inferential’ insofar as exchanging the 
seemings with corresponding beliefs containing the same propositional contents would render 
the transition as an instance of inference between beliefs.  
 
Now, for McGrath, it is only seemings which do not have such a quasi-inferential basis – i.e. 
what he calls ‘receptive seemings’ – which are capable of providing immediate and 
 
45 Importantly, note that these accounts are more revisionary of PC than Chudnoff’s view. Both 
McGrath and Markie impose restrictions on how justification-conferring seeming states must be 
generated, whereas Chudnoff only offers an extra phenomenological constraint on experiences 





defeasible justification for the relevant belief; a quasi-inferential basis effectively bars a 
seeming from acting as a source of immediate or foundational epistemic justification. At best, 
seemings with a quasi-inferential basis might be capable of conferring mediate justification to 
the relevant belief, but only if it is an epistemically permissible quasi-inference, i.e. only if 
the content of the basis seeming adequately supports the content of the quasi-inferred 
seeming. Importantly, though, note that quasi-inferred seemings cannot generate immediate 
or foundational justification themselves, they can only transmit mediated justification to the 
relevant belief via an epistemically permissible quasi-inference from the base seeming.  
 
So, applying these details to the example at hand, the wishful prospector has a receptive 
perceptual seeming that there is a yellowish pebble. On McGrath’s account, the prospector 
would be immediately justified in believing that there is a yellowish pebble on the basis of 
this seeming. However, the prospector’s desire to discover gold intervenes and produces a 
quasi-inferred perceptual seeming that the pebble is gold. Because this perceptual seeming is 
quasi-inferred from the base perceptual seeming that there is a yellowish pebble, it is not 
capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying the prospector’s belief that the pebble is 
gold. Moreover, we can see that this quasi-inference taking place is not an epistemically 
legitimate one. The seeming with the content ‘there is a yellowish pebble’ does not 
sufficiently support the content of the quasi-inferred seeming, i.e. ‘the pebble is a gold 
nugget’. Hence, the wishful prospector is in no way justified in their belief that the pebble is 
gold on the basis of their perceptual seemings. McGrath thus summarises this restricted view 
of PC as follows:  
 
One is prima facie justified in believing P when one has a receptive seeming that P. In 
free enrichment cases [i.e. cases in which a seeming arises due to cognitive 
penetration], the output seeming isn’t receptive; it isn’t part of one’s basic evidence or 
the grounds one fundamentally is “handed”. It therefore cannot provide foundational 
justification. Nor can it provide non-foundational justification, because it depends on 
something very much like bad reasoning, viz., a bad “quasi-inference.” (p. 244 – 245) 
 
If this looks like a plausible view with respect to perceptual seemings, then perhaps we can 






Receptive Seemings Emotional Dogmatism (RSED): S’s emotional experience is 
capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief that an object O 
instantiates an evaluative property E if and only if (i) the experience makes it seem to 
her that O is E, and (ii) this seeming does not have a quasi-inferential basis.  
 
RSED, then, attempts to qualify basic ED by excluding emotional seemings which are quasi-
inferred from other seemings from enjoying immediate and defeasible justificatory power.   
 
Now, to some degree, the question of whether RSED constitutes an improvement on RED 
hinges on whether RSED gives us the right result in emotional over-generalisation cases; 
whether it correctly diagnoses what’s going wrong with the suspicious interviewer’s 
emotional seeming, for example, and has the philosophical tools to exclude it from being 
capable of conferring justification. The problem is that, while the notion of receptivity may 
be plausible with respect to perceptual seemings and perceptual over-generalisation cases, it’s 
not obvious that it translates particularly well to the emotional case. There’s a question of 
whether any emotional seemings are receptive, and not quasi-inferred from other seemings, 
given that emotions rely on cognitive bases. That is, unlike perceptions, emotions depend 
upon base mental states such as perceptions, memories, beliefs, and so forth. I can’t 
experience fear in response to the approaching snake without in some way perceiving the 
snake and its fearsome-making features. The same is not true of visually perceiving the 
snake; my visual experience of the snake does not presuppose a further mental state in the 
same way that my emotional experience does. In light of this fact, then, we might wonder 
how any emotional experience can involve a seeming that an object instantiates a particular 
evaluative property without that seeming being quasi-inferred from non-emotional seemings 
pertaining to the non-evaluative features of the object.  
 
This is a problem because, if it is the case that all or most emotional seemings are quasi-
inferred from the seemings of their cognitive bases (i.e. perceptual seemings, introspective 
seemings, etc.), it looks like RSED can’t explain the intuitive epistemic difference between 
legitimately and illegitimately produced emotional seemings. Reconsider two versions of the 
suspicious interviewer case. In one scenario, the interviewer’s emotional seeming that the 
candidate is duplicitous is caused by legitimate observations of duplicitous-making features 
of the candidate, whereas the other scenario involves the emotional seeming being caused by 





the interviewer’s emotional seeming that the candidate is duplicitous is quasi-inferred from 
another seeming, and is thereby incapable of lending immediate justification to the evaluative 
belief that the candidate is duplicitous. But, as we’ve seen above, it looks like both the good 
and the bad case involve quasi-inferred emotional seemings. If merely being non-receptive 
makes a seeming incapable of conferring immediate justification, then RSED generates the 
same result for both the good and bad cases of suspicious interviewer. 
 
In response to this point, the defender of RSED might argue that the view can still explain the 
intuitive difference in epistemic capacity between the emotional seemings involved in both 
cases. That is, they may point to the difference in epistemic quality in each quasi-inference as 
that which explains the intuition that the emotional seeming produced by legitimate 
observations is better epistemically placed than the seeming produced by illegitimate bias. 
Recall from above that, on McGrath’s account, a quasi-inferential basis need not rob the 
seeming of all of its justificatory power. If it is a good quasi-inference, i.e. if the content of 
the base seeming adequately supports the content of the quasi-inferred seeming, then the 
quasi-inferred seeming can transmit mediate justification to the relevant belief. The defender 
of RSED might argue that in the good case, i.e. the case in which the emotional seeming that 
the candidate is duplicitous is quasi-inferred from the perceptual seeming which has as its 
content the relevant conjunction of duplicitous-making non-evaluative features of the 
candidate (i.e. their behaviours and mannerisms), the quasi-inference is legitimate insofar as 
the content of the base perceptual seeming adequately supports the content of the emotional 
seeming. We can see this by replacing the seeming experiences with beliefs with the same 
content. It seems plausible that the belief that the candidate is acting in particular ways (e.g. 
excessive talking, avoiding the gaze of the panel, etc.) is capable of lending inferential 
support to the belief that the candidate is duplicitous. On the other hand, consider the bias 
case. Presumably, the emotional seeming that the candidate is duplicitous will be quasi-
inferred from perceptual seemings with different contents, e.g. if the bias is a bias against 
women, then the emotional seeming that the candidate is duplicitous will be quasi-inferred 
from the base perceptual seeming that the candidate is a woman. Clearly, this is not a 
legitimate quasi-inference; there is nothing about the base seeming that adequately supports 
the content of the quasi-inferred emotional seeming. In other words, there’s an illegitimate 
‘jump’ in the bias quasi-inference that isn’t present in the good case, and this is what explains 






Now, even if this is a plausible way of explaining the intuitive difference between the two 
suspicious interviewer cases, it still doesn’t get us where we want to go. Recall that we’ve 
been interested in how emotional phenomenology can immediately justify our evaluative 
beliefs. If it is the case that emotional seemings can only ever transmit mediate justification 
generated by perceptual (or memorial, or introspective) seemings, then RSED cannot account 
for emotional experience as a source of foundational or immediate epistemic justification.46 
Given that the justificatory thesis of emotion is wholly interested in the latter, endorsing 
RSED seems to concede too much. For these reasons, then, it looks like McGrath’s 
receptivity-based view is not a suitable theoretical framework for a plausible restricted 
emotional dogmatist view. RSED does not fare any better than RED.  
 
3.3.2  Knowledge-How Emotional Dogmatism 
 
Finally, let’s consider Markie’s view. Returning to the gold prospector case, a natural 
suggestion as to why the expert prospector’s perceptual seeming enjoys justificatory power is 
that the expert knows what gold looks like; the novice doesn’t have anything close to this 
knowledge. One way of spelling out the problem with basic PC is that it can’t account for the 
fact that this ought to make for a difference between the epistemic status of the expert’s and 
novice’s belief. In light of this natural intuition, Markie (2013) proposes a qualified view of 
phenomenal conservatism which restricts the type of seemings capable of possessing 
justificatory power to seeming experiences brought about by the agent’s exercise of the 
relevant knowledge-how capacity: 
 
The difference between them is that [Expert] knows how to visually identify gold 
nuggets, and his seeming state and resulting belief are an instance of his exercise of 
this know-how; [Novice]’s seeming experience is not an instance of any such know-
how. Perhaps then an epistemically appropriate perceptual seeming experience to the 
effect that something is Q is one that is had in the exercise of the subject’s knowledge 
of how to perceptually identify something as being Q. (p. 262) 
 
 
46 Although, see Cowan (2018) for the proposal that emotions of this sort (i.e. emotional experiences 
quasi-inferred from their cognitive bases), while incapable of providing immediate justification, can 





For Markie, then, merely having a perceptual seeming is insufficient for immediate and 
defeasible justification. A further condition must be met, namely that the subject must have 
the relevant knowledge-how capacity to recognise the relevant property and the seeming 
must be appropriately related to that capacity, i.e. the knowledge-how plays a substantive 
causal role in bringing about the seeming. Now, importantly, a subject’s possessing the 
relevant knowledge-how capacity is not the same as their possessing the ability to reliably 
identify the property in question. Instead, on Markie’s view, what possessing a knowledge-
how capacity amounts to is the subject possessing a disposition to experience the relevant 
seemings upon perceptually apprehending certain features of the object in question, e.g. the 
expert prospector has the knowledge-how capacity to perceptually identify gold nuggets 
insofar as they are disposed to have the perceptual seeming that a pebble is gold when 
apprehending certain gold-making features of the object. Moreover, that subject’s disposition 
is, as Markie puts it, “determined by” (p. 264) their having the right sort of background 
information, e.g. that an object which has certain features and looks a certain way is gold. 
Finally, on Markie’s account, having this background information is a matter of having 
evidence that justifies the subject in believing, in this case, that an object which looks a 
certain way is gold.  
 
So, if this view looks like its generating the right result in the perceptual case, we can 
transpose it into an emotional dogmatist view as follows: 
 
Knowledge-How Emotional Dogmatism (KHED): S’s emotional experience is 
capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief that an object O 
instantiates an evaluative property E if and only if (i) the experience makes it seem to 
her that O is E, and (ii) S’s experience makes it seem to her that O is E in virtue of her 
knowledge of how to emotionally identify something as being E.  
 
To take a simple case, my emotional experience of fear towards the snake is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying my evaluative belief that the snake is fearsomeness if 
and only if my experience makes it seem to me that the snake is fearsome, and I have this 
emotional seeming as the result of my knowledge of how to emotionally identify something 
as fearsome. Analogously to the details of the perceptual case above, a subject’s knowledge-
how capacity to emotionally identify something as fearsome (or disgusting, or enviable, or 





involves the possession of a disposition to experience emotional seemings of fearsomeness 
upon attending to certain features of the object or situation. Moreover, and again analogously 
to the perceptual case, I possess this disposition at least partly by virtue of my having the 
relevant background information, i.e. what makes fearsome things fearsome.  
 
The good news for KHED is that it looks like the addition of the knowledge-how condition 
on seemings places the view in a much better position than RED to be able to handle over-
generalisation cases. Take the case in which the interviewer’s suspicious emotional seemings 
towards the candidate are produced by an epistemically illegitimate bias as opposed to 
epistemically legitimate observations of duplicitous-making features of the candidate. KHED 
seems to be able to provide a straightforward explanation as to why the interviewer’s 
emotional seemings do not justify them in believing that the candidate is duplicitous, i.e. the 
suspicious seeming is experienced by virtue of the interviewer harbouring illicit biases, not 
by virtue of their knowledge of how to emotionally identify duplicitousness. The interviewer 
whose emotional seemings do arise as a result of legitimate observations of duplicitous-
making features, however, plausibly does enjoy justification for their belief that the candidate 
is duplicitous insofar as their experiencing the suspicious seemings as a result of those 
legitimate observations are an exercise of her knowledge-how capacity to identify 
duplicitousness.  
 
On a similar note, KHED is well-placed to explain the intuitive difference in justification 
attribution to A’s perfectly-attuned and B’s unstable embarrassment experiences. Plausibly, 
what explains the fact that A’s embarrassment experiences consistently hit the evaluative 
mark is that she has developed a knowledge-how capacity to emotionally identify situations 
which instantiate the property of ‘embarrassingness’, and it is because of this that her 
embarrassment seemings confer justification to her relevant evaluative beliefs. B, on the 
other hand, clearly does not have this knowledge-how capacity, as evidenced by the 
instability of his embarrassment responses. KHED, then, seems to be in good stead insofar as 
it appears to have the theoretical resources to sidestep the over-generalisation problem.  
 
However, I take it that there are two serious problems for the defender of KHED. The first 
worry is that KHED ends up being overly restrictive insofar as it over-intellectualises the 
acquisition of emotional justification. If it is the case that emotional experience can only 





capacity to emotionally identify objects as instantiating the relevant evaluative property, and 
if possessing this knowledge-how capacity is determined by the subject possessing the 
relevant host of background information (i.e. evidence that justifies the subject’s belief that 
an object instantiates a particular evaluative property), then it looks like emotional 
justification is going to be difficult to come by.  
 
To illustrate, reconsider moral and aesthetic emotional experiences. There seem to be many 
instances of these experiences that we intuitively take to be good candidates for experiences 
capable of conferring justification to evaluative belief, e.g. indignation in response to 
discriminatory political policies, guilt upon breaking a promise to a friend, awe in response to 
a beautiful painting, and so forth. If KHED is true, then it is a necessary condition on these 
experiences being capable of conferring justification that they ultimately derive from the 
subject’s having all of the relevant background information, i.e. evidence that would justify 
the subject in believing the relevant evaluative proposition, i.e. that the discriminatory policy 
is unjust, etc. This seems to be requiring too much of the subject. Moreover, it’s not entirely 
clear that this account paints a plausible picture of immediate justification. Since justification-
conferring emotional seemings must be the result of an exercise of a knowledge-how 
capacity, and since this capacity is determined by the possession of background information 
that would justify the relevant evaluative proposition, it’s not at all obvious that KHED is 
capturing the phenomenon that we set out to explain, i.e. how emotional experience can 
confer justification to evaluative belief which does not depend on the subject’s possessing 
any other justified beliefs. Like McGrath’s account, then, KHED doesn’t seem to be able to 
straightforwardly or adequately account for immediate emotional justification.  
 
Relatedly, a second worry for KHED is that attributing so much weight to the possession of 
the relevant background information that determines one’s disposition to have the relevant 
emotional seemings (and thereby the relevant knowledge-how capacity) threatens to render 
emotional phenomenology epistemically superfluous. That is, there’s a serious question of 
what justificatory work the emotional seemings are doing if the brunt of the epistemic labour 
has already been done by the subject insofar as she putatively has the background 
information required to justify her belief that a given object instantiates the relevant 
evaluative property. Given the epistemic centrality and significance of phenomenal seemings 





phenomenology would constitute a mark against the view as a plausible version of emotional 
dogmatism.     
 
To summarise, then, while KHED initially looks promising insofar as it seems better placed 
to handle the over-generalisation problem, we see on closer inspection that it both over-
intellectualises the acquisition of emotional justification and, by the same token, threatens to 
make emotional phenomenology epistemically superfluous insofar as it places the brunt of 
the epistemic burden on the possession of background information about evaluative concepts. 
Moreover, because the view plausibly over-intellectualises the acquisition of emotional 
justification, I take it that KHED will not be attractive to those intuitively aligned with 
phenomenal conservatism. On the other hand, insofar as KHED still attributes epistemic 
weight to phenomenal character, I take it that it will also be unattractive to those not 
intuitively aligned with phenomenal conservative views. KHED, therefore, does not appear to 
fare any better than RED as a restricted emotional dogmatist view.47  
 
3.4. Summing up  
 
Thus far in the dissertation, my aim has been to investigate the prospects of a dogmatist 
approach to emotional justification, i.e. an approach which identifies the phenomenological 
profile of emotional experience as the source of its ability to lend immediate and defeasible 
epistemic justification to evaluative belief. I have endeavoured to show that there appears to 
be no plausible way of spelling out the epistemically significant phenomenal character of 
emotional experience and, as such, that there appears to be no plausible candidate for a 
dogmatist approach to emotional justification.  
 
To recap, the beginning of this chapter saw RED enter the discussion with a clean slate. In 
the previous chapter, I identified RED as the most promising instantiation of the emotional 
dogmatist view, and defended it against the objection that evaluative properties, in virtue of 
bearing a normative dimension, are incapable of being objects of emotional seeming 
 
47 While KHED strikes me as an implausible view for the reasons mentioned here, note that my own 
view, which will be elucidated in Chapter 6 (§6.5), shares certain similarities to KHED. As will 
become clear, I think that mechanisms of emotional learning are central to the emotions’ ability to 
perform justificatory roles. These learning mechanisms could be considered similar to Markie’s 
construal of the knowledge-how capacity, but, crucially, I do not take learned emotional capacities to 





awareness. However, in §3.2, I argued that the question of what truth-makers for evaluative 
propositions consists in leads RED to a troubling dilemma. §3.2.1 saw that if we take 
evaluative properties to be the relevant truth-makers (REDEP), then the view will continue to 
over-generalise, whereas §3.2.2 established that if we instead take the relevant set of non-
evaluative properties to be the truth-makers (REDNEP), then the view will under-generalise 
and fail to include emotional experiences which, intuitively, are capable of lending epistemic 
justification to evaluative belief. In light of RED’s shortcomings, §3.4 then considered two 
alternative instantiations of the restricted ED view: Receptive Seemings Emotional 
Dogmatism (RSED) and Knowledge-How Emotional Dogmatism (KHED). I argued that 
neither of these views fare better than RED.  
 
So, where does this discussion leave us? The failure of both basic and restricted emotional 
dogmatist accounts, it seems, is that emotional awareness is not a sufficiently sophisticated 
philosophical tool through which we can secure a satisfactory account of emotional 
justification. First, our scope of emotional awareness was cast too wide, in which case too 
many emotional experiences were bestowed with justificatory power, but it was also seen that 
our attempts to adjust and fine-tune the scope of emotional awareness by imposing further 
restrictions on what can be plausibly included resulted in much too narrow a focus. The fact 
that emotional dogmatist accounts continually miss the mark when it comes to our intuitive 
verdict on whether an emotional experience can justify evaluative belief seems suggestive of 
the fact that emotional awareness and phenomenology just isn’t what’s doing the justificatory 
work; that there’s something else that’s determining whether emotional experiences are 
capable of justifying evaluative belief beyond the what-it-is-like-ness to undergo the 
experience. The prospects for a dogmatist approach to emotional justification, then, are bleak. 








A Reliabilist Approach  
 
4.1. Introductory Remarks 
 
Thus far, we’ve seen that the epistemic capacity of emotional experience to immediately and 
defeasibly justify evaluative belief cannot be plausibly spelled out in terms of emotional 
experience possessing an epistemically significant phenomenal character. Indeed, we saw 
that determining the justificatory status of a given evaluative belief on the basis of whether 
the subject’s emotional experience bears the relevant seeming phenomenal character 
repeatedly generated counterintuitive and problematic results. One possible explanation for 
this is that the question of whether a given emotional experience instantiates a particular 
phenomenal character is not in any way bound up with whether that emotional experience 
accurately represents its object. That is, focusing solely on a subject’s emotional awareness 
and her internal seeming states neglects the question as to whether our emotional experiences 
are actually accurately tracking the presence of evaluative properties, and this might seem 
significant with respect to determining whether emotional experience can immediately and 
defeasibly justify evaluative belief.  
 
In light of this, then, it seems like a natural transition following our rejection of 
phenomenology-based views of emotional justification is to shift our focus from internalist 
aspects of emotional experience, i.e. emotional awareness and phenomenology, and move to 
an account which invests epistemic significance in externalist aspects, i.e. factors external to 
the subject’s mental states. We can locate threads of support for an externalist view of 
emotional justification from a number of authors in the literature. Specifically, many of these 
authors unite around the notion of emotional reliability as the epistemically relevant 
externalist factor. For example, Elgin (2008) hinges the putative justificatory power of 
emotion on their being “reliably correlated” (p. 38) with the way things are in the evaluative 
landscape. Additionally, Pelser (2011) defends a version of the justificatory thesis plausibly 
understood as reliabilist insofar as he seemingly allows that the emotions’ pervasive and 
widespread unreliability would be sufficient to render them epistemically powerless.48 
 
48 Strictly speaking, Pelser takes the justificatory thesis to be compatible with a wide range of both 
internalist and externalist theories of justification. However, due to his extensive defence of the thesis 





Moreover, Brady (2013) appears to assume a reliabilist conception of the justificatory thesis 
in his discussion of the view, claiming that “[the] epistemic role and value of emotional 
experience… depends upon the existence of reliable causal links between emotional 
experience and the occurrence of “core relational themes” of danger, insult, contamination, 
less, shamefulness, wrongness, and the like” (p. 76).49 From these comments, then, we can 
draw up our next contender for an explanation as to how emotional experience can 
immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief: emotional reliabilism. Emotional 
reliabilism, roughly, is the view that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate 
and defeasible justification to evaluative belief in virtue of the fact that basing one’s 
evaluative belief on the relevant emotional experience is a reliable process of belief-
formation.50 In this chapter, I aim to do the following: (i) motivate and clarify the most 
plausible version of the emotional reliabilist view, and (ii) defend emotional reliabilism from 
the most conspicuous objection facing it, namely, the unreliability problem.   
 
This structure of this chapter is as follows. In §4.2, I set out emotional reliabilism in more 
detail by explaining the motivations for adopting it, and highlighting the philosophical fruit 
that doing so might bear. I also clarify the view by rebutting three preliminary objections 
facing emotional reliabilism in §4.2.1, §4.2.2, and §4.2.3 respectively in order to pave the 
way for the central critical discussion of the chapter. §4.3 then begins this discussion by 
presenting the unreliability problem and explaining why it ought to concern emotional 
reliabilists. I then identify what I take to be the three most promising ways in which one 
might argue for the systematic unreliability of emotional experience and defend emotional 
reliabilism by rejecting all three as implausibly theoretically costly. I then provide concluding 
remarks in section §4.4.  
 
4.2.  Motivating and Clarifying Emotional Reliabilism 
 
Emotional reliabilism is based on a process reliabilist view of epistemic justification. 
Following Goldman (2008), let us understand process reliabilism (henceforth ‘reliabilism’) in 
terms of the following: 
 
attributes a great deal of epistemic importance to the reliability of emotion. See Pelser (2011) for 
further detail.  
49 Note again, however, that Brady rejects the justificatory thesis of emotion as implausible.  
50 In this chapter, and throughout the dissertation, note that I often use ‘emotional reliability’ as 






Reliabilism: a proposition p is propositionally justified for an epistemic agent S (at 
time t) just in case S’s total mental state (at t) is such that if S were to “target” 
proposition p and were to apply suitable reliable processes in her repertoire to that 
total state, then a belief that p would be generated in S. (p. 77) 
 
We can unpack this with a straightforward case of sense perceptual experience. Take the 
visual experience of an orange on the table. For reliabilists, I’m immediately and defeasibly 
justified in believing that there’s an orange on the table if and only if that belief is formed via 
a reliable cognitive process (or processes). In this case, the relevant process involves my 
visually experiencing the orange and forming the belief that there is an orange on the basis of 
that visual experience. Now, because that belief-forming process is reliable insofar as it tends 
to produce more true beliefs than not, I am thereby immediately and defeasibly justified in 
believing that there is an orange on the basis of my visual experience. My merely guessing 
that there is an orange, on the other hand, would not be capable of justifying my belief that 
there is an orange, given that guessing lacks a favourable ratio of true output-beliefs over 
false ones, and thereby fails to constitute a reliable belief-forming process.  
 
Reliabilism is typically considered to be the chief representative and paradigm of externalist 
epistemology, and enjoys a host of support from epistemologists in the literature.51 The 
primary attraction of the account is that it secures an intuitive and robust connection between 
justification and truth. To illustrate, reconsider the case of Markie’s gold prospector. 
Reliabilists can easily explain why the novice prospector’s belief that the pebble is gold fails 
to enjoy the same positive justificatory status as the expert’s, i.e. the wishful novice lacks any 
reliable processes which would give rise to the belief that the pebble is gold. Indeed, recall 
that the wishful prospector forms their belief on the basis of their desire to discover gold. 
Because this is evidently not a reliable process of belief formation, i.e. it will only by chance 
generate a true belief and will regularly produce false beliefs, the novice prospector is not 
justified in believing that the pebble is gold. The expert prospector, on the other hand, is 
justified insofar as their believing that the pebble is gold on the basis of their perceptual 
experience and learned identification skills is a reliable process.  
 
51 Reliabilist epistemology has been defended by many notable authors, including Goldberg (2010), 






So, if reliabilism looks like it’s generating the right result in the perceptual case, then we can 
build an emotional analogue as follows: 
 
Emotional Reliabilism (ER): S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and 
defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if forming evaluative beliefs 
on the basis of emotional experience is a reliable process of belief-formation.  
 
For ER, my experience of fear towards the snake is capable of immediately and defeasibly 
justifying my evaluative belief that the snake is fearsome if and only if my evaluative beliefs 
formed on the basis of my emotional experiences tend to be true. Crucially, for the emotional 
reliabilist, the reliability of the overall belief-forming process requires that the subject’s 
emotional system reliably generates true evaluative content, i.e. the subject’s emotional 
system tends to be reliably responsive to the presence of evaluative properties. Of course, 
reliability does not entail infallibility. It’s perfectly compatible with ER that my emotional 
experiences occasionally miss the mark under unideal conditions. The only requirement is 
that forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience is a reliable enough 
belief-forming process. As a final clarificatory point, note that, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I do not intend to construe the truth of ER as a logical consequence of the truth 
of generic process reliabilism. That is, the prospects of ER will be evaluated independently of 
the truth or falsity of generic reliabilism.52   
 
There are good reasons to endorse ER. The first of which, as we’ve seen above in §4.1, is that 
the view enjoys a host of support from notable authors in the literature. Moreover, one 
particularly attractive feature of this view from our perspective is that, similarly to the way in 
which general reliabilism offers a solution to Markie’s prospector case, ER promises to 
provide us with a way out of the emotional over-generalisation problem that stumped 
dogmatist views. Recall the suspicious interviewer. ER has the resources to be able to explain 
the intuitive verdict that the interviewer is significantly more likely be justified in their 
evaluative belief when the emotional experience of suspicion is based on their observations 
of duplicitous-making features of the candidate, but not when the interviewer’s suspicion is 
produced by illegitimate background biases. That is, very plausibly, the relevant belief-
 





forming processes are different. Forming an evaluative belief on the basis of emotional 
experience generated by illicit biases is likely to be a largely unreliable process of belief 
formation, whereas forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of legitimate observations of the 
non-evaluative properties which give rise to the evaluative properties will be significantly 
more reliable. ERs can point to this difference in the reliability of the processes in each of the 
cases as what explains our intuition that the epistemic status of the latter case is better than 
that of the former.53  
 
Now, in spite of these attractions, ER faces three preliminary objections. The first of which is 
a causal worry, the second is a version of a generality problem, and the third targets the 
necessity of reliability for epistemic justification. In what remains of this section, I will tackle 
these worries, defending and clarifying ER along the way.  
 
4.2.1 A Causal Problem 
 
First, one might worry that ER suffers a causal problem. More specifically, it might be 
objected that there doesn’t seem to be the right kind of causal nexus between emotional 
experience and evaluative properties required for a tenable reliabilist theory. Reliabilism, as a 
theoretical descendent of a causal process theory of justification, is traditionally understood 
to be a paradigm of a naturalised epistemology, locating epistemic value and epistemic 
properties in natural causal processes that take place between the believer and the objects of 
her belief. To illustrate, consider sense perceptual experiences. It might be thought that the 
reliability of my visual perception in tracking properties such as colour, shape, and motion is 
grounded in the particular causal interaction taking place between those properties and my 
perceptual faculty. That is, my visual experience of the book on the table is caused by the 
book’s properties, my auditory experience of a passing car is caused by the car, and so forth. 
Thus, I am justified in believing that there is a book on the table or that a car has passed by at 
least partially in virtue of the fact that I stand in a certain causal relation to the objects of 
those beliefs.  
 
 
53 Here, one important question may arise concerning how we individuate the relevant processes 





In order for ER to be appropriately analogous to general reliabilism, then, it might be argued 
that a similar causal interaction must take place between emotional experience and evaluative 
properties; that emotional experience and evaluative properties must be appropriately 
causally networked in order for subjects to have epistemic access to evaluative properties, 
and thereby for a plausible reliabilist conception of the justificatory thesis of emotion to get 
off the ground. However, it doesn’t seem obvious that my emotional experience of fear is 
caused by the evaluative property of fearsomeness, or that my emotional experience of anger 
is caused by the evaluative property of offensiveness. Indeed, claiming that such evaluative 
properties are causally efficacious is a controversial metaethical position.54 As such, it might 
be objected that forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience cannot be a 
reliable belief-forming process precisely because our emotions are not causally ‘hooked up’ 
to evaluative properties in the right kind of way, and therefore, that emotional experience 
cannot be supplemented into a reliabilist theory of justification. 
 
It seems to me that the defender of ER can dispose of this objection in one of two ways. First 
of all, one might deny that the kind of causal interaction detailed above is necessary for 
reliabilism.55 As it has been spelled out here, all that ER requires is that the following 
precondition is met: forming evaluative belief on the basis of emotional experience is a 
reliable process of belief formation. It is not obvious that this precondition necessitates that 
emotional experience and evaluative properties are causally networked. That is, it’s not 
obvious that the relevant causal interaction is required for reliability. Consider mathematical 
knowledge and justified belief, for example. It doesn’t seem obviously incorrect to suggest 
that we reliably form true mathematical beliefs (e.g. that 12 is the square root of 144, that 3 is 
a prime number, etc.) without being appropriately causally networked to the relevant abstract 
mathematical entities. Thus, the defender of ER can diffuse the objection by detaching 
reliabilist theories of justification from the causal constraints imposed upon them by the 
theoretical context in which they arose.  
 
However, for the sake of argument, suppose that tenable reliabilist accounts do require causal 
interaction between the believer and the object of her belief. This does not undermine ER, for 
the defender of the thesis can appeal to a certain causal connection between emotional 
 
54 However, see Oddie (2005) for a defence of this view.  
55 Shafer-Landau (2003) argues for this point in his response to a very similar causal objection facing 





experience and evaluative properties. While it might be true that evaluative properties 
themselves are causally inert, one might insist that evaluative properties supervene on the 
non-evaluative properties of objects which are appropriately causally networked to emotional 
experience. On this account, while my fear may not be caused by the ‘fearsomeness’ property 
of the dog, it is plausibly caused by the non-evaluative features of the dog that the evaluative 
property supervenes on (e.g. the sharp teeth, the snarling maw, etc.). We can therefore 
understand evaluative properties as having some sort of causal power, albeit a causal power 
not intrinsic to them but derived from the non-evaluative, descriptive properties which 
constitute their supervenience base.56 Thus, in light of these feasible responses, I take it that 
the defender of ER has the resources available to her to disarm causal worries of this sort.  
 
4.2.2 A Generality Problem 
 
The second problem facing ER is a familiar foe for any instantiation of a reliabilist account. 
The generality problem for reliabilism, roughly, is the problem of non-arbitrarily 
individuating the processes of belief-formation which are to be assessed in terms of their 
reliability. Reconsider the visual experience of the orange. The token process of belief 
formation in this case, i.e. forming a belief that there is an orange on the basis of the visual 
perceptual experience of an orange, is an instance of many types. Not only is it a token 
instance of the type ‘visually perceiving an orange’, but also of ‘visually perceiving an 
orange in good lighting conditions’, ‘visually perceiving an orange on a Tuesday’, ‘visually 
perceiving an orange when I’m in a good mood’, and so forth. Now, the process token itself 
is a one-off and unrepeatable event, and cannot be assessed in terms of its reliability. It 
seems, then, that we must look to the process-type to which that token belongs as the locus of 
our reliability assessment. The question for reliabilists is which one of these process-types is 
relevant for the assessment of reliability. This is an important question, particularly given that 
it’s entirely possible that reliability verdicts, and thereby attribution of justification, will 
differ across the range of processes. The challenge for reliabilism, then, is to provide a 
principled way of determining which process-type is the correct candidate for reliability 
 
56 Audi (2013) endorses a similar causal story with respect to moral properties. On Audi’s account, 
moral properties are grounded in non-moral properties, such that the former can figure into causal 






evaluations. Without such a rule, reliabilism is, as Conee and Feldman (1998) put it, 
“radically incomplete” (p. 3). 
 
With this in mind, we can see how an objector might level a generality-style challenge 
against ER. That is, one might raise the challenge of how we are to identify the relevant 
process type for forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience (e.g. ‘fear in 
response to slithery animals’, ‘fear in response to a snake’, ‘fear in response to a snake which 
is grounded in observations of the fearsome-making features of the snake’, etc.). This is a 
question concerning how fine the process-grain ought to be when it comes to reliability 
evaluations.57 It’s clear that this question is important given that we’ve already seen the 
impact the answer has on reliability verdicts. Recall from above that ER’s answer to 
emotional over-generalisation cases, like the suspicious interviewer, is to point to differences 
in the relevant process-type. That is, the interviewer’s evaluative belief is justified when it is 
based on an emotional experience which is in turn based on observations of the duplicitous-
making features of the candidate (given the reliability of this belief-forming process), and 
isn’t justified when it is based on an emotional experience caused by cognitive biases (given 
the comparable unreliability of this belief-forming process). But on what principle can we 
carve a distinction between these processes, such that these are the relevant belief-forming 
processes to be assessed in terms of their reliability?  
 
There are a couple of things to say about this. First of all, given that this particular problem 
for ER is an instance of a more general problem for reliabilists, I take it that ERs have a 
range of argumentative options to choose from in how they answer this challenge. Many 
reliabilists have attempted to provide a principle for type-individuating the relevant belief-
forming process, choosing to individuate on the basis of such features as how the belief is 
based on the subject’s available evidence, the information-processing problems solved by the 
belief-forming process, the algorithms and parameters employed by the process, and so 
forth.58 Given that ER strikes me as no more worse off with respect to the generality problem 
than these other general reliabilist views, and because these general reliabilist views have this 
range of argumentative options to choose from, I take it that the defender of ER can also 
make use of whichever option she deems most plausible.  
 
57 Deonna and Teroni (2012b, p. 70) briefly discuss this point.   






Second, if the objector is unsatisfied by the prospect of ER borrowing a general solution to 
the reliabilist’s generality problem, note that I will put forward an argument which directly 
bears on the question of how we ought to individuate our reliability assessments in Chapter 6 
(§6.5). On my view, the belief-forming processes (or, more specifically, emotional 
competences – but more on that later) are individuated according to the subject’s learned 
capacity to emotionally identify an object as instantiating a given evaluative property. That is, 
one’s evaluative belief is immediately and defeasibly justified on the basis of their emotional 
experience if and only if that emotional experience arises from the subject’s learned capacity 
to identify the relevant object as instantiating the relevant evaluative property. Crucially, 
these learned emotional capacities are fine-grained, i.e. a subject comes to emotionally learn 
how to identify aggressive snakes as fearsome, or spoiled foods as disgusting, or sexist 
comments as offensive, and so forth. Briefly, one reason for endorsing this view is that 
individuating instead on a coarse-grained basis, i.e. assessing reliability across the full range 
of one’s emotion-types and experiences, risks objectionably ruling out cases in which an 
individual has an epistemically valuable emotional experience but, due to their general 
emotional unreliability, doesn’t count as being sufficiently reliable in the right way so as to 
award particular emotional experiences justificatory power.59  
 
One of the upsides of endorsing such a view is that it provides us with principled grounds for 
explaining why we ought to narrowly individuate emotional belief-forming processes, such 
that we can make sense of the verdict that the interviewer’s belief that the candidate is 
duplicitous is not justified when it is formed via the emotional experience of suspicion based 
on the illicit bias, but it is (or can be) justified when it is formed via the emotional experience 
of suspicion based on legitimate perception of duplicitous-making features of the candidate, 
 
59 Later on in Chapter 6 (§6.4 and §6.5.2), I present two cases which demonstrate this point. As a brief 
illustration, the first of which concerns a canine behaviourist who reliably experiences fear in 
response to fearsome dogs but fails to reliably experience any other emotion as appropriately 
responsive to the presence of an evaluative property. The second case concerns a member of an 
oppressed social group who reliably experiences, say, anger in response to sexually offensive 
comments, but fails to reliably experience other emotions as appropriately responsive to the presence 
of evaluative properties. These will be spelled out in further detail later, but the crucial point for our 
purposes here is that a broad-scope ER (i.e. one which assesses for reliability across all of one’s 
emotion-types and emotional experiences) would be unable to bestow the canine behaviourist’s fear 
experiences with justificatory power, nor would be it able to allow the oppressed individual’s specific 
anger experiences justificatory ability in virtue of their overall emotional unreliability. As will 





i.e. the emotional experience arises from the subject’s relevant emotional competence to 
emotionally identify individuals as duplicitous.  
 
Of course, the details of this proposal will be spelled out in more detail later on in the 
dissertation. For now, I take the availability of both various general reliabilist solutions to the 
generality problem and my forthcoming argument for the fine-grained individuation of 
processes to be sufficient to diffuse the immediate objection, such that we can explore the 
prospects of ER untroubled by generality worries. 
 
4.3.3. A Necessity Problem 
 
A third objection that one might level against ER concerns the putative necessity of 
emotional reliability for epistemic justification of evaluative belief. Specifically, one might 
argue that reliability of the relevant belief-forming process cannot be necessary for the 
relevant beliefs to enjoy positive justificatory status.60 Let us first consider how this problem 
is typically presented with respect to general process reliabilism, namely, in terms of the New 
Evil Demon Problem (NEDP): 
 
Imagine that, unknown to us, our cognitive processes, those involved in perception, 
memory and inference, are rendered unreliable by the actions of a powerful demon or 
malevolent scientist. It would follow on reliabilist views that under such conditions 
the beliefs generated by those processes would not be justified. This result is 
unacceptable. The truth of the demon hypothesis also entails that our experiences and 
our reasonings are just what they would be if our cognitive processes were reliable, 
and, therefore, that we would be just as well justified in believing what we do if the 
demon hypothesis were true as if it were false. (Lehrer & Cohen 1983, p. 192) 
 
The worry is that a theory of epistemic justification which requires reliability of the relevant 
belief-forming process will generate the wrong result here. That is, it seems drastically 
counterintuitive (and perhaps even unfair), so the thought goes, to deny our demon-world 
 
60 On the other side of the coin, one might worry that reliability cannot be sufficient for epistemic 
justification, such that ER must be false. This objection, I contend, is significantly more challenging 






analogues with epistemic justification for their beliefs merely because the relevant belief-
forming processes are unreliable in their world, and the reason for this is that the demon-
world belief-forming processes are (putatively) identical in all of the relevant ways to the 
belief-forming processes in the normal world, which, given their reliability, do confer 
justification to the relevant beliefs. If NEDP is convincing, then reliability of the relevant 
belief-forming processes cannot be necessary for epistemic justification. Moreover, if this 
reliability is not necessary for epistemic justification, then general process reliabilism must be 
false. Finally, if general process reliabilism is undermined by NEDP, then perhaps, the 
objector may stress, we have good reason to think that ER will be similarly defeated.  
 
I take it that there are two reasons as to why we should resist this conclusion. The first of 
which is that it’s not obvious that the NEDP is a knock-down argument for the falsity of 
general reliabilism. Indeed, many advocates of reliabilism do not take NEDP to establish that 
reliability cannot be necessary for epistemic justification. Take Goldman’s (1988) response to 
the challenge, for instance. According to Goldman, the reliabilist can distinguish between 
notions of strong and weak justification in order to dispel the result that demon-world 
subjects are not justified in their beliefs. For Goldman, the demon-world subjects can be said 
to enjoy weak justification for their beliefs in light of the fact that all weak justification 
requires is that the belief is formed non-culpably or blamelessly (p. 53). Strong justification, 
on the other hand, requires that the belief was actually well-formed by suitable processes. 
Plausibly, the demon-subjects are blameless in their beliefs (given the intuition that it would 
be unfair to deny them justification for beliefs formed by processes relevantly identical to 
normal-world subjects), and so enjoy weak justification, even if they cannot enjoy strong 
justification in light of the demon’s intervention. Alternatively, if distinguishing between 
different varieties of epistemic justification strikes the reader as implausible, Baysan (2017) 
argues that the reliabilist need not alter their position in light of the NEDP, and suggests that 
appeal to a dispositionalist framework of properties can provide reliabilists with the resources 
to explain why the demon-world subjects can, in fact, be justified in their beliefs. According 
to Baysan, what we can say about the demon-world subjects is that their belief-forming 
processes plausibly instantiate the dispositional property of being reliable, but that the 
demon’s intervention prevents this disposition from being manifested. Hence, reliabilists 
need not deny that the demon-world subjects are justified in their beliefs, and the 






There are, of course, many more strategies available to the reliabilist. Lyons (2013), for 
example, argues that the reliabilist in fact ought to deny positive justificatory status to some 
of the demon-world subjects’ beliefs. Comesaña (2002), on the other hand, advances a 
nuanced Indexical Reliabilism which purports to diffuse the force of the NEDP, while Moon 
(2012b) argues that the more plausible variants of internalism also fall foul of the NEDP. A 
full discussion of these argumentative options would take us too far afield, given that the 
purpose of this chapter is to assess emotional reliabilism, but I take it that the availability of 
such strategies might go some way in diminishing the putative intuitive force of the NEDP 
for reliabilists. 
 
A second reason to resist this challenge is that even if general reliabilism is undermined by 
NEDP, we have good reason to suppose that ER is not similarly vulnerable to this 
challenge.61 To illustrate, consider S, a subject in the actual world, and S*, S’s demon-world 
counterpart. Let us suppose that S and S* undergo psychologically identical processes of 
apprehending an approaching snake and its features, e.g. erratic movements, aggressive 
hissing, sharp fangs, and so forth. Moreover, suppose that both S and S* have an emotional 
experience of fear in response to the snake. Correspondingly, both S and S* form the 
evaluative belief that the snake is fearsome on the basis of their emotional experience. Now, 
following the example of the NEDP, we can stipulate that ER will bestow S’s evaluative 
belief with justificatory power given S’s reliability with respect to forming evaluative beliefs 
about fearsomeness on the basis of their fear experiences, whereas ER denies the same 
justificatory power to S*’s evaluative belief given S*’s drastic unreliability in this regard. Is 
this a problematic result? Plausibly not, and I take it that this is down the nature of the 
relationship between emotional experience and evaluative properties. Let me explain. 
 
If we suppose that the normal-world subject and the demon-world subject are psychologically 
identical, then, presumably, this entails that both subjects have the same experience of the 
relevant non-evaluative properties of the object, i.e. both subjects experience the cognitive 
base of the emotional experience (e.g. the perceptual experience of the snake and its features) 
in the same way. Moreover, recall from earlier chapters that one plausible theory concerning 
the nature of evaluative properties is that they merit or make fitting particular emotional 
 
61 Indeed, recall that I’m taking my assessment of ER’s plausibility to be logically independent from 
the overall truth or falsity of general reliabilism, such that, even if general reliabilism is rendered 





responses. An object instantiates the evaluative property of ‘fearsomeness’, then, insofar as 
that object merits fear responses. Putting all of this together, then, if S is reliable with respect 
to forming true fearsomeness-beliefs on the basis of their fear experiences, then S reliably 
tracks fearsomeness-making non-evaluative properties instantiated by particular objects via 
perceptual experience, imaginative experience, etc. Importantly, S* is psychologically 
identical to S, so S* must also reliably track fearsomeness-making non-evaluative properties 
instantiated by particular objects. However, by stipulation of the NEDP example, S* is 
unreliable with respect to forming fearsomeness-beliefs on the basis of their fear experiences. 
But, if S* is psychologically identical to S, and thereby reliably tracks fearsomeness-making 
features of objects, then how could S* be unreliable with respect to forming true 
fearsomeness-based beliefs? The only plausible answer to this question (assuming neo-
sentimentalism)62 is that the demon’s intervention changes what merits fearsomeness in the 
demon-world, such that what instantiates the evaluative property ‘fearsomeness’ is different 
in the demon-world than in the normal-world. Therefore, demon-world subjects cannot be 
identical to normal-world subjects in all relevant respects because the evaluative properties 
that they’re tracking must be different by stipulation of the case. The fact that ER does not 
bestow justificatory power to the demon-world subject, then, is not problematic.  
 
So, if NEDP cannot be plausibly applied to ER, then I take it that this provides us with good 
reason not to abandon the necessity of reliability for emotional justification. As a further 
reason, recall that appeal to reliable success was what allowed ER to generate the correct 
result in the over-generalisation cases that plagued dogmatist versions of the justificatory 
thesis. The fact that building in a reliability condition into the justificatory thesis of emotion 
seems to significantly improve its prospects with respect to these cases (alongside the fact 
that ER doesn’t seem to be undermined by an analogous presentation of the NEDP) certainly 
seems suggestive of the idea that the reliability of forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of 
emotional experience is an important, and perhaps even necessary, condition for the emotions 
to possess immediate and defeasible justificatory power. In light of these arguments, then, I 




62 Although I assume neo-sentimentalism here, note that the point of this example is compatible with 






4.3 Objection: The Unreliability Problem 
 
Now, having clarified and defended ER against some initial objections, let us move onto a 
further worry facing the view. One of the most straightforward means of rejecting ER is to 
deny the consequent of the biconditional, i.e. to deny that forming evaluative beliefs on the 
basis of emotional experience is a reliable process of belief-formation. So, if it’s true that 
reliability is necessary for the emotions’ ability to immediately and defeasibly justify 
evaluative belief (as argued for in §4.2.3), and if forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of 
one’s emotional experience is in fact an unreliable belief-forming process, then evaluative 
beliefs formed on the basis of one’s emotional experiences cannot be justified. Call this 
objection the unreliability problem.  
 
The idea that emotional experience is unable to meet a sufficient threshold of reliability in 
order to perform a positive epistemic role is a familiar one. Indeed, recall from Chapter 1 
(§1.1) that opposing the justificatory thesis of emotion is the idea that emotional influence 
makes us epistemically worse off than we would otherwise be; that emotions bias and cloud 
our perception as to the way things are. It certainly seems to be a common folk intuition that 
hot-headed emotional reasoning is likely to lead us astray, while cool and cerebral rationality 
is the reliable pathway to truth. Moreover, we can look to the philosophical literature for 
comments suggestive of this intuition, such as Tappolet’s (2016) claim that “it is far from 
clear that the relation between emotions and concerns is a reliable one. More often than not, 
emotions misfire…” (p. 42). An immediate challenge for ER, then, is to defend the reliability 
of forming evaluating beliefs on the basis of emotional experience against this appearance of 
unreliability.  
 
To be clear, the unreliability problem cannot amount to the simple claim that emotions 
sometimes misfire, for advocates of ER will be perfectly happy to accept this possibility 
given the caveat that emotional experience only defeasibly justifies evaluative belief on this 
model. In order to do any substantive damage to ER, then, the unreliability problem must be 
presented not just as the worry that emotions misfire in unideal conditions, but instead as the 
worry that emotional experience is significantly or systematically unreliable, such that it is 
uniformly incapable of conferring any degree of epistemic justification. It is not the problem 





beliefs, but rather, it is the problem that emotions so often misfire such that they do not meet 
the reliability precondition required for ER to obtain.  
 
In what follows, the question I will endeavour to answer is whether there exists any plausible 
theoretical support for the idea that are emotions are systematically unreliable. I take there to 
be three possible arguments one might present in favour of such unreliability: (1) emotional 
experience is highly cognitively penetrable, and this high rate of cognitive penetration is the 
source of the emotions’ unreliability, (2) the complexity and obscurity of value concepts 
severely hinders the emotions’ ability to accurately track evaluative information, and (3) the 
possibility of reliable emotional dispositions in virtuous agents is ruled out by: (i) situationist 
challenges, and/or (ii) the absence of any compelling feedback system with respect to 
emotion and evaluative belief. In what remains of this chapter, I will elucidate and ultimately 
reject each of these arguments in turn.63  
 
4.3.1 The Cognitive Penetrability of Emotion 
 
One possible explanation of the emotions’ widespread unreliability might be that the content 
of our emotional experiences appears to be significantly susceptible to being unduly 
influenced by background cognitive states, such as beliefs or desires. For example, a 
subject’s unjustified belief that members of a particular ethnic group are untrustworthy will 
plausibly cause them to inappropriately experience fear or suspicion towards those 
individuals; a subject’s desire to rush home in time for the series finale of their favourite 
show will plausibly cause them to inappropriately experience anger towards leisurely 
pedestrians blocking their path. To put it more formally, one might think that emotional 
experience is cognitively penetrable to a significant degree.64  
 
63 At this point, one might object that the putative unreliability of emotion is a matter of brute 
empirical fact, such that, even if we cannot find a plausible avenue of theoretical support for the 
systematic unreliability of emotion, the fact of the matter remains that forming evaluative beliefs on 
the basis of one’s emotional experience is just an unreliable process of belief-formation. Let me 
clarify two points in response. First, the burden of proof is on the advocate of the unreliability 
problem to provide widespread empirical support for the idea that emotional experience is unreliable 
to this extent, i.e. that emotions are insufficiently reliable across all agents and contexts. Second, in 
the absence of this support, the further absence of a convincing theoretical explanation for this idea 
must count against the plausibility of the unreliability problem.  
64 Interestingly, we’ve already discussed putative cases of cognitive penetration. Recall the focus on 
Markie’s gold prospector in the previous two chapters. Plausibly, what’s going on in the case of 






In the interest of clarity, let us formally define cognitive penetration in terms of the following 
from Vance (2014):  
 
A visual experience is cognitively penetrable with respect to some content or 
character c if and only if two subjects (or the same subject at different times) can 
differ with respect to whether their experience has c, and the difference is the result of 
a causal process tracing back to a non-visual psychological state of the subject, where 
we hold fixed between the two subjects (or one subject at different times) the 
following: (i) the stimuli impacting their sensory receptors, (ii) the subject’s spatial 
attention, and (iii) the conditions of the subjects’ sensory organs. (p. 259)  
 
On this definition, an experience is said to be cognitively penetrable if the content of that 
experience is liable to being non-trivially influenced by the subject’s background cognitive 
states.65 For an illustration of a putatively cognitively penetrated visual experience, consider 
the following case from Siegel (2012):  
 
Jill believes, without justification, that Jack is angry with her. The epistemically 
appropriate attitude for Jill to take toward the proposition that Jack is angry at her is 
suspension of belief. But her attitude is epistemically inappropriate. When she sees 
Jack, her belief makes him look angry to her. If she didn’t believe this, her experience 
wouldn’t represent him as angry. (p. 209) 
 
Siegel’s case appears to fulfil the conditions for cognitive penetrability outlined in the 
definition above. Without the belief that Jack is angry with her, and holding fixed all other 
relevant conditions, Jill would not visually experience Jack’s facial expression as angry. 
Thus, it seems to be the case that Jill’s background cognitive state, her belief that Jack is 
angry with her, is penetrating her visual experience.66  
 
experience, i.e. the visual experience with the contents ‘this yellow pebble is gold’ can be causally 
and non-trivially traced back to the prospector’s strong desire to discover gold. 
65 See Macpherson (2012) and Siegel (2012) for similar definitions.  
66 The extent to which visual experiences are cognitively penetrated, if they can be at all, is largely an 
empirical matter. Some have argued that visual experiences are, in fact, impervious to penetration from 
cognitive states; that cases like Siegel’s can be analysed and re-described in ways that do not require 
the possibility of cognitive penetration. I will assume here that cognitive penetration of visual 






What makes cognitive penetration relevant to this discussion is the epistemic challenge it 
raises for accounts of justification. Some, including Siegel, have suggested that this putative 
cognitive penetrability of visual experiences may have negative epistemological ramifications 
in certain cases; that such a feature might threaten or at least limit the justificatory ability of 
certain visual experiences. In an ordinary case, i.e. a case in which Jill’s visual experience is 
not cognitively penetrated, it may be plausible to suggest that Jill’s visual experience of 
Jack’s facial expression defeasibly justifies her belief that he is angry with her. However, 
because the content of Jill’s visual experience has been influenced by her antecedent 
unjustified belief that Jack is angry, one might worry that this influence effectively bars that 
visual experience from doing any justificatory work. That is, crucially, cognitive penetration 
does not just serve as a defeater for the prima facie justification ordinarily conferred by visual 
experience, but rather it blocks the experience from performing any justificatory role.67  
 
So, if we have reason to think that the justificatory power of visual experiences may be 
threatened or limited by their putative cognitive penetrability, then we may have reason to 
think that emotional experiences are similarly liable to this possibility. On the question of 
whether the notion of cognitive penetrability can be applied to emotional experience, Vance 
(2014) has presented the following putative definition as a direct analogue to his initial 
criteria for the cognitive penetration of visual experiences:  
 
Emotional states are cognitively penetrable with respect to some content or aspect of 
phenomenal character c if and only if two subjects (or the same subject at different 
times) can differ with respect to whether their emotional states have c as the result of 
a causal process tracing back to a cognitive state of the subject, holding fixed between 
the two subjects (i) the stimuli impacting their sensory receptors, (ii) the subjects’ 
spatial attention, and (iii) the conditions of the subjects’ sensory and emotional 
organs. (p. 270)  
 
penetrability. Note, moreover, that a variety of empirical studies have been conducted which suggest 
that cognitive penetrability of this sort we’re interested in here is possible. See, for example, Levin and 
Banaji (2006) and Perky (1910). See also Macpherson (2012) for a helpful survey and analysis of this 
evidence.  
67 Chudnoff (2020) refers to this as the ‘Downgrade Thesis’ (p. 2), i.e. the view that cognitively 
penetrated, or “hijacked”, experiences are incapable of lending immediate and defeasible justification 






Reconsider the emotional examples cited above. In both cases, the content of the emotional 
experience would be different in the absence of the influencing cognitive state. Upon 
encountering the individual from a particular ethnic group, the xenophobe’s emotional 
experience would not be one of suspicion if they didn’t already have the unjustified 
antecedent belief that members of this group were untrustworthy; one’s emotional experience 
would not be one of anger towards the leisurely pedestrians if they didn’t already have the 
antecedent desire to get home quickly. Indeed, on this definition, it seems like a great many 
of our emotional experiences are going to turn out to be cognitively penetrated. Holding all 
the factors fixed in the above definition, the content of my emotional experience will often 
differ from yours due to the fact that you and I have different background desires, beliefs, etc. 
I may experience contempt in response to something that you find amusing, you may 
experience sadness in response to something that brings me great joy, and so forth. Thus, it 
might be suggested that this high cognitive penetrability of emotional experience is a 
precisification of the intuition that underlies the unreliability problem. Emotions are so often 
misleading and unreliable because the content of emotional experience is heavily vulnerable 
to infection from a host of psychological pollutants.  
 
Now, an immediate thing to say about this suggestion is that the mere fact that emotional 
experience bears a higher rate of cognitive penetration is insufficient to arrive at the 
conclusion that the emotions are systematically unreliable. A further step is required, and that 
is to show that most instances of emotional cognitive penetration are epistemically damaging. 
That is, it would have to be argued that the surge in influence from our background beliefs 
and desires makes us significantly epistemically worse off than we would be otherwise in 
order to decrease the veridicality ratio of emotional experience to a level insufficient for 
reliability. This seems to be implausibly strong for two reasons.  
 
Firstly, very few in the perception literature would be comfortable endorsing the claim that 
cognitive penetration of visual experience (if and when it occurs) always or for the most part 
suppresses the potential justificatory power of the experience. Discussion of the epistemic 
implications of cognitive penetration tends to be more nuanced than indiscriminate claims 
like this. Siegel (2012), for instance, argues that the justificatory power of visual experience 
is extinguished by cognitive penetration only when an epistemically problematic circularity is 





her belief that Jack is angry with her because the causal root of her having that visual 
experience is her unjustified belief that Jack is angry with her. Jill, so the argument goes, 
effectively enters into a feedback loop with respect to her justification. To generalise, what is 
epistemically illicit about (some) cases of cognitive penetration is that the causal origin of the 
process is the unjustified belief that X is F. This belief then causes the subject to visually 
experience X as F. The subject then bases her belief that X is F on her visual experience that 
X is F. Because the belief that X is F is thereby plausibly understood as being based on itself, 
Siegel takes cognitive penetrability to extinguish the justificatory power of visual experiences 
only when it leads us into these epistemically vicious feedback loops.  
 
Alternatively, Lyons (2011) proposes that the root of the epistemic challenge of cognitive 
penetration concerns not epistemically vicious circularity but the question of reliability. 
According to Lyons, cognitive penetration inhibits the epistemic function of visual 
experience only when the penetrating state curtails the overall reliability of the perceptual 
system. On this account, what is epistemically worrisome about cases like Siegel’s is that the 
cognitive penetration of Jill’s visual experience – the manipulation of her visual experience 
by her antecedent unjustified belief – biases her perception such that she would visually 
experience Jack as angry regardless as to whether this were true (p. 301). Certain instances of 
cognitive penetration render us unresponsive and insensitive to the way things are, and this is 
what is epistemically problematic. The insensitivity to facts caused by certain instances of 
cognitive penetration decreases the likelihood of our beliefs turning out to be true, and this 
threat of unreliability is what inhibits the justificatory power of visual perception.  
 
Crucially, in both Siegel’s and Lyons’ account, the epistemic outcome of cognitive 
penetration is judged locally, rather than globally across all cases. Therefore, because there is 
very little in the way of evidence for the claim that cognitive penetration of visual experience 
uniformly or for the most part inhibits the justificatory power of the experience, it seems that 
we have good reason to believe there is analogously little evidence for the claim that 
cognitive penetration of emotional experience is chiefly epistemically vicious.  
 
Secondly, considering emotional cognitive penetration directly, it seems implausible to claim 
that cognitive states consistently corrupt my emotions for the worse. For example, my 
background beliefs about the technical expertise involved in performing certain pieces of 





admiration in response to admirable performances of those pieces; my desire to preserve my 
bodily integrity may penetrate my emotional system such that I more reliably experience fear 
in response to physically threatening objects. In cases like these, and plausibly many more, 
the cognitive penetrability of emotional experience is not epistemically damaging, but instead 
appears to be epistemically beneficial; it places me in a better epistemic position with respect 
to grasping my evaluative surroundings than I would be in without the cognitive influence.  
 
Therefore, because the cognitive penetrability argument can only succeed in establishing the 
emotions’ systematic unreliability by endorsing the claim that most instances of emotional 
cognitive penetration are epistemically vicious, and because this claim seems to be 
implausibly strong, I conclude that this line of argument fails to support the unreliability 
problem, and thereby fails to undermine ER.   
 
4.3.2 The Obscurity of Value  
 
A second possible argument in favour of the systematic unreliability of emotional experience 
concerns not the nature of the emotional experience itself, but the nature and obscurity of 
evaluative information and properties. To contrast, return to the case of visual experience. 
Our visual systems seek to gather non-evaluative information about our surroundings, 
tracking properties of colour, shape, motion, etc. These visual properties are, at least in 
normal cases, straightforwardly grasped by perceivers. On the other hand, evaluative 
information which constitutes the core relational themes of anger, envy, pride, shame, 
indignation, etc. is relatively more obscure, and consequently more difficult for ordinary 
perceivers to grasp.  
 
In elucidating this claim, one might point to one of the following two features of our 
experience with value concepts as putative indicators of the comparative obscurity of value. 
First, one might identify the widespread disagreement pervading our value discourse as such 
an indicator. It seems to be the case that everyday experience lends support to the claim that 
we often encounter disagreement in our value judgments.68 For instance, I might judge a 
 
68 A stronger claim might be that evaluative concepts do not just often incite substantive disagreement 
(that is, disagreement concerning the content of the concept), but rather that they essentially admit 
such disagreement. That is, one might claim that evaluative concepts are essentially contestable, and 





particular joke to be offensive, whereas somebody else might judge it to be amusing; I might 
judge somebody’s action to be admirable, whereas somebody else might judge it to be 
dishonourable, and so forth. Disagreements like these happen often, or at least significantly 
more so than disagreement concerning, say, the properties of colour and shape tracked by our 
visual systems. Under ordinary conditions, normal observers do not tend to encounter the 
same (or even a similarly high level of) disagreement concerning whether the colour of the 
door is blue or red, or whether the shape of the water bottle is round or square. One might 
take this comparatively widespread disagreement to be suggestive of the fact that there is 
little in the way of common understanding of the evaluative information which constitutes 
our concepts of value.69 In turn, we might then take this absence of any robust consensus as 
indicative of the obscurity of value.  
 
Relatedly, one might identify the lack of any determinate boundaries between value concepts 
as a potential indicator of their obscurity. Again, to illustrate against the background of 
perceptual experience, consider properties tracked by our visual systems. Typically, it is not 
the case that ordinary observers suffer any substantial confusion about the boundaries 
between what is green and what is red; what is round and what is square; what is moving and 
what is stationary. However, this does not seem to be true with respect to evaluative 
properties. It is significantly less clear what the demarcating boundaries are between 
evaluative concepts such as ‘offensive’ and ‘insulting’, ‘shameful’ and ‘embarrassing’, 
‘contemptible’ and ‘disgusting’, and so forth. Thus, our inability to accurately identify 
determinate boundaries between various value concepts might be understood as suggestive of 
the obscurity of value.70 Therefore, because the evaluative information putatively sought after 
 
69 As a point of qualification: it seems at least prima facie true that different evaluative concepts bring 
about varying levels of disagreement. Perhaps it may be difficult for a diverse pool of observers to 
agree unanimously on what the core relational theme of ‘shamefulness’ consists in, but it seems 
significantly more likely that that pool of observers will agree on, say, the wrongness of particular 
actions such as murder or incestual relationships. This discrepancy of disagreement across evaluative 
concepts might suggest that some evaluative information is obscurer than others, such that some of 
our emotion-types are correspondingly less likely to be reliably responsive to the presence of 
evaluative properties than others. This thought might prompt us to consider adopting a finer-grained 
approach to making assessments of reliability (as I suggested in §4.2.2), but I set this point aside for 
now, given that my purpose here is to argue that the obscurity of evaluative information is not a 
plausible explanation of the systematic unreliability of emotional experience. 
70 Similar points concerning the indeterminacy of certain evaluative concepts have been made by 
others in the literature. Szigeti (2015), for example, discusses the indeterminacy of the core relational 
theme of guilt (p. 15), while D’Arms and Jacobsen (2003) point out that there is “considerable 
internal disagreement within the tradition: for instance, over how to differentiate guilt from remorse, 





by emotional experience is so relatively obscure, the advocate of the unreliability problem 
might take this to be a plausible diagnosis and theoretical backing for the systematic 
unreliability of emotional experience. The opacity of evaluative information hinders our 
emotions’ ability to accurately track value, and, therefore, forming evaluative beliefs on the 
basis of one’s emotional experiences cannot constitute a reliable belief-forming process.  
 
The problem with this argument is that it involves opening the door to a widely 
encompassing and pernicious scepticism with respect to our access to evaluative information. 
After all, if it is the case that evaluative information is so obscure such that it severely hinders 
our emotions’ ability to accurately track value, then, plausibly, the obscurity of value also 
theoretically disables all other means we have of accessing such information. Our inability to 
grasp value seriously calls into question the accuracy of both our reasoning about value and 
the body of our evaluative beliefs and judgments. If the advocate of the unreliability problem 
wishes to push this line of argument in support of their objection, then it seems that they must 
allow this pervasive scepticism to creep into their account; they must concede that the 
obscurity of value blocks any secure epistemic access we have to the evaluative realm. This 
is a heavy theoretical burden to bear. No secure access to the evaluative reality threatens the 
existence of all sorts of evaluative knowledge and understanding we intuitively take 
ourselves to have, including moral and aesthetic knowledge.   
 
In summary, then, because diagnosing the systematic unreliability of emotional experience by 
appeal to the opacity and obscurity of evaluative information involves opening the door to 
serious scepticism about evaluative knowledge, and because of the significant theoretical 
costs involved in doing so, I argue that this line of argument fails to support the unreliability 
problem, and thereby fails to undermine ER.  
 
4.3.3 Against the Reliable Emotional Dispositions of Virtuous Agents  
 
Now, in defence of ER, one might argue that there are circumstances in which forming 
evaluative belief on the basis of emotional experience is a reliable process of belief 
formation, namely, circumstances concerning the emotional dispositions of virtuous agents. 
The possession of the virtues, i.e. particular moral and intellectual character traits, plausibly 
involves certain dispositions to, as Pelser (2011) puts it, “have the right emotions towards the 





thought goes, will feel the right degree of anger in the right circumstances involving an 
illegitimate wrong; she will feel the right degree of sadness in the right circumstances 
involving loss, and so forth. In reliably experiencing her emotions in the appropriate 
circumstances, the virtuous agent may plausibly be understood as possessing emotional 
dispositions which accurately track value. Therefore, if it is true that some people possess at 
least some virtues,71 then there are cases in which forming evaluative belief on the basis of 
emotional experience is a reliable process of belief formation.72 Indeed, it is when the 
emotions are functioning properly in the virtuous agent that they fulfil their epistemic role 
and vindicate ER. 
 
A third potential way in which the advocate of the unreliability problem might attempt to 
source theoretical support for their position concerns eliminating and disavowing the 
possibility of reliable emotional dispositions in virtuous agents. That is, one might attempt to 
dismiss this argument, and consequently reinforce the systematic unreliability of emotion, in 
one of two ways: (i) appeal to situationist critiques of virtue ethics in order to challenge the 
possession of virtue, and (ii) appeal to the absence of any robust and compelling feedback 
system with respect to evaluative belief in order to challenge the idea that virtues can be 
developed in the first place. This section will reject both of these arguments in turn.  
 
First of all, the advocate of the unreliability problem might note that there is an affluence of 
empirical evidence which suggests that possession of the virtues is incredibly infrequent, if 
attainable at all. Situationist psychological studies have called the existence of virtues into 
question by showing that merely manipulating the non-moral, situational factors of a scenario 
has a significant influence on the moral behaviour of others.73 These studies, roughly, work 
by slightly altering a non-moral variable within a situation and find that the change in this 
variable reliably produces a change in the moral behaviour of subjects. One example of this is 
Isen and Levin’s (1972) study in which ordinary pedestrians walk into a payphone. Some of 
these subjects walk in to find a dime, and others do not. Regardless as to whether a dime was 
 
71 Most virtue ethicists, in opposition to the traditional Aristotelian view, allow for the possibility of 
an agent’s possessing some virtues without possessing others; that one can possess the virtue of 
generosity without possessing the virtue of honesty, for example. However, see Badhwar (1996) for a 
nuanced discussion of how the virtues systematically relate to one another.  
72 In opposition to a view of this sort, however, one might argue that the virtuous agent simply will 
not form evaluative beliefs on the mere basis of their emotional experiences. See Brady (2010) for a 
view of this sort.  





found, when the subjects left the payphone, they came across a pedestrian who dropped a pile 
of papers in the street. Researchers monitored which of the subjects stopped to help the 
distressed passer-by and found that those who found the dime in the payphone were 
significantly more likely to help.74 What these challenges show is that manipulating 
situational factors appears to alter the moral behaviour of others, such that these situational 
factors have a greater explanatory power with respect to our moral actions than the putative 
existence of moral virtues. Therefore, in light of these challenges, it is thought that the 
existence of robust, persisting character traits ought to be called into question.  
 
Now, recall from Chapter 1 (§1.1) that one important motivation for endorsing the 
justificatory thesis of emotion was that it promised a substantive epistemic yield, i.e. it 
promised a simple and naturalised explanation as to how we obtain justified evaluative belief, 
such that we could annul sceptical worries pertaining to the acquisition of justified evaluative 
belief. In order for the appeal to virtuous agency to fully vindicate ER, it would have to be 
shown that the possession of virtue is frequent enough such that the reliabilist conception of 
the justificatory thesis of emotion could retain this advantage, i.e. it would have to be shown 
that possession of virtue is frequent enough such that, for many of us, forming evaluative 
belief on the basis of emotional experience is a reliable process of belief formation, such that 
many of us, rather than just the virtuous minority, can enjoy epistemic justification for our 
evaluative beliefs on the basis of our emotional experiences. The advocate of the unreliability 
problem, in amassing the conclusions drawn from these situationist studies as evidence for 
absence of regular, persisting virtues, could argue that appeal to the reliable emotional 
dispositions of virtuous agents is too insubstantial to do any philosophical work in this 
regard. Possession of virtue is much too infrequent in order to vindicate ER in a way that 
retains the original attractions of the justificatory thesis of emotion.75  
 
However, this line of argument – disavowing the possibility of virtuous agency on account of 
situationist challenges – suffers a similar dialectical problem to the one facing both the 
cognitive penetrability argument and the obscurity of value argument. This argument hinges 
entirely on the philosophical power of situationist challenges and, thereby, on the falsity of 
 
74 For further situationist experiments along these lines, see Milgram (1974) and Darley and Batson 
(1973).  
75 Carter (2020) appears to have a worry of this sort with respect to a reliabilist conception of the 





popular strands of virtue ethics. Again, this seems like heavy theoretical baggage to carry. 
Virtue ethicists certainly do not take the conclusions of situationist studies to dismantle their 
position. Sreenivasen (2002), for example, has argued that situationist challenges fail to 
undermine virtue ethics due to the fact that there is a fundamental mismatch between the 
virtue ethicist’s conception of a character trait, and the particular conception of a character 
trait targeted and putatively threatened by situationist challenges. According to Sreenivasen, 
situationist challenges rest on a deficient “operationalised conception of a ‘character trait’” 
(p. 47), and this inadequacy is rooted in their failure to take into account relevant factors of 
the agent’s situation, such as whether they themselves construe their situation as pertinent to 
that character trait, how relevant their behaviour actually is to the character trait in question, 
etc. On a similar note, Annas (2005) has argued that situationist challenges fail due to the fact 
that these challenges misguidedly target versions of virtue theories which identify character 
traits as mechanical, unthinking reflexes. According to Annas, most in the virtue ethics 
tradition instead conceive of character traits as (or involving) cognitive capacities to act on 
the basis of reasons (p. 637). In the payphone study, the fact the agents opted not to help the 
struggling confederate is insufficient to decisively show that those agents lacked the virtue of, 
say, generosity. Virtues need not manifest themselves as habitual, automatic responses to 
certain moral triggers. As a third alternative, Sabini and Silver (2005) argue directly against 
the payphone situationist challenge, contending that picking up papers simply isn’t a 
significant enough moral action to provide us with any substantive information about an 
agent’s character. In this case, according to Sabini and Silver, an agent’s being in a bad mood 
(or, to be precise, an agent’s not being in a good mood relative to those who found the dime) 
may be a perfectly legitimate reason for them not to pick up the papers.  
 
It is not within the scope of this chapter to review and evaluate all possible means of 
responding to these challenges. Rather, the point here is to show that simple appeal to 
situationist experiments – without due consideration of possible responses made on the behalf 
of virtue ethicists –  is insufficient to decisively rule out the possibility of possession of 
virtue, and consequently, reliable emotional dispositions of virtuous agents. If the advocate of 
the unreliability problem wishes to push this line of argument, they would have to 
systematically trawl through each of these responses and show that none of them can be 
successful. While not impossible, this places a significant and problematic explanatory 





experiments in order to disavow the possibility of reliable emotional dispositions in virtuous 
agents fails to support the unreliability problem, and thereby fails to undermine ER. 
 
Finally, the advocate of the unreliability problem might attempt to disavow the possibility of 
reliable emotional dispositions in virtuous agents by challenging the idea that virtuous agents 
can develop reliable emotional dispositions in the first place. According to most Aristotelian 
strains of virtue ethics, virtues are not simply embedded into one’s character from birth, but 
instead are developed over one’s life through conscious habituation and practice. If it is the 
case that the possession of virtue involves the possession of the certain emotional 
dispositions, then these emotional dispositions are also plausibly understood as being 
cultivated and refined through the relevant forms of practice and training. However, one 
might argue that this notion of practicing virtue is implausible due to the fact that there is no 
appropriate feedback system in place to correct our emotional dispositions and thus facilitate 
such training.  
 
To illustrate this point, reconsider sense perceptual experience. As we go about our lives, it 
seems that we regularly receive ‘feedback’ on how accurately our perceptual experience is 
representing the world around us. If I’m driving a car, and my perceptual system is 
misconstruing properties of shape and motion to me, I’ll straightforwardly receive feedback 
on this failure in the form of my crashing into obstacles; feedback which then prompts me to 
recalibrate my perceptual system to improve its accuracy and reliability. It’s less clear what 
analogous sense of feedback we might get with respect to emotional experience and 
evaluative information. The closest thing we seem to receive in terms of feedback in the 
evaluative case is disagreement with others. Suppose I experience amusement towards a 
certain joke, and thereby judge it to be amusing, whereas you fail to do so. Unlike feedback 
received in the perceptual case, it’s not at all clear that this mere disagreement will compel or 
even prompt me to recalibrate my emotional system in order to bolster its accuracy. I can 
explain away your lack of amusement (perhaps by appeal to the background beliefs and 
desires mentioned in the cognitive penetration argument) without admitting the possibility of 
my evaluative mistake, such that mere fact of our disagreement does not compel me to 





crashing my car compels me to reassess my visual perception of properties of motion and 
space.76 
 
In summary, then, the absence of any similarly compelling feedback system with respect to 
evaluative properties means that I cannot check my evaluative perception against the 
evaluative reality, whereas it seems that I can rather straightforwardly check my visual 
perception against the non-evaluative reality. The advocate of the unreliability problem might 
cite this absence of feedback as a barricade for the potential of ‘training’ emotional 
dispositions, and thereby, as a means of explaining away the possibility of reliable emotional 
dispositions in virtuous agents.  
 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that a compelling evaluative feedback system is 
necessary for the development of reliable emotional dispositions. It seems to me that the 
defender of ER can respond to this objection in one of two ways. First of all, they might point 
out that while some evaluative properties admit little in the way of compelling feedback, this 
is not the case for all evaluative properties. Take fearsomeness, for example. If my emotional 
system is failing to accurately track properties of fearsomeness, a plausible consequence of 
this is that I’ll fail to evade objects which constitute genuine threats to my bodily integrity, 
and thereby endure greater and more frequent injury than I would do were my emotional 
system to correctly track those properties. Similarly, if my emotional system is failing to 
accurately track properties of disgustingness, a plausible consequence of this is that I’ll fail to 
evade contaminated objects, and thereby suffer illness and infection more frequently than I 
would do were my emotional system to correctly track those properties. Hence, it does seem 
as though there is a compelling feedback system in place with respect to evaluative 
properties. Note, of course, that this response remains concessive to the advocate of the 
unreliability problem insofar as it allows that only some evaluative properties admit suitable 
feedback, and thereby that only the relevant corresponding emotional experiences can be 
‘trained’ to the level required for virtuous agency.  
 
As an alternative, then, the defender of ER might push back against the idea that all instances 
of disagreement are uniformly weak sources of feedback. Certainly, it seems true that I am 
 
76 Kauppinen (2013) makes a similar point concerning the lack of any substantive feedback system 





not compelled to recalibrate and re-examine my emotional dispositions every time I 
encounter somebody who disagrees with my evaluative judgment. However, it seems to be 
equally true that I regularly experience the strong inclination to revise my evaluative 
judgment when it comes into conflict with the evaluative judgments of those that I respect. 
Suppose, again, that I judge a particular joke to be amusing, whereas my mother (i.e. 
somebody that I consider to be virtuous) judges the joke to be cruel and offensive. Further, 
suppose that she confronts me about my amusement and asserts her strong disagreement of 
my judgment. It seems quite straightforwardly true that in this instance, i.e. an instance in 
which my interlocutor is somebody that I consider to be a role model, my being faced with 
this disagreement will prompt me to re-evaluate the fittingness of my emotional experience. 
Receiving evaluative feedback in the form of disagreement or disapproval from those we 
respect is a central part of our moral development, and thereby, seems to me to be a suitable 
candidate for the type of feedback system putatively required for the development of reliable 
emotional dispositions in virtuous agents. Tarring all forms of disagreement with the same 
critical brush overlooks this integral part of our moral and evaluative development, and, as 
such, I argue that this objection fails to support the unreliability problem, and thereby fails to 
undermine ER. 
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to construct and make tenable a reliabilist account of 
emotional justification which identifies the source of the emotions’ justificatory power in the 
fact that forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience is a reliable process 
of belief formation.  
 
§4.1 began by identifying various authors in the philosophy of emotion literature that seem to 
attribute epistemic importance to the emotions’ reliable connection to evaluative properties. 
In §4.2, I then suggested that, in light of this, a plausible contender for an attractive account 
of emotional justification is a view based on process reliabilism. From this, I identified the 
target view as emotional reliabilism (ER), according to which emotional experience is 
capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying an evaluative belief e if and only if forming 
evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience is a reliable process of belief-
formation. I then attempted to motivate this view by highlighting its advantages and 





absence of a required causal interaction between emotional experience and evaluative 
properties undermined the plausibility of ER (§4.2.1), the second levelled a generality 
problem against the view (§4.2.2), and the third objected that reliability of the relevant belief-
forming process cannot be necessary for epistemic justification (§4.2.3). I argued that none of 
these objections were strong enough to undermine ER.  
 
In §4.3, I then presented what I take to be the most conspicuous objection facing ER, namely, 
the unreliability problem. The unreliability problem argued that emotional experience cannot 
immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief in virtue of the fact that forming 
evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience is not a reliable process of belief 
formation; that emotional experience is systematically unreliable such that this widespread 
unreliability renders it incapable of acting as a source of epistemic justification. In order to 
investigate the prospects of this problem, I then presented what I take to be the three most 
plausible arguments in favour of such systematic emotional unreliability, and argued that all 
three of these arguments failed. The first argument (§4.3.1) suggested that the emotions’ 
cognitive penetrability explained their significant unreliability, i.e. the fact that the contents 
of our emotional experiences are significantly vulnerable to influence by our background 
beliefs and motivational states is what explains their deflated veridicality ratio. I argued that, 
even if our emotional experiences are so vulnerable, this is insufficient to get us to the 
conclusion of systematic unreliability, given that cognitive penetration can also improve the 
epistemic status of certain experiences. The second argument (§4.3.2) focused on the 
comparative obscurity and ineffability of evaluative information, and argued that this 
obscurity rendered the emotions incapable of reliably tracking evaluative properties. I 
suggested that this argument fails in virtue of its opening the door to a pernicious form of 
scepticism; that if we concede that the obscurity of value inhibits emotional access to 
evaluative properties, we must concede that all other forms of access to these properties fail. 
Finally, the third argument presented in favour of the unreliability problem (§4.3.3) attempted 
to disavow the possibility of reliable emotional dispositions in virtuous agents by appealing 
to: (i) situationist challenges, and (ii) the absence of any compelling feedback system with 
respect to emotional detection of evaluative properties. I argued that, first, situationist 
challenges are not sufficient to undermine the possibility of virtue, and second, we can make 
sense of such a compelling feedback system. The unreliability problem, I conclude, has no 






In what follows, however, we’ll see that ER’s success with respect to the specific challenges 
mentioned in this chapter does not guarantee overall plausibility for the view. Chapter 5 will 







The Problem with Emotional Reliabilism 
 
5.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
The primary concern of the previous chapter was to present and defend emotional reliabilism 
against some preliminary objections. Recall that we’re understanding the view as follows:  
 
Emotional Reliabilism (ER): S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and 
defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if forming evaluative beliefs 
on the basis of emotional experience is a reliable process of belief formation. 
 
For ER, the justificatory ability of emotional experience requires that forming evaluative 
beliefs on the basis of emotional experience tends to produce more true beliefs than not (and, 
moreover, this requires that the emotional system reliably generates true evaluative contents). 
Thus far, I have rebutted four objections facing ER. First, I rejected the idea that there is a 
problematic lack of an appropriate causal connection between emotional experiences and 
evaluative properties (§4.2.1). Second, I argued that the emotional reliabilist has the 
resources available to her to answer generality-style challenges facing reliabilist theories of 
justification (§4.2.2). Third, I defended ER against the objection that reliability of the 
relevant belief-forming process is not necessary for epistemic justification (§4.2.3). Finally, I 
argued against an objection which contends that forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of 
emotional experience is an unreliable process of belief formation given the unreliability of 
our emotional systems. I endeavoured to show that there is no plausible way of arguing for 
epistemically significant emotional unreliability (§4.3).  
 
Now, while the view may be capable of withstanding these particular objections, this does 
not spell smooth sailing for ER. In this chapter, I will argue that there is a further problem 
facing the reliabilist approach to emotional justification which cannot be so easily overcome. 
More specifically, I argue that emotional clairvoyance-type cases establish that the reliability 
of forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience cannot be sufficient for 
epistemic justification. From a discussion of this objection, I conclude that ER cannot provide 
a plausible explanation as to how emotional experience can immediately and defeasibly 






The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §5.2, I begin by setting out how clairvoyance 
objections are typically levelled against general reliabilist views of justification, before 
presenting an analogous emotional case in order to demonstrate the insufficiency of 
emotional reliability for justification. §5.3 then raises the possibility of modifying ER in 
order to evade the bite of clairvoyance-type counterexamples while also striving to preserve 
the core reliabilist thesis of the original view. Accordingly, I present and evaluate two 
alternative emotional reliabilist views inspired by modified reliabilist views provided in the 
literature: (i) Evidentialist Emotional Reliabilism (§5.3.1) and (ii) Agent Emotional 
Reliabilism (§5.3.2). Ultimately, I argue that neither of these views can provide a successful 
framework for the justificatory thesis of emotion. Finally, I provide concluding remarks in 
§5.4, and sum up the central lessons to be learned from the discussions of Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
5.2 Objection: The Insufficiency of Emotional Reliability 
 
Let me begin here by presenting and motivating a standard objection facing reliabilist 
accounts of justification, namely, the objection that it’s not at all clear that a reliable process 
of belief-formation alone is sufficient for epistemic justification. Here’s a popular way of 
presenting this challenge from BonJour (1980): 
 
Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kind of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or 
reasons of any kind for or against the generally possibility of such a cognitive power, 
or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day, Norman comes to believe 
that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against 
this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under 
circumstances in which it is completely reliable. Is Norman epistemically justified in 
believing that the President is in New York City? (p. 62)77 
 
77Another way of presenting this challenge is in terms of Lehrer’s (2000) Mr. Truetemp case. Briefly, 
this case involves a subject, Mr. Truetemp, who is unknowingly fitted with a small machine which 
accurately computes the ambient temperature of whatever environment Mr. Truetemp is in. 
Accordingly, this device immediately causes Mr. Truetemp to form true beliefs about the temperature 
of his surrounding environment. Plausibly, so the thought goes, despite being maximally reliable in 
forming true beliefs about the ambient temperature of his surroundings, Mr. Truetemp is not justified 






According to Bonjour, a case like this meets the reliability requirement for process-reliabilist 
theories of epistemic justification. That is, so long as Norman is reliable in forming beliefs 
about the President’s location on the basis of his clairvoyant experience, i.e. so long as that 
process tends to output more true beliefs than false ones, Norman is justified in his belief that 
the President is in New York. Many think that this result is implausible; that Norman cannot 
be justified in his belief that the President is in New York. In effect, then, what cases of this 
sort do is level a similar over-generalisation charge against process reliabilism to the kind of 
challenge we saw levelled against dogmatist accounts of justification. That is, cases like that 
of Norman’s clairvoyance putatively establish that reliabilism over-generalises to cases in 
which we ought not bestow positive justificatory status to the belief in question, just like 
basic phenomenal conservatism putatively over-generalised to experiences like that of 
Markie’s gold prospector. Reliability of the relevant belief-forming process alone, then, 
cannot be sufficient for epistemic justification.  
 
The significance of clairvoyance cases is often taken to go beyond this negative claim, 
however. Many take the intuitive verdict delivered by these cases to illuminate a further 
necessary condition on epistemic justification. Internalists and externalists tend to spell out 
this condition in different ways. One explanation typically appealed to by internalists, for 
example, is the idea that the presence of epistemic justification seems to require the subject to 
have an appropriate perspective on the reliability of their belief-forming processes. That is, 
clairvoyance cases establish that mere reliability of the relevant belief-forming process(es) 
cannot be sufficient for the presence of justification. Rather, something else is required, and 
that ‘something else’ is to be construed in terms of an internalist constraint, such as an 
appropriate awareness of the evidence one has for the belief, or the general reliability of the 
relevant belief-forming process, and so forth. This insight can be put in terms of the Subject’s 
Perspective Objection (SPO): 
 
If the subject holding a belief isn't aware of what that belief has going for it, then she 
isn't aware of how its status is any different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary 
conviction. From that we may conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that 
 
case shares with Norman the Clairvoyant, I intend the label ‘clairvoyance cases’ to include cases such 





her belief is true. And that implies that it isn't a justified belief. (Bergmann 2006, p. 
12) 
 
Externalist epistemologies are particularly vulnerable to the SPO given that they typically 
eschew any form of an awareness requirement.78 Indeed, for reliabilists, so long as the belief 
in question is produced by a truth-conducive process, then the subject need not have any sort 
of awareness concerning what this process is, its probability of success, and so forth. With 
this objection in mind, then, return to the clairvoyance case. Plausibly, what underlies the 
intuition that reliability is insufficient for justification here is that, from Norman’s 
perspective, it’s mere accident that his belief that the President is in New York is true. 
Indeed, Bonjour seems to say as much in his own analysis of the case:  
 
From [Norman’s] standpoint, there is apparently no way in which he could know the 
President’s whereabouts. Why then does he continue to maintain the belief that the 
President is in New York City? Why is not the mere fact that there is no way, as far as 
he knows or believes, for him to have obtained this information a sufficient reason for 
classifying this belief as an unfounded hunch and ceasing to accept it? And if Norman 
does not do this, is he not thereby being epistemically irrational and irresponsible? 
(1980, p. 62 – 63) 
 
Bonjour takes this (i.e. Norman’s irresponsibility were he to maintain a belief that, from his 
perspective, is unfounded) to establish that the belief in question cannot be even defeasibly 
justified.79 From the internalist perspective, then, it looks like clairvoyance cases give us both 
a negative claim – i.e. that reliability of the relevant belief-forming process is insufficient for 
justification – and a positive claim – i.e. that the subject must have an appropriate awareness 
of the evidence she has for her belief.  
 
Externalists, of course, reject the idea that clairvoyance cases illuminate the necessity of 
awareness or appropriate perspective for epistemic justification. Instead, some have 
suggested that we can make sense of the insufficiency of mere reliability in externalist terms. 
 
78 Having said that, Bergmann himself levels the SPO against internalist views. I also raise the SPO 
against one interpretation of Chudnoff’s presentationalism, which is very plausibly internalist, in 
Harrison (2019). 
79 Although, see Bernecker (2008) for the claim that Bonjour’s internalist analysis of the clairvoyance 





Greco (1999), for example, argues that “strange and fleeting processes” (p. 285) like the 
process of clairvoyance, though reliable, do not give rise to justified belief. Roughly 
speaking, this is because justification requires that the belief in question arises via a stable 
and reliable cognitive disposition integrated within the subject’s cognitive character. Greco 
(2003) discusses the clairvoyance case and specifies why clairvoyance is plausibly not a 
cognitively integrated process as follows:  
 
If [Norman’s] power of clairvoyance is not well-integrated with the remainder of [his] 
cognition, then it will not count as cognitive character and will therefore not count as 
a source of knowledge according to agent reliabilism. As we have noted, one aspect 
of cognitive integration concerns the range of outputs – if the clairvoyant beliefs are 
few and far between, and if they have little relation to other beliefs in the system, then 
the power of clairvoyance is less well integrated on that account. Another aspect of 
integration… is sensitivity to counterevidence. If clairvoyant beliefs are insensitive to 
reasons that count against them, then this too speaks against cognitive integration. (p. 
475).80  
 
For Greco, then, acquiring valuable epistemic goods such as knowledge and justification 
requires that the processes through which we arrive at these goods are sufficiently entrenched 
and integrated parts of the subject’s cognitive character, such that clairvoyance, as it is 
typically described, is ruled out as being capable of performing such an epistemic role. We’ll 
return to the details of Greco’s proposal in §5.3.2, but, for now, note that this diagnosis of the 
clairvoyant’s failing is externalist. As such, Greco has a means of explaining the 
insufficiency of mere reliability without committing to the positive claim that something like 
an appropriate perspective or awareness is required for justification.  
 
So, putting all of this together, clairvoyance cases can be interpreted as involving a negative 
claim that reliability of the relevant-belief-forming process is insufficient for justification, 
and a positive claim that something else is required for justification, and this ‘something else’ 
can be construed in internalist or externalist terms. Clairvoyance cases, then, bolstered and 
underwritten by the putative necessity of something like an appropriate perspective on one’s 
 
80 Note, however, that Greco is open to the possibility of clairvoyance constituting a source of 






belief-forming process or cognitive integration of the relevant belief-forming process, purport 
to establish the falsity of brute reliabilist theories of epistemic justification.  
 
Finally, it’s important to note that challenges of this sort have struck a chord with 
epistemologists. Indeed, many sympathetic to externalism take clairvoyance cases to be 
successful in establishing that reliability is insufficient for justification, and thereby cite the 
failure of generic reliabilism at the hands of these cases as motivating the move to an 
alternative theory which putatively avoids the pitfall. Comesaña (2010), for instance, argues 
that clairvoyance cases demonstrate that “reliability in itself is not sufficient for justification” 
(p. 590), and that these cases thereby motivate the move to a hybrid evidentialist reliabilist 
view, according to which justification requires that the belief accords with evidence which is, 
in turn, reliably connected to truth. Lyons (2009) also recognises the force of clairvoyance 
cases, writing, “[m]y own view is that the clairvoyance objection is a sound objection to SR 
[i.e. the generic process reliabilist view]” (p. 114). Moreover, in a similar vein to Greco, Sosa 
(1992) identifies clairvoyance cases – or “metaincoherence cases” (p. 81), as he calls them – 
as indicative of a serious fault within generic reliabilist epistemologies which at least partially 
motivates his own virtue reliabilist view.81 Likewise, Kelp (2019) cites clairvoyance cases as 
one of four compelling reasons to move away from general process reliabilist views.82 In 
light of their pervasiveness and impact throughout the literature, then, it looks like we have 
good reason to take clairvoyance cases seriously in an evaluation of brute reliabilism’s 
prospects.83 
 
Now, let us set aside the question as to whether generic reliabilism is in fact undermined by 
clairvoyance-style challenges, and turn our attention back to the emotions. For now, let’s 
focus on the negative claim putatively established by clairvoyance cases, i.e. the insufficiency 
of reliability for justification (we’ll return to the discussion of the positive claims later on in 
§5.3). Could an analogous challenge be levelled against ER? To determine this, consider the 
following case:  
 
 
81 Sosa’s virtue reliabilism is a theory of epistemic justification and knowledge that we’ll go on to 
look at in further detail in Chapter 6 (§6.2.2). 
82 Kelp also cites the New Evil Demon Problem, the generality problem, and the problem of world-
bound reliability as three further issues for generic reliabilism.   
83 I take the label of ‘brute reliabilism’ to refer to a reliabilist view unenhanced by additional 





Emotional Clairvoyance: Suppose that a subject S, under certain conditions that 
usually obtain, is completely reliable with respect to experiencing moral disgust 
towards individuals that have odious moral characters. She possesses no evidence or 
reasons of any kind for or against the possibility of her possessing such an emotional 
ability. One day, S passes a stranger on the street – somebody she’s never 
encountered before – and experiences a clear wave of moral revulsion with respect to 
the stranger. As a consequence of this, S forms the evaluative belief that the stranger 
has an odious moral character. In fact, this evaluative belief is true and results from 
her emotional experience of moral disgust under circumstances in which it is 
completely reliable. Is S epistemically justified in believing that the stranger has an 
odious moral character?  
 
This is a close analogue of the clairvoyance case. S’s experiences of moral disgust, insofar as 
they are psychologically immediate to S (i.e. they do not arise as mediated via any conscious 
judgment she has about the stranger) and insofar as S has no awareness of nor evidence for 
their reliability, seem to be a kind of emotional clairvoyance. S reliably forms true evaluative 
beliefs on the basis of these clairvoyant emotional experiences. So, the question arises: is it 
plausible that S is thereby immediately and defeasibly justified in her emotion-based 
evaluative belief about the stranger’s character?  
 
It seems to me that the intuitive verdict will be that S is not justified. Interestingly, we might 
note that this case seems similar to the initial presentation of Brady’s suspicious interviewer 
case considered in Chapter 2 (§2.2.1). Recall that, in this initial instantiation of the over-
generalisation case, the interviewer has a ‘bad feeling’ about one of the potential job 
candidates (to be understood as an emotional experience of suspicion or distrust towards the 
candidate), and, crucially, the verdict in this case seems to be that the interviewer’s emotional 
experience cannot even defeasibly justify their evaluative belief that the candidate is 
duplicitous. Indeed, the only relevant difference between the emotional clairvoyance case and 
the suspicious interviewer case is that the emotional reliabilist takes the reliability of S’s 
belief-forming process to be sufficient for justification, whereas the emotional dogmatist 
takes the interviewer’s emotional seeming phenomenal character to be sufficient for 
justification. Plausibly, then, if we have the intuition that the suspicious interviewer’s 
emotional experience cannot justify their evaluative belief that the candidate is duplicitous, it 





moral disgust cannot justify their evaluative belief that the stranger has an odious moral 
character.84 Furthermore, if we do have this latter intuition, then it looks like ER will turn out 
to be false; the reliability of forming true evaluative belief on the basis of emotional 
experience cannot be sufficient for justification given the intuitive verdict delivered by the 
emotional clairvoyance example.  
 
However, there is an immediate problem with the emotional clairvoyance case. Recall from 
earlier in Chapter 4 (§4.2) that I do not take the plausibility of ER to hinge on the overall 
plausibility of generic reliabilism. That is, I don’t mean to insist that ER is a straightforward 
application of generic reliabilism such that the truth of the latter entails the truth of the 
former. Rather, for the sake of this dissertation, I intend to evaluate ER independently of the 
truth or falsity of generic reliabilism. The defender of ER may identify this dialectical 
framing as what immunises ER from the emotional clairvoyance case above. In other words, 
the defender of ER might insist that the emotional clairvoyance case is irrelevant to the 
prospects of their view given that ER does not maintain that the reliability of clairvoyant 
belief-forming processes is sufficient for justification; it maintains that emotional reliability 
(i.e. the reliability of forming true evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experiences, 
where this requires the reliability of the emotional system generating true evaluative 
contents) is sufficient for justification. In this emotional clairvoyance case, we have 
reliability of a belief-forming process which is entirely attributable to a power of 
clairvoyance, not the subject’s emotional system. Without the power of clairvoyance, S 
would not be capable of reliably experiencing fitting episodes of moral disgust towards the 
odiousness of strangers, given that the non-evaluative features of an individual’s moral 
character which give rise to the evaluative property of moral odiousness or abhorrence are 
not properties that one can track or recognise via a passing glance on the street. If this is true, 
then the emotional clairvoyance case is emotional in name only, and consequently, incapable 
 
84 One might source further support for this intuitive verdict by appeal to a similar thought experiment 
proposed by Carter (2020). In Carter’s Metaincoherent Emoter case (p. 1242), we’re invited to 
consider a subject, Tim, whose emotional experiences reliably track the presence of evaluative 
properties, such that he is maximally reliable in forming true evaluative beliefs on the basis of his 
emotional experiences. Crucially, however, the source of Tim’s emotional reliability is the 
intervention of a benevolent demon. Without the demon’s interference, Tim’s emotional experiences 
would not reliably track evaluative properties, such that the majority of his emotion-based evaluative 
beliefs would turn out to be false. Carter argues that the intuitive verdict in this case is that Tim is not 
justified, despite his emotional reliability. One might construe Carter’s verdict as evidence that 
emotional reliability is insufficient for justification. Note, however, that Carter’s case specifically 





of constituting any real threat to ER. At most, it might provide evidence in favour of the 
implausibility of generic reliabilism, but not an independently assessable emotional analogue. 
 
This strikes me as a fair objection. Perhaps a strict emotional analogue of the clairvoyance 
case can be dismissed by the proponent of ER on the grounds of its lying beyond the 
theoretical scope of the view. However, I take it that this worry can be circumvented by 
constructing a similar case which does not rely on sourcing the reliability of the relevant 
belief-forming process in the power of clairvoyance. Accordingly, consider the following 
example:  
 
Caffeine Case: Suppose that, every morning on my walk into the office, I pick up a 
flat white from a randomly chosen local coffee shop. Some of these shops roast their 
coffee in a particular way such that their flat whites have very high levels of caffeine, 
but I have no awareness of this fact. When I drink one of these high-caffeine coffees, 
I reliably experience nervousness about the events ahead in my working day; i.e. the 
direct cause of my nervousness about the events of my day is the high concentration 
of caffeine that I’ve inadvertently consumed that morning. Now, suppose further that 
most every morning in which I unknowingly drink a high-caffeine coffee, I do have a 
later event in my working day which merits nervousness, e.g. a high-stakes 
presentation to potential employers, a meeting with a cruel and combative colleague, 
a gravely serious performance review, etc. As it so happens, then, my emotional 
experiences of nervousness concerning the events of my working day are almost 
perfectly reliable, but, crucially, I undergo these experiences purely in virtue of 
consuming strong coffee beforehand. 
 
What makes this case relevantly analogous to the emotional clairvoyance case is that, here, 
we have reliability of the relevant belief-forming process facilitated by some epistemically 
deviant cause, i.e. the power of clairvoyance or, in this case, an unanticipated surge of 
caffeine at epistemically opportune moments. Without the surge of caffeine, I would not 
experience nervousness with respect to the upcoming nervousness-meriting events of my 
working day (suppose that I’m ordinarily an even-tempered and well-composed person). 
What makes this case relevantly dissimilar to the clairvoyance case, such that it’s able to 
circumvent the above worry, is that my belief-forming process (i.e. forming evaluative beliefs 





my emotional experiences of nervousness and anxiety) is entirely an emotional one. Here, I 
apprehend my upcoming professional events and my emotional system reliably generates true 
evaluative contents, such that I reliably experience nervousness with respect to the 
nervousness-meriting events. The belief-forming process is emotional and reliable – it just so 
happens that it’s always prompted by an unanticipated surge of caffeine.85 It seems to me that 
there’s no compelling way in which the objector can determine this case as being beyond the 
theoretical scope of ER. The reliability of this belief-forming process may be ultimately 
attributable to the caffeine surge, but it’s not the case that the entire belief-forming process 
centres around the ingestion of caffeine in the same way that the entire belief-forming 
process hinges on the power of clairvoyance in the above emotional clairvoyance case. In 
other words, my emotional system is what’s reliably tracking the worrisome-making 
properties of my working day (albeit facilitated by the caffeine), whereas, in the emotional 
clairvoyance case, it’s the power of clairvoyance which allows S to reliably track the 
odiousness-making features of the stranger’s moral character.  
 
So, with the above objection dispelled, the crucial question arises: is it plausible to determine 
that I’m immediately and defeasibly justified in my evaluative beliefs concerning the high-
stakes, nervousness-meriting events of my working day on the basis of my emotional 
experiences of nervousness? Plausibly not. Again, the only reason that my emotional belief-
forming process is reliable is because I unknowingly ingest high levels of a chemical 
stimulant at epistemically opportune moments. I take it that the intuition at play in the 
emotional clairvoyance and suspicious interviewer cases will also find a foothold in the 
caffeine case, and determine that, intuitively, the reliability of the relevant emotional belief-
forming process is not sufficient for the presence of justification. If this is the case, then ER is 





85 Here, the objector may raise a generality-style worry concerning the level of detail at which we 
individuate this belief-forming process, i.e. one might question whether the relevant level of 
individuation is a belief-forming process about nervousness-meriting events which occur within the 
professional sphere, or whether it ought to be individuated in a coarser grain. In a similar vein to my 
comments in Chapter 4 (§4.2.2), I invite the reader to bracket such generality-style worries for the 
moment, given that my proposal in Chapter 6 will provide motivation for individuating on a fine-grain 





5.3 Modifying Emotional Reliabilism 
 
Thus far, we’ve seen that the caffeine case, as an analogue to traditional clairvoyance cases 
levelled against generic reliabilism, appears to establish the insufficiency of emotional 
reliability for justified evaluative belief. ER, as it stands, seems significantly less promising 
than it appeared to be at the end of the previous chapter.   
 
At this point in the dialectic, one might attempt to modify the view with the aim of preserving 
the core emotional reliabilist thesis while also building in the theoretical resources to help 
exclude problematic clairvoyance-type cases. Recall from §5.2 that the traditional 
clairvoyance cases levelled against reliabilism are not only taken to establish the 
insufficiency of reliability, but rather they are also often taken to illuminate a further 
necessary condition for justification. We saw that internalists typically identify this condition 
as requiring that the subject has an appropriate awareness or perspective on the evidence one 
has for their belief, whereas externalists might identify this condition as requiring that the 
subject’s belief arises via a stable and reliable cognitive disposition integrated within the 
subject’s cognitive character. In light of these lessons putatively provided by clairvoyance 
cases, Comesaña has advocated on behalf of a hybrid Evidentialist Reliabilist view which 
purports to satisfy the internalist diagnosis of the case, while Greco has advocated on behalf 
of an Agent Reliabilist view which purports to satisfy the externalist diagnosis. Plausibly, 
then, Comesaña’s and Greco’s modified reliabilist proposals are plausible candidates for the 
basis of an analogous modified emotional reliabilist view.   
 
In what remains of this chapter, I will present each of these interpretive options in turn, and 
argue that, ultimately, neither can provide a satisfactory epistemological framework for the 
justificatory thesis of emotion. The shortcomings of these views, combined with the above 
insufficiency charge, I contend, demonstrate that reliabilism does not provide us with a 
plausible epistemological foundation for a theory of emotional justification.   
 
5.3.1 Evidentialist Emotional Reliabilism 
 
Corresponding to the internalist diagnosis of clairvoyance cases, we might attempt to modify 
ER so as to evade the problematic implications of the caffeine case by supplementing our 





awareness. In the interest of pursuing an internalist/externalist blend of emotional reliabilism, 
then, it seems like a natural place to look for a framework for such a view is Comesaña’s 
Evidentialist Reliabilism.  
 
Recall from §5.2 that Comesaña takes clairvoyance cases to successfully establish the 
insufficiency of reliability, and consequently advocates on behalf of a modified reliabilist 
view which accommodates for the putative necessity of evidence for justified belief, i.e. a 
version of reliabilism supplemented by aspects of an evidentialist view of justification. To 
summarise the latter view briefly, evidentialists centre around the claim that the justificatory 
status of one’s belief depends entirely on the evidence that one has in favour of (or against) 
that belief.86 For the most part, evidentialists tend to construe ‘evidence’ in internalist terms, 
such that two individuals that are psychologically identical in terms of their internal states 
will also be epistemically identical in terms of the evidence that they possess for a given 
proposition.87  
 
Blending reliabilism and evidentialism, then, Comesaña advocates on behalf of the view that 
a belief is justified if and only if that belief is based on evidence E and the process-type of 
forming a belief on the basis of evidence E is reliable.88 Importantly, adopting such a view 
seems to give us the correct result in Bonjour’s clairvoyance case. That is, because Norman’s 
clairvoyant belief is not based on any evidence, nor does Norman have any evidence for the 
reliability of his clairvoyant power, Norman is not even defeasibly justified in believing that 
the President is in New York. By combining the basic reliabilist requirement (i.e. the 
 
86 See Conee and Feldman (1985).  
87 Although, note that it is possible to hold an externalist-leaning evidentialist view. One might 
endorse Williamson’s (1997) view that “a subject’s evidence consists of all and only the propositions 
the subject knows” (p. 717), or one might adopt a weaker version of evidential externalism identified 
by Silins (2005), according to which one’s evidence is “what one truly and justifiably believes” (p. 
378). For the purposes of the discussion at hand, however, I will focus on internalist variants of the 
evidentialist thesis.  
88 Note that Comesaña’s view is explicitly put forward as a theory of doxastic, rather than 
propositional justification, i.e. it is primarily concerned with the question of what it is for a subject’s 
existing belief to be justified, rather than the question of what it would take for a belief to be justified 
regardless as to whether or not it is held by the subject. While this thesis is primarily concerned with 
the question of whether emotional experience can confer propositional justification to evaluative 
belief, I take it that this shift in focus isn’t a substantive problem for our analysis, given that 
Comesaña suggests that the view could be straightforwardly translated in terms of propositional 
justification as follows: “S is propositionally justified in believing that p if and only if there is some 
evidence e that S has such that the type producing a belief that p based on e is actually a reliable 





reliability of the relevant-belief forming process) with the requirement of believing on the 
basis of evidence, then, we get a modified reliabilist view which now has the resources to be 
able to disarm the clairvoyance objection. 
 
So, if Evidentialist Reliabilism generates the right result in the clairvoyance case, perhaps an 
emotional analogue of the view will be capable of precluding the caffeinated emoter from 
claiming justification for their evaluative beliefs. Taking inspiration from this idea, then, we 
can build such a view as follows:  
 
Evidentialist Emotional Reliabilism (EER): S’s emotional experience is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if: (i) the 
contents of S’s emotional experience constitutes evidence for e, (ii) S forms e on the 
basis of that emotional experience, and (iii) S’s forming e on the basis of that 
emotional experience is a reliable process of belief-formation.  
 
Now, it should be clear that the first of these three conditions is the interesting one for our 
purposes. We’re taking for granted in these cases that S forms the evaluative belief on the 
basis of the emotional experience, and Chapter 4 (§4.3) endeavoured to show that arguing on 
behalf of the emotions’ systematic and widespread unreliability is a difficult and theoretically 
costly task. As such, I take it that we can plausibly assume (ii) and (iii) obtain, and focus our 
attention on (i).  
 
With that in mind, then, let us turn back to the caffeine case. Is it the case that the contents of 
my emotional experience of nervousness constitute evidence for my evaluative belief that my 
upcoming professional events are worrisome? In order to answer this question, it should be 
clear that more detail is required concerning how we elucidate the notion of ‘evidence’. 
Within the internalist sphere, one can approach the question as to what constitutes a subject’s 
evidence in one of two broad ways. First, an evidentialist could construe evidence in 
accessibilist terms. Accessibilism is a brand of internalism which asserts that a subject must 
have reflective access to the justifier (i.e. internal state). On an accessibilist spin of an 
evidentialist view, then, a necessary condition on a mental state serving as evidence for a 
given proposition is that the subject has reflective access to the contents of this mental state. 
Second, and alternatively, an evidentialist could construe evidence in mentalist terms. 





subject need not have reflective access to these states in order for them to count as justifiers. 
Now, in the interest of pursuing an internalist modification of ER (given our inspiration from 
the internalist diagnosis of generic reliabilism’s clairvoyance problem), I take it that an 
accessibilist spin on evidential internalism is our most promising route to clarifying the 
notion of evidence, given the fact that many have raised concerns about whether mentalism 
can accurately and satisfactorily be viewed as an internalist position. Notions of awareness 
and accessibility are typically considered to be absolutely central to internalism, such that 
views which purport to be internalist while rejecting the epistemic centrality of these notions 
are faced with a difficult question as to what permits them to retain the internalist label.89 In 
light of this worry, then, and for the purposes of the discussion at hand, let us assume an 
accessibilist internalist perspective.  
 
With our internalist element clarified, we now have a refined question: is it the case that I 
have reflective access to the contents of my emotional experiences of nervousness, such that 
they can constitute evidence for my evaluative belief that my upcoming professional events 
are worrisome? This strikes me as a difficult question. Speaking broadly, it seems true that 
subjects very often don’t have reflective access to the contents of their emotional 
experiences. Indeed, recall from Chapter 3 (§3.2.2) that there seem to be emotional 
experiences which are at least prima facie plausible candidates for justification-conferring 
states which do not bring with them awareness of the relevant non-evaluative properties of 
the emotion’s object. One example of this was an emotional experience of awe towards a 
piece of artwork. This seems like a case in which the experience ought to be capable of 
justifying one’s evaluative belief that the artwork is beautiful, but the subject of the 
experience lacks reflective access to the non-evaluative features of the painting that the 
emotional experience is tracking (e.g. the particular arrangement of brushstrokes, the 
spectrum of hues, etc.). What makes this case relevant for our purposes, then, is that this 
looks like a case in which the subject lacks reflective internal access to the contents of their 
emotional experience of awe. If this is true, then this instance of emotional experience will 
not constitute evidence for one’s evaluative belief, and thereby will be incapable of 
performing a justificatory role under EER. As I argued in §3.2.2, this seems like the wrong 
 
89 See, for example, Pritchard’s (2006) criticism of Conee and Feldman’s mentalist evidentialism: 
“My question… is whether it is really so obvious, as it seemingly is to Conee and Feldman, that we 
would refer to such a [mentalist] view as an internalist position if it lacked the accessibilist 





result. Constraining the justificatory abilities of emotional experience on the basis of what 
they do and do not bring awareness of (or, in this case, what is and what is not internally 
accessible to the subject) generates implausible verdicts.  
 
The problem for EER, then, is that although the view may be able to determine that the 
caffeinated emoter is not justified in their emotion-based evaluative belief (given that their 
plausible lack of reflective access to the contents of their experience of nervousness 
determines that their experience cannot constitute evidence for the evaluative belief), EER 
will also deliver the problematic result that many emotional experiences fail to constitute 
evidence for evaluative beliefs, and so fail to possess justificatory power, given that 
individuals often lack reflective access to the contents of their emotional experiences. 
 
In response to this argument, the defender of EER may argue that individuals do tend to have 
reflective access to the contents of their emotional experiences, and this is because these 
contents are better spelled out in terms of the relevant evaluative property itself, rather than 
the non-evaluative properties of the emotional object. On this view, then, the content of my 
emotional experience of awe towards the painting is just the evaluative property of 
awesomeness putatively instantiated by the painting, rather than the set of non-evaluative 
properties which gives rise to that evaluative property. Plausibly, then, I do have reflective 
access to the contents of my emotional experience in this case, such that it can constitute 
evidence for my evaluative belief that the painting is awesome. If individuals do typically 
have reflective access to their emotional contents, then those contents typically can serve as 
evidence for evaluative belief, such that EER won’t end up yielding objectionably restrictive 
justificatory results.  
 
Here’s the problem with this response. Conceiving of emotional contents in this way will 
make EER vulnerable to the over-generalisation charge. If all that’s required for the contents 
of an emotional experience to serve as evidence for one’s evaluative belief is that the 
individual has reflective access to the putative presence of the evaluative property that the 
emotion is responding to, then the caffeinated emoter in our above case will count as justified 
given that, presumably, she has reflective access to the evaluative property of her working 
events that merits nervousness. So, all in all, if we construe the contents of emotional 
experience in terms of non-evaluative properties, then too few emotional experiences will 





terms of evaluative properties, then too many emotional experiences will constitute evidence 
for evaluative belief.90 For this reason, then, I take it that EER is implausible. 
 
In summary, it seems that the proponent of EER faces a dilemma in how they elucidate the 
internalist component of the evidentialist view. Either they spin it in accessibilist terms, in 
which case the view runs into difficulties concerning the scope of our reflective access to 
emotional contents, or they spin it in mentalist terms, in which case the view faces the worry 
that mentalism is not accurately viewed as an internalist position. In light of these difficulties, 
I take it that infusing ER with an internalist evidentialist component fails to provide a 
plausible account as to how emotional experience can immediately and defeasibly justify 
evaluative belief. We’ll have to look elsewhere for a promising modification of the view.  
 
5.3.2 Agent Emotional Reliabilism 
 
Given the worries facing an internalist modification of ER, then, we might instead attempt to 
construct a version of ER which plugs the gap exploited by clairvoyance cases with Greco’s 
agent reliabilist framework. Recall from §5.2 that Greco identifies cognitive integration of 
the relevant processes as reliabilism’s key to evading the problems raised by ‘strange and 
fleeting processes’, such as the clairvoyance case. Let me begin by briefly summarising 
Greco’s view before transposing it into an epistemology of emotional experience.  
 
On Greco’s view, we must restrict the types of reliable process that are capable of giving rise 
to knowledge (and justified belief) to those reliable processes that result from “stable and 
reliable dispositions that make up [one’s] cognitive character” (1999, p. 288).91 Integration of 
these processes into one’s cognitive character involves various aspects, such as the frequency 
of beliefs generated by the disposition, the ways in which these output beliefs relate to and 
interact with the subject’s other beliefs, the sensitivity of the output beliefs to defeating 
evidence, and so forth. In a rough summarisation, we can say that a reliable process is 
grounded in a disposition that is integrated into a subject’s cognitive character to the extent 
that the doxastic outputs of the process regularly interact with other beliefs and information 
 
90 Note that this result mirrors the dilemma that RED faced in elucidating what a truth-maker for an 
evaluative proposition consists in (§3.2). 
91 Greco’s view is typically categorised as being an instance of a virtue reliabilist view. We’ll look at 





(such as defeating evidence) in the subject’s psychological system. With this in mind, then, 
the reason that Norman’s belief that the President is in New York does not enjoy justification, 
despite the fact that it was formed via a reliable process, is that the process lacks cognitive 
integration; Norman’s clairvoyant beliefs (i.e. the output beliefs) are infrequently produced, 
they do not regularly interact with the other beliefs in Norman’s psychological system, they 
fail to be sensitive to counter-evidence, and so forth. Greco’s Agent Reliabilism, then, seems 
to correctly exclude Norman from enjoying justification for his beliefs about the President’s 
location.  
 
So, if appeal to cognitive integration looks promising with respect to its ability to dispel the 
insufficiency charge raised by clairvoyance cases, then, we can inspire and formulate an 
emotional analogue of the view as follows: 
 
Agent Emotional Reliabilism (AER): S’s emotional experience is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if (i) S’s 
forming e on the basis of her emotional experience is a reliable process of belief-
formation, and (ii) this process is sufficiently integrated within the subject’s cognitive 
character.  
 
At first glance, it looks like placing the notion of cognitive integration at the epistemological 
centre stage captures something about our intuition in the caffeine case. To repeat the initial 
description of the case, the only reason that my emotional belief-forming process is reliable is 
because I unknowingly ingest high levels of a chemical stimulant at epistemically opportune 
moments; without the influence of the caffeine, I wouldn’t reliably experience appropriate 
nervousness in response to worrisome professional events. Plausibly, what’s problematic 
about ER’s determination that the caffeinated emoter is justified is that what makes their 
belief-forming process reliable is not down to any skill or success of theirs. Rather, the source 
of their emotional reliability is down to a lucky arrangement of external factors. Requiring 
that the belief-forming process is sufficiently integrated within the subject’s cognitive 
character at least seems to go some way towards recognising the epistemic importance of 
agent-based or agent-caused reliability, rather than incidental reliability.  
 
The problem with AER is that, while the notion of cognitive integration may capture 





emotional cases and include the good ones. That is, it’s not entirely clear to me that 
emotional experiences that we don’t want to be capable of justifying evaluative belief can be 
ruled out on the basis of they’re not being sufficiently integrated within the subject’s 
cognitive character. Reconsider the caffeine case, and recall from §5.2 that what made this 
case a more compelling counterexample to ER than the straightforward emotional 
clairvoyance case was that the belief-forming process in the former was entirely emotional, 
whereas the belief-forming process in the latter was primarily one of clairvoyance. Given 
this, it strikes me as plausible that the belief-forming process in the caffeine case is 
sufficiently integrated within the subject’s cognitive character, despite the fact that it is 
causally sourced in the caffeine surge. The output-beliefs of this process (i.e. my evaluative 
beliefs concerning the worrisome nature of my upcoming professional events) plausibly 
interact with and are responsive to a variety of my other beliefs within my psychological 
system, such as my beliefs about my workplace, the relationships I have with others in this 
environment, the importance of having a successful career, etc. As such, it’s not at all 
obvious to me how AER can utilise the tool of cognitive integration to exclude the 
caffeinated emoter from enjoying justification for her emotion-based evaluative belief.  
 
Indeed, these limitations of cognitive integration seems particularly salient in a revised 
version of the biased suspicious interviewer case discussed in Chapter 3 (§3.2.1). Recall that, 
here, we have a scenario in which the interviewer undergoes an experience of suspicion 
towards a candidate which, in fact, is the result of the interviewer’s implicit social bias 
against women. To make this case relevant, we can stipulate further that it just so happens 
that the interviewer’s belief-forming process is reliable; most every professional woman that 
the interviewer experiences suspicion and distrust towards in the workplace happens to be 
duplicitous, such that the interviewer’s forming the relevant evaluative beliefs on the basis of 
their emotional experiences of suspicion is a perfectly reliable belief-forming process. Is this 
belief-forming process also sufficiently cognitively integrated within the interviewer’s 
cognitive character? Plausibly, yes. The bias-produced experience of suspicion very plausibly 
interacts with and is responsive to a number of other beliefs within the interviewer’s 
psychological system, such as their implicit misogynistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of 
career-driven woman, the superiority of male character in the workplace, and so forth. 





seems implausible to allow justificatory power to their emotional experiences.92 Thus, in lieu 
of an explanation as to how the process of forming an evaluative belief on the basis of 
emotional experience is sufficiently cognitively integrated in the good cases, but not in the 
bad cases, then, I take it that AER can’t provide a plausible explanation as to how certain 
emotional experiences can immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief.  
 
5.4 Summing Up 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present what I take to be the most significant problem 
facing emotional reliabilism (ER), namely, the objection that the reliability of forming 
evaluative beliefs on the basis of one’s emotional experience is insufficient for the epistemic 
justification of evaluative belief.  
 
I began in §5.2 by introducing clairvoyance cases, and explaining how these cases are 
typically utilised in order to establish: (i) that reliability of the relevant belief-forming process 
is insufficient for epistemic justification, and (ii) that something else is required for 
justification, where this ‘something else’ can be construed in either internalist or externalist 
terms. I then constructed an analogous emotional case which aimed to demonstrate that the 
reliability of forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of one’s emotional experience cannot be 
sufficient for the justification of evaluative belief. 
 
Having levelled the objection against ER, §5.3 then considered the possibility of modifying 
ER in light of clairvoyance cases. In this section, I presented two alternative emotional 
reliabilist views corresponding to the internalist and externalist diagnoses of the clairvoyance 
case respectively. §5.3.1 presented the Comesaña-inspired Evidentialist Emotional 
Reliabilism (EER), and §5.3.2 presented the Greco-inspired Agent Emotional Reliabilism 
(AER). I argued that both EER and AER were unable to provide a plausible explanation as to 
how emotional experience can immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief. Given 
 
92 At this point, the defender of AER might object, in a similar vein to a response raised in Chapter 2 
(§2.2.1) that the intuitive verdict delivered by the biased interviewer case is being hijacked by a moral 
intuition that the interviewer is making a moral mistake in harbouring and believing on the basis of 
such a bias. However, because the caffeine case plausibly lacks this moral element and generates the 
same intuitive result, I take it that we have good reason to suppose that there is also a relevant 
epistemic violation in the biased interviewer case, such that it remains relevant and problematic for 





the failures of ER, EER, and AER, then, I conclude that the prospects for a reliabilist 
approach to emotional justification appear to be bleak.  
 
Where does this leave us? I take it that the discussions contained within Chapters 4 and 5 
illuminate several interesting findings with respect to the epistemic relevance of reliability 
when it comes to how emotional experience can justify evaluative belief. First, although the 
sufficiency of emotional reliability has been undermined in this chapter, I take it that we still 
have good reason to think that reliability, in some sense, may be necessary for epistemic 
justification. Building a reliability condition into our account, i.e. emphasising a robust 
connection between emotional experience and evaluative truth, allowed us to both sidestep 
the specific kinds of over-generalisation cases levelled against dogmatist views and capture a 
wide variety of support from authors in the literature. Moreover, recall that the New Evil 
Demon Problem failed to get a foothold on ER; an emotional version of the NEDP was 
insufficiently powerful to establish that emotional reliability cannot be necessary for 
emotional justification. Finally, although the Greco-inspired AER ultimately failed to provide 
us with a compelling theory of emotional justification given our worries with the notion of 
cognitive integration, it seems plausible that turning our attention to features of the agent 
herself provides us with an interesting and promising perspective on how we might be able to 
build a more nuanced understanding as to how emotional experience can justify evaluative 
belief. Plausibly, it’s honing in on the reliability of the belief-forming processes in isolation 
from the rest of the subject’s epistemically relevant features that renders a view vulnerable to 
clairvoyance-style challenges. Turning our attention instead to the way in which this reliable 
belief-forming process is situated and contextualised within the subject’s overall cognitive 
character may help us to evade these challenges, and provide a more compelling account of 
emotional justification.  
 
Looking forwards, then, Chapter 6 will provide an in-depth analysis into the prospects of 
agent-based views of emotional justification. I believe that it is a specific view within this 







Virtue, Character, and Competence: Agent-Based Approaches 
 
6.1. Taking Stock 
 
Thus far in the thesis, I’ve identified and evaluated two general approaches to a theory of 
emotional justification: emotional dogmatism and emotional reliabilism. Broadly speaking, 
we’ve seen that the downfall of dogmatism consists in the view’s inability to provide a 
plausible phenomenology-based explanation as to how we can suitably restrict the view so as 
to exclude over-generalisation cases from enjoying epistemic justification, while reliabilism 
is rendered untenable by a vulnerability to an emotional analogue of the clairvoyance case, 
i.e. a case which establishes the insufficiency of emotional reliability for epistemic 
justification.  
 
Before turning our attention to the third and final category of views, it will be instructive to 
first reflect upon the various desiderata for a plausible account of emotional justification 
raised by the vices of dogmatism and reliabilism. I take it that there are three desirable 
criteria that an account of emotional justification ought to be able to meet in order to 
constitute an improvement over the previous views. The first desideratum is that the theory 
must be suitably restrictive, such that it offers a principled reason as to why the biased 
interviewer’s baseless emotional experience of suspicion towards the candidate cannot 
immediately and defeasibly justify their evaluative belief that the candidate is untrustworthy, 
for example. Second, on the other side of the coin, the view must not veer too far on the side 
of restraint, such that emotional experiences that we would ordinarily consider to be valuable 
justificatory resources do not end up being excluded on spurious grounds. Similarly, recall 
that for the justificatory thesis of emotion to be of particular epistemological importance, it 
must promise a sufficiently widespread degree of emotionally justified evaluative belief, such 
that emotional experience can also serve as the experiential bedrock for further epistemic 
goods, such as evaluative knowledge and understanding. Third, bearing in mind the 
clairvoyance-type challenges raised against emotional reliabilism, the view must recognise 
and provide an explanation of the necessity but insufficiency of emotional reliability. That is, 
while reliabilism’s focus on a robust connection between experiential justification and truth 
was a welcome development in some respects, emotional reliability alone cannot be enough 






So, where do we look for a view which can accommodate these desiderata? The final 
category of views that will be examined in this dissertation are theories of emotional 
justification grounded in a virtue epistemological framework; what we might call agent-
based views of emotional justification. These are views which prompt a shift in focus from 
assessing features of the emotional experience and the emotion-based evaluative beliefs to 
assessing features of the emoter herself, such as the intellectual character traits or epistemic 
competences that led to the formation of her emotional experience and the corresponding 
evaluative belief. On agent-based views, it doesn’t make sense to epistemically evaluate the 
emotional experience and the corresponding belief independently of the way in which they 
were formed by the emoter. Instead, we must direct our attention to the etiology of these 
experiences, and base our epistemic assessment on the features of the emoter that give rise to 
the emotional experience in question. Here, I argue that an agent-based view is our best bet 
for a plausible account of emotional justification. More specifically, I will argue that an 
account grounded in the possession of learned emotional competences both satisfies the 
above desiderata, and yields further philosophical advantages which make it, in my view, the 
most promising view of emotional justification.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §6.2, I provide a brief introduction to the topic 
of virtue epistemology, and set out the two broad virtue epistemological approaches: virtue 
responsibilism (§6.2.1) and virtue reliabilism (§6.2.2). Here, I suggest that virtue 
responsibilism is unlikely to be able to provide a plausible framework for a theory of 
emotional justification, and that we ought to focus our efforts on building a virtue reliabilist 
theory instead. On that note, §6.3 then presents what I take to be the most plausible 
instantiation of such a view available on the philosophical market, namely, Carter’s 
competence-based view of emotional justification (EC). This section clarifies the account and 
highlights its advantages. 
 
In spite of these advantages, however, §6.4 then argues that EC is in need of further 
development. More specifically, I identify an area of ambiguity within the account which 
requires clarification. Namely, given that the possession of generative emotional competence 
requires that the subject is likely to succeed in experiencing an emotion that is appropriately 
responsive to the presence of an evaluative property, I argue that the scope of this success 





the likelihood of success is calculated by taking into account all of the subject’s emotional 
experiences, (ii) the likelihood of success is calculated by taking into account only instances 
of the given emotion-type, (iii) the likelihood of success is calculated by taking into account 
only instances of the given emotion-type elicited by a particular scenario. The upshot of this 
ambiguity is twofold. First, without a clear explication of the success requirement, the view 
fails to provide a fully informative account as to what is required for the possession of 
emotional competence, and, consequently, what is required for emotional justification. 
Second, and relatedly, if it is the case that calculations of likely success must only take into 
account instances of the given emotion-type (or emotion-type + particular eliciting 
scenarios), then it would seem to follow that we can have emotional competences localised to 
particular emotion-types (or emotion-types + particular eliciting scenarios). If this is true, 
then it seems to follow that it is possible for some of a subject’s emotional experiences to 
bear justificatory power with respect to their evaluative beliefs, but not others. It is for these 
reasons that I take clarifying this ambiguity to be essential. I then dismiss option (i) as being 
insufficiently nuanced to accommodate for the complexity of our emotional skills and 
profiles, and propose that we turn our attention to the localised variants as a more plausible 
starting point.  
 
Accordingly, §6.5 then argues that EC’s success requirement on emotional competences 
ought to be construed in terms of option (iii), i.e. as localised to particular emotion-types 
experienced in response to particular eliciting scenarios. This is because the most plausible 
explanation of the development of generative emotional competence, I contend, is that 
individuals undergo processes of emotional learning with respect to the presence of particular 
evaluative properties in particular eliciting scenarios. My view is that it is when and only 
when an emotional experience arises from a competence forged by these learning processes 
that it is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying evaluative belief. This refined 
version of EC is what I refer to as the Learned Emotional Competence (LEC) theory of 
emotional justification. I then strive to bolster the prospects of LEC by expanding upon the 
processes and significance of emotional learning (§6.5.1), and highlighting a unique selling 
point of LEC, namely, its ability to illuminate and explain a popular insight from feminist 
philosophy (§6.5.2). I then close in §6.6 by summarising the virtues of LEC and explaining 
how it meets the desiderata identified for a compelling theory of emotional justification. 






6.2. Virtue Epistemology and Emotional Justification 
 
As noted above, virtue epistemologists are concerned with shifting the locus of epistemic 
assessment from the qualities of the belief in question to the qualities of the believer. That is, 
it is features of the epistemic agent herself that matter for the belief’s epistemic status, such 
as her epistemic virtues, skills, or competences, rather than questions of whether the belief 
was produced via a reliable process, or whether it was based on an experience with the 
appropriate phenomenal character, and so forth. Looking at justified belief through a virtue 
epistemological lens, then, we arrive at the rough idea that an agent’s belief that p is justified 
if and only if that belief is the result of the agent’s exercise of the relevant intellectual 
capacity or feature.  
 
With respect to answering the question of what kind of agential feature is relevant for 
epistemic assessment, virtue epistemologists have been traditionally divided into one of two 
broad camps. Roughly speaking, virtue responsibilists attribute epistemic significance to an 
agent’s intellectual and epistemic character traits, such as her curiosity, open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage, and so forth, whereas virtue reliabilists attribute significance to an 
agent’s reliable cognitive faculties and capacities, such as her perception, introspection, 
intuition, and so forth. On the question of what makes a belief a justified belief, then, virtue 
responsibilists inclined to answer such a question will argue that a justified belief is a belief 
that arises via the exercise of the agent’s intellectual character traits, while virtue reliabilists 
will insist that a justified belief is a belief that arises via the exercise of her reliable cognitive 
faculties. Thus, while both of these views identify the seat of a belief’s positive justificatory 
status as embedded in the epistemically relevant features of the believer, they differ on what 
these relevant features are.  
 
In what remains of this section, I will sketch out both virtue responsibilism and virtue 
reliabilism in finer detail, and set out how we might figure emotional experience into each of 
these justificatory pictures. More specifically, I will argue that virtue responsibilism is 
unlikely to be able to provide a satisfactory model for a justificatory thesis of emotion, given 
its focus on intellectual character traits and virtuous motivation or inquiry. Instead, I suggest 







6.2.1. Virtue Responsibilism  
 
Let us first consider the prominent virtue responsibilist view elucidated by Zagzebski. On the 
topic of justified belief, Zagzebski (1996) suggests the following:  
 
A justified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who 
has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, might 
believe in like circumstances. (p. 214) 
 
First, and centrally, we have the notion of intellectual virtue. For Zagzebski, intellectual 
virtues have both a motivational and a reliability component. Take, as an illustrative 
example, the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness. On Zagzebski’s view, open-mindedness 
involves an affective motive towards a particular valuable end, i.e. a love or care for 
considering appropriate alternative ideas. Crucially, however, it also involves a reliability 
component insofar as the open-minded agent will be reliably successful in considering 
appropriate alternative ideas. To generalise, the motivational component of each intellectual 
virtue is derivative from a general care for, or love of, truth, and it is relativised to the 
particular trait in question, e.g. curiosity involves the motive of care to discover new ideas, 
intellectual courage involves the motive of care to persist in holding beliefs and conducting 
epistemic inquiries even when under pressure to discard them, and so forth. Moreover, each 
motivational component is matched by a reliable success condition, such that the 
intellectually virtuous agent will have the disposition to be appropriately motivated towards 
suitable ends and will be reliably successful at achieving those ends.   
 
The second feature of Zagzebski’s account of epistemic justification requires that the subject 
has the relevant understanding of their cognitive situation. Put simply, what this requirement 
amounts to is the subject possessing the relevant descriptive facts pertaining to their 
epistemic situation and the formation of the relevant belief, such as relevant facts about the 
contents of the belief, their evidence and their surroundings, and so forth. In summary, then, 
Zagzebski provides a picture of justified belief in which a belief is justified if that belief 
would be formed by an agent who (i) is motivated by intellectual virtue, and (ii) has the 






So, how might emotional experience figure into this picture? The most obvious opening 
seems to be the affective element of the motivational component of intellectual virtues. 
Indeed, Zagzebski explicitly leaves epistemic space for the emotions in her description of the 
relevance and nature of motivation:  
 
What is important is just the idea that beliefs can be and perhaps typically are 
motivated, and that the motive can affect the evaluation of the belief in a way that is 
analogous to the way the motive can affect the evaluation of an overt act. What I 
mean by a motive is an affective state that initiates and directs action. In my theory of 
emotion, a motive is an emotion that is operating to produce action. (2003, p. 17) 
  
In light of these comments, then, perhaps, we can construct a virtue responsibilist account of 
emotional justification along the following lines:   
 
S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her 
evaluative belief e if and only if that experience at least partially constitutes an 
intellectual virtue.  
 
There are, however, some issues with endorsing such a view. First, it’s not at all clear that our 
various everyday emotional experiences will be capable of justifying evaluative belief along 
Zagzebski’s lines. It is not obvious how, say, fear of an approaching snake or disgust towards 
spoiled milk can figure into an intellectual virtue in the relevant way so as to be bestowed 
with justificatory power. These emotional experiences do not obviously seem to be tied up 
with any valuable intellectual motivation (to uncover truth, to consider new ideas, etc.) such 
that they can be considered as partly constitutive of intellectual virtue.93 If it’s only emotional 
experiences that neatly figure into epistemic inquiries of this sort that are capable of bearing 
justificatory power, then one might worry that this version of the justificatory thesis fails to 
satisfy the above desideratum of delivering a substantive enough epistemic yield.  
 
93 Perhaps it might be argued that these emotional experiences are tied up with an intellectually 
valuable motivation, i.e. to discover truth (where we construe this motivation in a very broad sense so 
as to include fairly trivial or banal truths, such as the fearsomeness of nearby threats or the 
disgustingness of spoiled foods). If one adopts this line of argument, however, it seems to me that 
most every type of emotional experience could be described in such a way insofar as emotional 
experiences putatively purport to represent world accurately, such that most every emotional 
experience would count as partially constituting an intellectual virtue. If this were the case, of course, 






Second, and relatedly, a view of this sort only seems to offer emotional experience a backseat 
role in securing epistemic goods in a way which clashes with the original motivations of the 
justificatory thesis. That is, it’s not really the emotional experience doing the fundamental 
epistemic work here; the emotional experience is only capable of performing an epistemic 
role insofar as it figures into the broader intellectual virtue. It’s the latter that’s particularly 
epistemically significant, and this seems at odds with the motivations that make the 
justificatory thesis of emotion philosophically interesting, i.e. that emotional experience acts 
as a simple and naturalised means of obtaining justification for evaluative belief, and, in turn, 
aids in the acquisition of further epistemic goods. Indeed, on this note, many of Zagzebski’s 
critics object to the idea that the motivational component of intellectual virtue is 
fundamentally affective or emotional.94 In response to criticisms along these lines, Zagzebski 
concedes that “the formal structure of the theory does not require that motives be emotions” 
(2000, p. 210). Furthermore, it’s not clear how such a view could explain the immediacy of 
the justification conferred by emotional experience. If emotional experience can only justify 
evaluative belief when it constitutes an intellectual virtue, and possessing intellectual virtue 
requires an understanding of one’s cognitive situation, then one might worry that the 
justificatory ability of emotional experience hinges on the possession of that non-emotional 
cognitive understanding in such a way that undermines the former’s capacity to justify 
evaluative belief independently of any connections to the subject’s existing justified beliefs. 
Given these concerns, then, it looks like a justificatory thesis of emotion built on the 
foundations of Zagzebski’s virtue responsibilism has notable shortcomings.  
 
Importantly, though, it’s not just Zagzebski’s instantiation of the responsibilist view that 
gives rise to worries like these for a responsibilist account of emotional justification. 
Consider, on the other hand, Hookway’s comments on the importance of epistemic and 
intellectual character when it comes to determining the justificatory status of one’s belief:  
 
[A]t best we might say that someone is justified in believing something if their belief 
issues from responsible and virtuous inquiry. Justified beliefs are those that issue from 
the responsible inquiries of virtuous inquirers. (1994, p. 225) 
 
 





Hookway’s account differs from Zagzebski’s insofar as the central focus is on the importance 
of virtuous inquiry, rather than acting and believing in accordance with intellectual virtue 
(conceived as consisting in the motivational and reliability components). For Hookway, 
responsible and virtuous inquiry is a deliberative reasoning process unconsciously guided by 
cognitive character traits (i.e. intellectual virtues) which are embedded in one’s character 
through experience and practice. On this view, the intellectually virtuous agent will naturally 
engage in virtuous inquiry which manifests their entrenched traits of open-mindedness, 
curiosity, intellectual courage, and so forth. It is the beliefs arrived at through this process 
that count as being epistemically justified.  
 
How, then, might emotional experience enter the picture here? Hookway is receptive to the 
suggestion that emotions provide a positive contribution to effective inquiry. On the topic of 
the role of emotional experience in scientific deliberation, Hookway (2002) suggests that the 
emotions play a number of significant mechanical roles in regulating this inquiry, such as 
driving and halting inquiry through the initiation and cessation of epistemic anxiety 
respectively, acting as “cognitive shortcuts” (p. 257) which eliminate the need for 
burdensome and complex assessments of evidence, and so forth. Again, however, it’s not 
obvious that this claim – that emotional experience is necessary for virtuous inquiry, which, 
in turn, is necessary for justified belief – can get us to the view that emotional experience 
itself immediately and defeasibly justifies evaluative belief. Perhaps the most that can be said 
about the emotions here is that they figure into the system which produces justified belief. 
Thus, it looks like Hookway’s virtue responsibilism, as a potential basis for a justificatory 
thesis of emotion, suffers similar shortcomings to Zagzebski’s view.  
 
Taking all of this into account, it seems to be the case that virtue responsibilist views lack the 
resources to be able to easily offer up an account of immediate experiential justification. This 
isn’t particularly surprising, given the general virtue responsibilist motivation to shift the 
focus of traditional epistemic theorising from notions of ‘justification’ and ‘knowledge’ to 
more holistic notions of ‘intellectual character’ and ‘virtue’. Take Hookway’s claim that, if 
his responsibilist account is correct, “a general notion of ‘justification’ may have relatively 
little work to do in a developed account of epistemic evaluation” (1994, p. 225), or 
Zagzebski’s intent to offer a virtue responsibilist view that gives the concept of epistemic 
justification “a more modest role in epistemic evaluation” (2000, p. 213). Epistemic 





that these views will not lend themselves particularly well to forming a basis for a 
corresponding theory of emotional justification. In other words, virtue responsibilism and the 
justificatory thesis of emotion seem to be pursuing separate epistemological projects, such 
that a smooth blend of the two seems unlikely.   
 
In sum, if the defender of the justificatory thesis of emotion wishes to employ a virtue 
responsibilist framework to spell out their view, then it looks like they’ll have to engage in 
some tricky theorising to reconcile the aims of virtue responsibilism with the justificatory 
thesis of emotion, and explain both: (i) how our emotional experiences figure into the 
possession of intellectual virtue, and (ii) how our everyday emotional experiences, which are 
not obviously tied to epistemic inquiry, can be capable of bearing immediate justificatory 
power. For these reasons, then, perhaps we ought to look elsewhere in the virtue 
epistemological sphere for a plausible account as to how and when emotional experience can 
immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief.  
 
6.2.2. Virtue Reliabilism  
 
Let us now turn to virtue reliabilism as an alternative epistemological framework for the 
justificatory thesis of emotion. Recall that virtue reliabilists determine that intellectual virtue, 
i.e. what makes beliefs epistemically valuable, amounts to the subject’s possession of certain 
faculties which reliably give rise to true beliefs. Paradigmatic intellectual virtues, on such a 
view, are typically identified as faculties such as perception, intuition, memory, and the like. 
Where virtue reliabilists tend to differ is at the level of detailing the exact nature of these 
intellectual virtues, and their relationship to the believer.  
 
Now, interestingly, we’ve already come across an example of a virtue reliabilist view in our 
discussion. Recall Greco’s agent reliabilist view discussed in Chapter 5 (§5.3.2), according to 
which the reliable belief-forming processes that are capable of giving rise to knowledge (and 
justified belief) are those reliable processes that result from “stable and reliable dispositions 
that make up [one’s] cognitive character” (1999, p. 288). For Greco, these integrated 
dispositions constitute cognitive (or intellectual) virtues. Recall also, however, that Greco’s 
view encountered issues when transposed to emotional experience given worries concerning 
the notion of cognitive integration. For the purposes of this chapter, then, I will focus solely 





both the impact and influence that Sosa’s view has had within the literature and the results of 
our prior discussion of Greco’s view. In what follows, I will provide a brief overview of 
Sosa’s broad epistemological picture, before highlighting the place of epistemic justification 
within it, and explaining why such an account is a more promising epistemological 
foundation for the justificatory thesis of emotion.  
 
The starting point for elucidating Sosa’s view concerns his claim that epistemic normativity 
is a kind of performance normativity.95 Roughly speaking, on Sosa’s view, beliefs are types 
of performances aimed at truth, and, as performances, are assessable on the following three 
levels. First, performances can be accurate, i.e. whether the performance is successful in its 
aim. Second, performances can be adroit, i.e. whether the performance manifests a particular 
competence of the performer. Third, performances can be apt, i.e. whether they are accurate 
because they are adroit. To summarise a complex view briefly, Sosa argues that an apt belief 
constitutes an instance of knowledge.96 We secure valuable epistemic goods, therefore, when 
our epistemic performances manifest our competences in the relevant way, where these 
competences are to be understood as dispositions to reliably succeed in our particular 
performances.  
 
So, if knowledge amounts to apt belief,  where does epistemic justification enter the picture? 
In Sosa’s early work, he provides the following comments on epistemic justification: 
 
Here primary justification would apply to intellectual virtues, to stable dispositions 
for belief acquisition, through their greater contribution toward getting us to the truth. 
Secondary justification would then attach to particular beliefs in virtue of their source 
in intellectual virtues or other such justified dispositions. (1980, p. 23) 
 
 
95 Indeed, one can find echoes of Sosa’s performance-based virtue epistemology in the work of other 
notable virtue epistemologists. See, for example, Pritchard (2009). 
96 Technically speaking, Sosa identifies apt belief as an instance of animal knowledge, which is 
presented in contrast to the more demanding reflective knowledge. The latter requires that the belief is 
apt and that the believer has the appropriate first-person perspective on the aptness of her belief. 
Given our focus on epistemic justification, rather than knowledge, I won’t expand on this detail here, 
but note that this additional perspective requirement on the possession of reflective knowledge is 
useful insofar as it makes Sosa’s account capable of determining that Norman’s clairvoyance-





What Sosa refers to here as ‘secondary justification’ is the kind of epistemic justification that 
we’re interested in here; the kind that attaches to particular beliefs when they arise from 
intellectual virtues, i.e. dispositions to form true beliefs. In a similar vein, we can observe a 
similar point put differently in Sosa’s later comments:  
 
A belief may similarly hit the mark of truth unaided by luck, and may also fit within 
the believer's wider body of beliefs. And we can then evaluate it as “epistemically 
justified,” in one or another sense: “competently adroit” perhaps (or reliably based, or 
counterfactually safe, etc.)… (2009a, p. 114) 
 
Here, Sosa provides an analysis of epistemically justified belief in terms of that belief being 
“competently adroit”, i.e. manifesting subject’s competence to form true beliefs. Taking these 
comments into account, we see that, on Sosa’s performance-based virtue reliabilism, a 
belief’s being epistemically justified amounts to that belief being produced via the subject’s 
epistemic competence, i.e. their disposition to reliably succeed in forming true beliefs. Of 
course, reliable success does not entail infallible success. All that is required for a belief to be 
justified, on Sosa’s view, is that the subject’s formation of the belief manifests the 
competence to reliably enough form true belief. The possession and manifestation of 
particular competences are thus the key to this virtue reliabilist picture of epistemic 
justification.  
 
What are competences, then? On Sosa’s view, competences are “dispositions of an agent to 
perform well” (2010, p. 465) , and can be analysed in terms of their possessing a ‘triple S’ 
structure.  To illustrate, take an individual with perceptual competence. The possession of a 
competence involves three constitutive components. First, there’s the skill (or seat), which 
constitutes the innermost competence as the disposition to perform the activity successfully, 
e.g. the skill of perceiving the sensible world veridically. Second, the disposition requires that 
the subject be in the proper shape. That is, she’s in the relevant internal condition to be able 
to execute her skill, i.e. she’s not under the influence of a hallucinogen. Third, and finally, the 
disposition requires that the subject be properly situated. That is, her external and 
environmental conditions must be such that she is capable of manifesting the skill, e.g. she’s 






Now, briefly, there are a couple of things to note here. First, note that the subject retains 
possession of the skill even when she is not properly shaped and situated. That is, if I’m 
reliably successful when driving, then I still possess the skill to drive even if I’m submerged 
several hundred metres underwater and have recently ingested a hallucinogenic, but, 
crucially, I don’t possess the competence if I can’t actually drive successfully because I’m 
improperly shaped and situated. Second, generally speaking, identification of the relevant 
shape/situation pairs which correspond to the skill (which, constitutively, give rise to the 
relevant competence) is dependent on the background norms which govern and contextualise 
the performance of the act in question. The relevant shape/situation pair for assessing 
whether an individual has an archery competence, for instance, will be indexed to the 
conditions in which good archery performances are valued (i.e. in non-torrential weather 
conditions, when the archers are not under the influence of alcohol, etc.). 
 
Taking all of this into account, we can thereby test for an agent’s possession of complete 
perceptual competence with the following trigger-manifestation conditional: if our subject is 
likely to succeed in undergoing a veridical perceptual experience, given that she’s properly 
situated and in proper shape, then she has perceptual competence. Thus, forming a perceptual 
belief as a result of this competence would constitute an adroit performance, and, thereby, be 
evaluated as an epistemically justified belief. This is the essence of Sosa’s performance-based 
virtue reliabilist view.  
 
With all of this in mind, then, we can determine straight away why Sosa’s virtue reliabilism 
is better placed than virtue responsibilism for our investigation into an agent-based view of 
emotional justification. First, given that virtue reliabilism’s focus is on particular 
competences and faculties, such as perception and intuition, there’s a sense in which we can 
straightforwardly ‘plug-in’ a subject’s emotional system as constituting one of these faculties. 
This makes virtue reliabilism much more amenable to lending itself to accounts of immediate 
experiential justification than virtue responsibilism. Second, and relatedly, we can allow the 
emotions a central epistemic role without necessitating that they’re intricately bound up with 
intellectually virtuous character traits, or virtuous inquiry, and so forth. Moreover, as we’ll 
see in what follows, marrying the justificatory thesis of emotion with a virtue reliabilist 
framework meets the various desiderata specified for a plausible and compelling account of 
emotional justification. Without further ado, then, the next section will present a view which 





evaluative belief with reference to this virtue reliabilist framework. This, I take it, is the best 
starting point for a plausible agent-based theory of emotional justification.   
 
6.3. The Emotional Competence View 
 
Fortuitously for our purposes, a view of emotional justification grounded in Sosa’s virtue 
reliabilist framework has recently been developed by Carter (2020). In the interest of 
unifying a competence-based virtue epistemology with a justificatory thesis of emotion, 
Carter proposes the following:  
 
Emotional Competence View (EC): S’s emotional experience immediately and 
defeasibly justifies her evaluative belief e if and only if (i) the emotional experience is 
formed aptly (i.e. manifests S’s generative emotional competence) and (ii) S forms e 
via the exercise of her doxastic emotional competence.97 
 
To illustrate, reconsider an experience of anger in response to an offhand remark made by a 
colleague. According to EC, this experience is capable of justifying my evaluative belief that 
the remark is offensive if and only if the following two conditions are met. First, the 
experience of anger must be formed aptly, i.e., the experience must manifest a generative 
emotional competence to experience emotions which are appropriately responsive to the 
presence of an evaluative property. That is, roughly speaking, one has generative emotional 
competence insofar as one possesses the competence of reliably experiencing anger towards 
the offensive, shame towards the shameful, and so forth. Crucially, however, mere generative 
emotional competence is not sufficient for the positive justificatory status of the relevant 
belief. That is, it’s not enough to have a competence to experience the appropriate emotions, 
but, rather, one must also be competent at forming the appropriate evaluative belief on the 
basis of their apt emotional experiences; at transitioning from an apt emotional experience to 
the relevant evaluative belief. This leads us to the second condition: my evaluative belief that 
the remark was offensive must be generated via a doxastic emotional competence to form the 
appropriate evaluative belief on the basis of the relevant emotional experience. The apt 
emotional experience can only justify the evaluative belief when there’s an appropriate causal 
 





connection between the two. Thus, for Carter, it is only when these emotional skills are 
working in tandem that an agent’s emotional experiences can justify her evaluative beliefs.98   
 
How, exactly, should we understand generative and doxastic emotional competence? Recall 
Sosa’s triple-S structure of competences as elucidated above. Adopting that model, we can 
test for the possession of emotional competences in terms of the following trigger-
manifestation conditionals:  
 
Generative Emotional Competence: if a subject S is likely to succeed in experiencing 
an emotion appropriately responsive to the presence of an evaluative property, given 
that she’s properly shaped and situated, then she has generative emotional 
competence.  
 
Doxastic Emotional Competence: if a subject S is likely to succeed in forming the 
appropriate evaluative belief on the basis of her apt emotional experiences, given that 
she’s properly shaped and situated, then she has doxastic emotional competence.  
 
Now, a question may arise concerning how we identify the relevant shape/situation pairs for 
the domain of generative and doxastic emotional competence. That is, there is a question as 
to what constitutes proper shape and situation for experiencing appropriate emotional 
experiences and forming the relevant evaluative beliefs on the basis of these experiences. 
Recall that the relevant shape/situation pairs vary across different domains of performance, 
and are indexed to the norms in which good instances of that performance are valued. For the 
purposes of this discussion, I take it that it will suffice to make common sense assumptions 
about proper shape and situation required for generative and doxastic emotional competence. 
That is, she is not suffering from mental illness or psychological disorder, she is not under 
inordinate pressure in a life-or-death situation, and so forth.  
 
 
98 One interesting thing to note about the relationship between generative and doxastic emotional 
competence, as Carter spells it out, is that it doesn’t seem to be possible to meet condition (ii) of EC 
without first meeting condition (i). This is because exercising one’s doxastic emotional competence in 
a way which meets condition (ii) involves, as Carter puts it, “taking not just any emotion, but an apt 
emotion at face value” (p. 1248). In other words, if S forms e via the exercise of her doxastic 
emotional competence, she must be transitioning from an emotional experience which manifests her 
generative emotional competence to the relevant evaluative belief. Thus, it looks like (i) must be met 





Now, having set out the view, we’re now in a position to be able to evaluate EC with respect 
to the initial desiderata set out in §6.1. Recall that an essential criterion identified for a 
plausible justificatory thesis of emotion is that it is suitably restrictive such that emotional 
experiences like those of the biased interviewer don’t turn out to be capable of immediately 
and defeasibly justifying evaluative belief. Recall that, in this example, the interviewer has an 
emotional experience of distrust or suspicion towards the candidate which in fact arises from 
their illicit bias against members of the candidate’s social group. Now, it should be clear that 
EC will not bestow this emotional experience with justificatory power. Neither the 
interviewer’s emotional experience nor their corresponding evaluative belief that the 
candidate is duplicitous manifest the interviewer’s generative or doxastic emotional 
competences respectively. A social bias will very likely not constitute an emotional 
competence given that biases against particular social groups cannot be plausibly construed 
as dispositions to perform well within the domain of experiencing emotions appropriately 
responsive to the relevant property. Indeed, it seems as though biases against particular social 
groups can be identified as dispositions to experience emotions which are inappropriately 
responsive to the presence of irrelevant non-evaluative properties, e.g. an individual’s 
appearance properties. On the other hand, recall that a plausible theory of emotional 
justification must not veer too far in the direction of restraint, and rule out certain emotional 
experiences from bearing justificatory power on spurious grounds. On the face of it, EC 
seems to meet this requirement. For EC, any emotional experience could be capable of 
bearing justificatory power, so long as the competence requirements are met. Importantly, it 
doesn’t seem unreasonably exclusionary to determine that a subject’s emotional experience is 
incapable of bearing justificatory power when that subject lacks the relevant emotional 
competences. So far, then, EC seems to be in significantly better shape than the dogmatist 
approaches to emotional justification considered in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
What’s interesting to consider now is whether EC fares better than the reliabilist approach. 
Recall that our third desiderata for a plausible view was an ability to explain and account for 
the insufficiency of mere emotional reliability for justification. This insufficiency was 
established in Chapter 5 (§5.2) by appeal to a counterexample relevantly analogous to 
traditional clairvoyance cases levelled against generic reliabilism. In this counterexample, we 
considered a subject who is typically reliable with respect to forming evaluative beliefs 
concerning the anxiety-meriting events of their working day on the basis of their anxiety 





but the reason for this is that every time the subject does have an anxiety-meriting working 
day, they happen to have a strong cup of coffee that morning, and the surge of caffeine is 
what explains their anxiety. I argued that this looks like a case in which emotional reliabilism 
will generate a false positive. EC, on the other hand, looks particular well-equipped for 
explaining why the subject’s anxiety-based evaluative beliefs are not justified. Simply put, 
the subject’s experiences of anxiety cannot be capable of bearing justificatory power because 
they do not manifest a generative emotional competence. By stipulation, removing the 
influence of caffeine from the case also removes their likelihood of succeeding in 
experiencing anxiety appropriately responsive to the anxiety-making features of their 
working day. If this is the case, then EC can determine that the subject’s emotional 
experiences of anxiety are not capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying the relevant 
evaluative beliefs in virtue of the fact that they do not manifest or arise via the required 
emotional competence. Thus, it looks like EC is well-equipped for recognising the necessity 
but insufficiency of mere emotional reliability for justification; reliability and likely success 
are epistemically essential for EC, but, crucially, this reliability must result from the subject’s 
generative and doxastic competences.  
 
So, thus far, the prospects of EC appear to be promising. Insofar as the view is capable of 
evading the challenges which troubled dogmatist and reliabilist approaches, it looks like EC 
is particularly well-placed for a plausible view as to how emotional experience can 
immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief. However, in what follows, I will argue 
that EC, in fact, requires further development and clarification in light of an ambiguity in the 
scope of emotional competences. In light of this ambiguity, I will then propose a crystallised 
version of the Emotional Competence view which, I believe, is a stronger contender for a 
compelling view of emotional justification.  
 
6.4.  Objection: An Ambiguity in the Scope of Emotional Competences 
 
Put simply, the worry is that EC’s overall plausibility will hinge on how, exactly, we spell out 
the scope of a subject’s emotional competences. Reconsider the trigger-manifestation 






If a subject S is likely to succeed in experiencing an emotion appropriately responsive 
to the presence of an evaluative property, given that she’s properly shaped and 
situated, then she has generative emotional competence. 
 
The problem is that the scope of success in this conditional is ambiguous. To illustrate, 
suppose that, as a dedicated canine behaviourist, I am extremely reliable when it comes to 
experiencing fear with respect to fearsome dogs. Moreover, I am also reliably successful at 
taking these specific experiences at face value and forming evaluative beliefs that particular 
dogs are fearsome on the basis of those experiences. However, suppose that I am drastically 
unreliable when it comes to experiencing appropriate fear in response to non-dog fearsome 
objects; my reliability when it comes to appropriate fear experiences is very strictly localised 
to instances of fearsome dogs. Moreover, we can stipulate further that I am also drastically 
unreliable when it comes to undergoing non-fear emotional experiences that are appropriately 
responsive to the presence of an evaluative property. I almost never experience shame in 
response to the shameful, joy in response to the joyful, admiration in response the admirable, 
and so forth. Thus, we have a case in which I’m likely to succeed in experiencing fear which 
is appropriately responsive to the fearsomeness instantiated by particular dogs, but very 
unlikely to succeed in experiencing an appropriate emotional experience outside of this 
specific scenario.   
 
Now, assuming that my proper shape and situation remains constant across these cases  (i.e. 
my comparative unreliability with respect to the other emotional spheres cannot be explained 
in terms of my lacking proper shape and situation), there’s an open question as to whether I 
count as possessing generative emotional competence. In response to this ambiguity, I take it 
that there are three ways in which the defender of EC might attempt to clarify the view. We 
can spell out these options as follows:  
 
(i) Global Emotional Competence: If S is likely to succeed in experiencing any 
emotion appropriately responsive to the presence of an evaluative property, given that 
she’s properly shaped and situated, then she has generative emotional competence.  
 
(ii) Type-Local Emotional Competence: If S is likely to succeed in experiencing a 
given emotion-type (e.g. fear) appropriately responsive to the presence of the relevant 





then she has generative emotional competence with respect to that particular emotion-
type.  
 
(iii) Scenario-Local Emotional Competence: If S is likely to succeed in experiencing a 
given emotion-type (e.g. fear) appropriately responsive to the presence of the relevant 
evaluative property (e.g. fearsomeness) within the context of a particular eliciting 
scenario (e.g. with respect to encountering fearsome dogs) given that she’s properly 
shaped and situated, then she has generative emotional competence with respect to 
that particular emotion-type within the context of that particular eliciting scenario.  
 
These options are presented in an ascending order of localisation. The Global option, insofar 
as the likely success calculation takes into account all of the subject’s emotional experiences 
and the entirety of her emotional disposition, in effect renders generative emotional 
competence an all-or-nothing affair. Either the subject is likely to succeed in experiencing an 
appropriately responsive emotion, in which case the subject has generative emotional 
competence, or the subject isn’t likely to succeed, in which case they don’t. If they do have 
this global generative emotional competence, then, assuming the cooperation of the doxastic 
emotional competence, then all of the subject’s emotional experiences will be capable of 
justifying their evaluative beliefs.  
 
The localised options – Type-Local and Scenario-Local – deny this. For Type-Local, it’s 
possible for a subject to possess generative emotional competences with respect to particular 
emotion-types but not others. If I’m likely to succeed in experiencing anger appropriately 
responsive to the offensive, but unlikely to succeed in experiencing envy appropriately 
responsive to the enviable, then my experiences of anger are capable of justifying my 
evaluative beliefs about offence, but my experiences of envy are incapable of justifying my 
beliefs about the enviable. For Scenario-Local, the calculations of likely success and the 
corresponding competence verdicts are localised even further. On this interpretive option, it’s 
possible for a subject to possess generative emotional competence with respect to certain 
emotion-types elicited by some scenarios but not others. If I’m likely to succeed in 
experiencing anger appropriately responsive to offensive comments from my peers but 
unlikely to succeed in experiencing anger appropriately responsive to offensive and unjust 
political policies, then my comment-elicited experiences of anger are capable of justifying 





experiences of anger are incapable of justifying my beliefs about the offensiveness of those 
policies.  
 
Hopefully it’s clear, then, that EC’s ambiguity in the scope of competences matters. How the 
defender of the view elects to clarify how we ought to make the calculation of likely success 
will change the ultimate justificatory result of certain emotional experiences. Taking the 
illustrative case above, Global will determine that my experiences of fear in response to 
fearsome dogs, despite being reliably responsive to the presence of fearsomeness, will not be 
capable of justifying my corresponding evaluative belief given that I’m not overall likely to 
succeed in experiencing appropriately responsive emotions, and so fail to possess generative 
emotional competence. Similarly, Type-Local will determine that my experience of fear with 
respect to fearsome dogs will not be capable of justifying my corresponding evaluative belief 
given that I’m not likely to succeed in experiencing appropriately responsive fear in general, 
and so fail to possess generative emotional competence with respect to the emotion-type of 
fear. Only Scenario-Local generates the result that I possess generative emotional 
competence with respect to experiencing fear in response to fearsome dogs, such that these 
fear experiences are capable of justifying the relevant evaluative beliefs. Given this 
discrepancy across the different interpretive options, then, EC cannot be a fully informative 
view until this ambiguity is clarified.  
 
So, the question arises: how do we go about clarifying the view? Immediately, I think that we 
can dismiss the Global option. One significant problem for construing emotional competence 
as a global, all-or-nothing affair is that endorsing such a view would make EC insufficiently 
nuanced to be able to offer a compelling account of emotional justification. There is 
something counterintuitive about hinging the justificatory ability of, say, one’s anger 
experiences on whether one’s experiences of shame and fear and joy are likely to succeed in 
being responsive to the presence of the relevant evaluative properties. Indeed, it seems very 
prima facie plausible that individuals have varying levels of reliability across different types 
of emotions in different circumstances.99 If the likelihood of success is something that we 
 
99 One possible explanation for this variety of reliability across emotion-types may be that emotional 
experiences, as we saw in Chapter 4 (§4.3.1), are cognitively penetrable, i.e. they’re non-trivially 
influenced by our background cognitive states and desires. If some emotion-types are cognitively 
penetrable to a greater degree than others (e.g. perhaps social emotion-types such as shame and envy 
are susceptible to a higher rate of cognitive penetration than basic emotion-types, such as fear and 





care about when it comes to determining whether an emotional experience has justificatory 
ability, then, surely, it seems more natural to make more specific epistemic judgments about 
whether an individual’s emotional experiences are capable of justifying evaluative belief 
according to this variety of reliability. Tarring all of one’s emotional experiences with the 
same brush, i.e. having an all-or-nothing determination as to whether one possesses 
generative emotional competence, and thereby whether one’s emotional experiences are 
capable of justifying her evaluative beliefs, doesn’t take into account the complexity of our 
emotional dispositions.100 For this reason, then, I propose that we dismiss the Global 
interpretation of the trigger-manifestation conditional for generative emotional competence, 
and turn our attention to the localised variants as the more plausible answers.  
 
Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will endeavour to show two things. First, I will 
argue that the defender of EC ought to advocate on behalf of the Scenario-Local option: that 
generative emotional competence is localised with respect to particular emotion-types 
experienced in response to particular eliciting scenarios, such that the relevant trigger-
manifestation conditional concerns whether the subject is likely to succeed in experiencing a 
given emotion-type appropriately responsive to the presence of the relevant evaluative 
property within the context of a particular eliciting scenario. As will become clear, this is 
because epistemically valuable generative emotional competences develop via processes of 
emotional learning, and these learning processes are localised with respect to particular 
eliciting scenarios. Second, and as a result of this conclusion, I will argue that this motivates 
a refined version of EC grounded in the notion of emotional learning. I will then attempt to 
defend this crystallised account as the most plausible theory of emotional justification 
considered thus far.  
 
recall from §4.3.1 that an appeal to the cognitive penetrability of a particular emotion-type by itself is 
insufficient to deliver the result that that emotion-type will be altogether unreliable.  
100 Note also that the Global option fails to mirror our intuitive judgments elsewhere. Suppose, for 
instance, that we’re assessing a particular subject for perceptual competence. Now, this subject has 
exceptional visual acuity, and is thereby extremely likely to succeed in having an accurate visual 
experience of her surroundings. However, suppose further that the subject’s auditory and gustatory 
acuities are comparatively very low, such that she is very unlikely to succeed in undergoing accurate 
auditory and gustatory experiences. If a verdict of perceptual competence required that the subject 
was overall likely to succeed in having an accurate perceptual experience (i.e. encompassing all 
sensory faculties), then our subject would presumably fail to count as possessing perceptual 
competence given her drastic unlikelihood of success in the non-visual sensory domains. As such, an 
analogous view to Global EC concerning the epistemology of perception would determine that the 
subject’s visual experiences were unable to justify the relevant beliefs given her overall lack of 






6.5. Solution: Emotional Competences Localised to Eliciting Scenarios 
 
At this point in the dialectic, we’re faced with the following question: is the relevant level of 
competence-localisation relative to the particular emotion-type experienced by the subject, or 
is it relative to the particular emotion-type experienced by the subject in the context of a 
particular eliciting scenario? In other words, is it only possible to possess generative 
emotional competence with respect to, say, fear experiences, or can one possess generative 
emotional competence localised further to fear experienced within the context of a particular 
eliciting scenario? It is my view that closer inspection into the development of generative 
emotional competence illuminates a plausible and motivated answer to this question. More 
specifically, I propose that the scope of generative emotional competence ought to be 
localised with respect to particular eliciting scenarios given the way in which these 
competences develop in the first place. 
 
Now, interestingly, we’ve already come across a contender for a plausible theory as to how 
individuals come to possess at least some generative emotional competences. Recall from 
Chapter 2 (§2.4.1) that a compelling explanation as to how we come to learn which emotional 
experiences are appropriate within the context of particular situations is de Sousa’s sketch of 
emotional learning. As a quick recap, de Sousa’s view is that individuals come to learn which 
emotions are appropriate by gradual acquaintance with particular formative emotional 
contexts, i.e. “paradigm scenarios” (1987, p. 434). These scenarios are experienced in infancy 
and involve the subject experiencing instinctive responses towards particular objects and 
events in a given situation. The subject then comes to relate their experience to the particular 
features of the situation-type and thereby comes to grasp emotion concepts insofar as they 
associate their emotional experience with the eliciting scenario.  
 
What makes this relevant for our current purposes is that this view strikes me as capturing at 
least something close to the development of generative emotional competence insofar as it 
paints a picture in which individuals, through time and association, come to learn that certain 
emotions are appropriately associated with specific types of eliciting scenarios (i.e. scenarios 
which instantiate particular sets of non-evaluative properties). This type of emotional 
learning strikes me as at least indicative of coming to learn that certain eliciting scenarios (i.e. 





becoming reliably successful at experiencing emotions appropriately responsive to the 
presence of those evaluative properties.  
 
Crucially, however, de Sousa’s account is limited to a focus on the development of emotional 
learning throughout childhood and infancy. I take it that the development of generative 
emotional competence, on the other hand, is not restricted to one’s early years. It seems very 
plausible that we can come to emotionally learn that certain contexts and objects instantiate 
particular evaluative properties (such that we come to learn which emotions are appropriate 
within the context of particular scenarios) throughout the course of our lifetimes. Take the 
canine behaviourist who, through prolonged study of and exposure to different canine 
behaviours, comes to learn which dogs instantiate the property of fearsomeness, such that she 
reliably experiences fear in response to the fearsome-making features of dogs (e.g. particular 
aggressive behavioural indicators). This is a type of emotional expertise which arises not 
merely from early childhood experiences, but from more complex associations forged later 
on in life.  
 
Inspired by an expanded account of de Sousa’s theory, then, we can hypothesise the 
following: generative emotional competence (i.e. the ability to be reliably successful in 
experiencing an emotion appropriately responsive to the presence of evaluative properties) 
develops via gradual acquaintance and habituation with particular eliciting scenarios, such 
that, over time, the subject comes to emotionally learn that certain objects and states of affairs 
instantiate particular evaluative properties.101 This, I take it, provides us with the resources to 
provide a motivated answer to the question that we started with at the beginning of this 
section. Generative emotional competences are localised to particular emotions experienced 
in response to particular eliciting scenarios because these competences develop within the 
contexts of these particular scenarios through mechanisms of emotional learning.102  
 
 
101 Interestingly, this proposal strikes me as cohering particularly well with the Aristotelian theory 
concerning the development of virtue considered in Chapter 4 (§4.3.3). Recall that, according to 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, virtues are character traits which crucially involve specific emotional 
dispositions to undergo appropriate emotional experiences within particular contexts, and these 
virtues develop via prolonged practice and habituation. Hence, this looks like a theory which proposes 
that we come to develop emotional dispositions that are reliably responsive to the presence of 
evaluative properties via prolonged practice with and exposure to specific eliciting scenarios. 
Plausibly, the development of these emotional dispositions corresponds to the develop of generative 
emotional competences. 





What does this mean for our theory of emotional justification? I take it that we can paint a 
picture of emotional justification corresponding to this construal of generative emotional 
competences as follows. At a time t1, a subject S undergoes an emotional experience which 
attributes a particular evaluative property E to an object (or state of affairs) O. Now, 
assuming the cooperation of doxastic emotional competence, S’s emotional experience is 
capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying S’s corresponding evaluative belief insofar 
as S has undergone processes of emotional learning, such that she has developed a learned 
generative emotional competence to reliably undergo emotional experiences which attribute 
E to O, and, crucially, S’s emotional experience arises from this learned competence. Putting 
this into practice, our canine behaviourist’s experience of fear with respect to a particular dog 
is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief that the dog is 
fearsome if and only if: she has emotionally learned that dogs with these particular features 
instantiate the evaluative property of fearsomeness; her experience of fear arises via this 
learned generative emotional competence; and she forms her evaluative belief on the basis of 
this emotional experience.  
 
So, combining EC with the idea that it is through the process of emotional learning that one 
develops emotional competences, I propose the following view of emotional justification: 
 
Learned Emotional Competence View (LEC): S’s emotional experience which 
attributes evaluative property E to object O is capable of immediately and defeasibly 
justifying her belief that O is E if and only if (i) S has the emotional experience as a 
result of her having emotionally learned that O is E, and (ii) S forms the belief that O 
is E on the basis of that emotion.  
 
The first condition in this formulation corresponds to the subject’s possession of generative 
emotional competence, while the second corresponds to her possession of doxastic emotional 
competence. That is, the only substantive difference between LEC and EC is that the former 
spells out generative and doxastic emotional competence in terms of the subject’s learned 
emotional abilities. The former, then, is a refined version of the latter. So, in a nutshell, only 
emotional experiences which arise as a result of the subject’s learned capacity to emotionally 
identify an object as instantiating the given evaluative property are capable of justifying the 
relevant evaluative belief, and it’s the particular learned capacity which determines the 





generated instead by false beliefs, poor reasoning, etc. are not capable of performing an 
immediate justificatory role.  
 
This is the theory of emotional justification that this dissertation will defend as the most 
promising account considered thus far. In what follows, I will expand upon this view by 
further clarifying and elucidating the notion and mechanisms of emotional learning in §6.5.1, 
identifying a unique selling point of LEC in §6.5.2, and summarising the strengths of the 
view in §6.6. 
 
6.5.1 The Processes of Emotional Learning   
 
Let me begin by providing a more thorough characterisation of the mechanisms and 
processes of emotional learning. In the first instance, it may be instructive to elucidate the 
notion of emotional learning by analogy to perceptual learning, i.e. the process through which 
long-term changes are made to perception as a result of practice and experience. 
Paradigmatic examples of perceptual learning typically include the development of particular 
expertise. For example, take a wine aficionado’s ability to perceptually discern the quality of 
wine according to taste. Here, through prolonged exposure to the qualities of different wines, 
the aficionado comes to be perceptually sensitive to the subtle low-level properties which 
determine the quality of the wine. Importantly, note that perceptual learning differs from 
perceptual development insofar as the process of perceptual learning can occur at any point 
throughout one’s life; it’s not restricted to development in one’s early years. Emotional 
learning, on the other hand, plausibly happens via a similar mechanism. Through repeated 
experience with and exposure to particular situations, a subject comes to emotionally learn 
(via association with their past experience) which objects instantiate particular evaluative 
properties, i.e. which emotional responses are fitting with respect to the given object. 
 
What’s essential for our purposes is the epistemic significance of these learning mechanisms. 
Many take skills and expertise brought about by the process of perceptual learning to be 
epistemically significant when it comes to the justificatory status of the relevant beliefs. Take 
Brogaard and Gatzia’s (2018) claim that, in virtue of giving rise to particular perceptual 
expert skill-sets, “perceptual learning can thus turn our appearances into strong immediate 
justifiers of the beliefs we form as a result of said learning” (p. 554). Or, on a slightly 





is Q is capable of bearing justificatory power if and only if that experience “is had in the 
exercise of the subject’s knowledge of how to perceptually identify something as being Q” 
(p. 262).103 While Markie doesn’t specifically mention the process of perceptual learning, it’s 
plausible that one’s possession of a knowledge-how capacity to perceptually identify an 
object as being Q either amounts to (or is at least substantively dependent upon) having 
perceptually learned that objects that look like that are Q.104 
 
From these views, we can see that drawing a connection between one’s expertise brought 
about by the mechanisms of perceptual learning and the justificatory status of one’s relevant 
belief is not unfounded. To motivate this, suppose that you and I spend a pleasant afternoon 
wine-tasting. You, a competent and experienced winetaster, have learned to perceptually 
identify merlots by their taste properties, whereas I have no such perceptual expertise. At a 
time t1, you and I both have a perceptual experience of the same wine. In virtue of your 
learned capacity, you are able to perceptually identify the wine as being a merlot, i.e. long-
term changes have been made to your perceptual system through practice and experience, 
such that you are able to attend to the merlot-making features of the wine. This is not the case 
for me. At best, I can have a perceptual experience with the contents ‘there is a wine that 
tastes like that’, and guess that wines that taste like that are merlots, but I cannot have the 
perceptual experience with the contents ‘that is a merlot’, whereas, plausibly, you can. 
Perceptual learning, then, is feasibly what explains the intuitive verdict that your perceptual 
experience is capable of immediately justifying your belief that the wine is a merlot, while 
mine does not.  
 
LEC tells an analogous epistemological story with respect to emotional learning and the 
justificatory power of emotional experience.105 That is, just as the expert wine-taster enjoys 
 
103 Remember from Chapter 3 (§3.3.2) that, for Markie, a knowledge-how capacity to identify objects 
as being Q amounts (at least partially) to the possession of the relevant background information, i.e. 
justified beliefs that would enable one to identify an object as being Q. This raises difficulties for 
understanding the justification conferred as being immediate, but this is not a problem for my view 
given that LEC does not strictly mirror Markie’s account. 
104 Both Brogaard and Gatzia and Markie endorse forms of dogmatism about perceptual justification. 
Given the failures of dogmatism identified in Chapters 2 and 3, I do not ally myself with dogmatism 
here; I only use these views to highlight the fact that learning mechanisms have been considered crucial 
to understanding immediate perceptual justification in the literature.   
105 Note, however, that I do not hinge the plausibility of LEC on there being a strict analogy with 
perceptual learning. The analogy is intended only to illuminate what I take to be the central features 





immediate justification for their belief that the wine is a merlot in virtue of their having 
perceptually learned that wines that are perceptually like that are merlots, an individual who 
experiences fear in response to an approaching snake enjoys immediate justification for their 
evaluative belief that the snake is fearsome in virtue of their having emotionally learned that 
objects like that, i.e. objects with those fearsome-making non-evaluative properties, are 
fearsome. 
 
Now, as a matter of contrast with perceptual learning, the notion of emotional learning has 
not, as of yet, been fully explored with respect to the ability of emotional experience to 
immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief. In spite of this, however, I take it that 
there are notes of indirect support for this idea in the contemporary literature. Echeverri 
(2019), for example, draws an analogy between perceptual and emotional recognition (or 
learning) in his discussion of how we can conceive of the emotions being immediately 
justified themselves, i.e. how emotional experience can be immediately justified by the 
contents of their cognitive bases. Put roughly, Echeverri argues that a subject’s emotional 
experience is immediately justified if, through the cognitive base of the emotion, she is aware 
that a particular object instantiates a set of non-evaluative properties, and she has the 
emotional disposition that would cause her to seamlessly “move from the detection of” (p. 
560) the non-evaluative properties to the relevant emotional experience. Crucially, the point 
of similarity between Echeverri’s view and mine is that Echeverri argues that the transition 
between cognitive base awareness of non-evaluative properties to emotional awareness of the 
corresponding evaluative property is “phenomenally immediate”, and brought about by 
processes of recognition and learning: 
 
Expert birdwatchers have achieved high reliability in bird recognition. This high 
reliability is reflected in the phenomenology of perceptual recognition, i.e. in how 
expert birdwatchers experience the transition from the representation of low-level 
properties to the representation of high-level properties. Something similar occurs in 
our most basic emotional responses. Presumably, our basic emotional dispositions 
have developed through long evolutionary processes in relatively stable 
environments. Some of these emotional dispositions can even be shaped and modified 
through learning, therapy, or habit… Once we are endowed with the relevant 
dispositions, the emotional responses they ground are permitted from the first-person 






On Echeverri’s view, the epistemic relevance of emotional learning processes is that these 
processes plausibly forge emotional dispositions which allow us to transition from perceiving 
the non-evaluative properties instantiated by an object to experiencing an emotion which 
provides access to the relevant evaluative property in a phenomenally immediate way. Of 
course, given that my focus is on the question of how emotional experience can immediately 
justify evaluative belief, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide any substantive 
analysis on Echeverri’s view of how emotions themselves can be immediately justified. 
However, what is important for our purposes here is to note that emotional learning has been 
appealed to as part of the explanation as to how epistemic justification can attach to 
emotional experiences. Moreover, as we’ll see later, I take it that we can also find supportive 
notes for the possibility of epistemically significant emotional learning processes in the 
feminist philosophy literature. §6.5.2 will be dedicated to elucidating this connection, and 
highlighting the theoretical advantages that LEC bears with respect to insight from this 
literature.  
 
Importantly, however, LEC does not just enjoy support from related views within the 
philosophical literature. A major selling point of a view of emotional justification grounded 
in the possession of learned emotional competences is that coheres with a host of empirical 
support from related views and findings in developmental psychology and cognitive science. 
For example, consider the following from Pollak et al (2009). In pursuit of uncovering how 
the early social experiences of children influence their abilities to recognise the emotional 
states of others (as indicated by their facial expressions), it was found that children raised in 
physically abusive environments, i.e. environments marred by frequent episodes of hostility, 
were typically able to accurately identify expressions of anger much faster, and on the basis 
of significantly less visual information, than non-abused children. Pollak et al. summarise the 
findings as follows:  
 
The present experiment examined children’s construction of emotion representations 
from fragmentary or partial information as models generated naturalistic facial 
expressions. We found that children who have been exposed to unusually high levels 
of anger were able to accurately recognize anger early in the formation of the facial 
expression of anger, when fewer expressive cues (such as activation of facial 





when viewing other emotional expressions, suggesting that the abused children 
neither had a bias to select anger nor that the abused group generally performed or 
understood the task differently than did controls. (p. 243).  
 
There are a couple of important things to note about these findings. First, Pollak et al. present 
the developed perceptual abilities of these children as an instance of perceptual learning. That 
is, through prolonged exposure to instances of expressed anger and hostility, the perceptual 
systems of children raised in abusive environments have become sensitised to recognising 
specific kinds of perceptual information, i.e. facial cues indicative of anger.106 Second, note 
that this perceptual ability is strictly localised to recognising expressions of anger. The 
abusive environment did not prompt long-term changes in sensitivity to perceptual 
information conveyed by facial cues expressive of surprise, or joy, for instance.  
 
Now, what makes these findings relevant for our purposes is that, plausibly, this developed 
perceptual ability is not only an instance of perceptual learning, but also at least partially 
comprises an instance of emotional learning. When stipulating why the perceptual systems of 
abused children develop this sensitivity towards specific visual information, Pollak et al. 
suggest the following:  
 
The development of increased perceptual sensitivity for the fine-grained details of 
variation in affective expressions may provide a behavioral advantage for children 
living in threatening contexts, allowing earlier identification of salient emotions. 
Anger-related cues may become especially salient to physically abused children 
because they are associated with imminent harm. (emphasis added; p. 246).  
 
It is this association with imminent harm that strikes me as suggestive of a developed 
emotional capacity to identify instances of fearsomeness. Forging an association between 
anger-related cues and harm seems to me to be a plausible instance of emotionally learning 
that a particular set of non-evaluative properties instantiated in a given eliciting scenario (i.e. 
visual properties instantiated by angry-looking facial expressions) give rise to the evaluative 
 
106 A similar verdict was delivered by a study conducted by Wilkowski and Robinson (2012). Here, 
roughly speaking, it was shown that physically aggressive individuals had an increased perceptual 
sensitivity to angry facial expressions compared to non-aggressive individuals. Exposure to 
aggressive environments, such as harsh parenting, was noted as a significant causal contributor 





property of fearsomeness. So, given this development of particular competences to 
perceptually identify angry facial expressions, and the likely corresponding development of 
competences to emotionally identify fearsome expressive and behavioural traits, it strikes me 
as very plausible that these children’s experiences of fear in response to particular facial cues 
are capable of justifying their evaluative beliefs concerning the fearsomeness of their 
situation and their aggressor. Crucially, again, the justification conferred by emotional 
experiences which arise via the relevant learning processes is immediate; it doesn’t depend 
on any inferential connections to any existing justified beliefs, nor does it require the children 
to have an awareness of the relevant non-evaluative visual properties or their perceptual 
ability. What I take this research to show, then, is that there is compelling empirical evidence 
for the proposal that individuals can and often do develop localised competences with respect 
to undergoing accurate perceptual experiences, and the development of these competences is 
facilitated by processes of perceptual learning. Moreover, these perceptual learning processes 
are intricately bound up with the way in which the individual construes their evaluative 
environment. My view of emotional learning, insofar as it involves a subject becoming 
sensitised to the instantiation of particular evaluative properties in a given eliciting scenario 
(via becoming sensitised to the non-evaluative properties which give rise to the evaluative 
property in question), coheres well with these findings.  
 
In summary, I take it that the notion and epistemic significance of emotional learning enjoys 
support both from close similarities and connections to processes of perceptual learning, and 
from closely related philosophical and empirical research. The process of emotional learning 
takes place over time and through repeated exposure to specific eliciting scenarios. The 
subject, through patterns of association and learning, comes to be emotionally sensitised to 
the presence of evaluative properties through becoming sensitised to the relevant sets of non-
evaluative properties. Crucially, this process is not cognitively demanding; the subject need 
not be aware of this process taking place. As suggested by Pollak’s findings, children can and 
do undergo processes of emotional learning, such that their emotional experiences which 
arise via these processes are capable of conferring immediate justification to their evaluative 









6.5.2 Emotional Learning and the Insight from Oppression 
 
Having motivated and clarified LEC, let me now highlight what I take to be a powerful 
selling point for the view. Namely, I argue that LEC is uniquely capable of explaining a 
plausible insight defended by many in the feminist philosophy literature, namely, that certain 
emotions experienced by individuals from oppressed socio-political groups are capable of 
bearing epistemic value in virtue of those individuals’ social standing.107 Let me begin by 
contextualising and clarifying this insight, before explaining how LEC manages to capture it.  
 
The idea that certain emotions experienced by members of oppressed groups can serve as 
valuable epistemic resources is a common one in feminist epistemology. As a clear statement 
of such a view, consider the following influential remarks from Jaggar (1989): 
 
Subordinated people have a kind of epistemological privilege in so far as they have 
easier access to this standpoint [of the subordinated] and therefore a better chance of 
ascertaining the possible beginnings of a society in which all could thrive. For this 
reason, I would claim that the emotional responses of subordinated people in general, 
and often of women in particular, are more likely to be appropriate than the emotional 
responses of the dominant class. That is, they are more likely to incorporate reliable 
appraisals of situations. (p. 168) 
 
There are a couple of important things to note here. First, note the emphasis on the increased 
likelihood of emotional reliability within the emotional dispositions of oppressed persons. 
Plausibly, what Jaggar has in mind here is that emotions experienced by members of 
oppressed groups are especially likely to succeed in being appropriately responsive to 
particular evaluative properties. Of course, this does not entail infallibility. Moreover, note 
that the explanation for this is that subordinated or oppressed individuals have unique access 
 
107 Silva (2020) also discusses a version of this insight with respect to a theory of emotional 
justification. More specifically, Silva focuses on the epistemic value of outlaw emotions (i.e. 
emotional experiences which bear representational contents that conflict with dominant social values), 
and argues that accommodating for this epistemic value requires advocating on behalf of a reliabilist 
version of the justificatory thesis informed by standpoint theory. Silva’s project is similar to mine, 
then, insofar as she takes likely success brought about by occupying a particular epistemological 
standpoint to be essential for the emotions’ capacity to justify evaluative belief, but differs from mine 
in that she does not explain or motivate the significance of standpoint reliability in terms of emotional 





to a particular perspective, or standpoint, through which one can accurately apprehend 
features of her oppressive environment. It is in virtue of being oppressed that a marginalised 
individual has increased likelihood of reliability when it comes to emotionally apprehending 
relevant features of her environment. 
 
To illustrate, consider a subject who experiences sexualising remarks at the hands of her 
colleagues. Their sexism and misogyny manifests in different ways, such as commenting on 
the way in which she dresses, making sexualising jokes about her body, and so forth. Further, 
suppose that, within her workplace, comments such as these are considered to be innocuous. 
The general social ethos is that remarks of this sort constitute good-natured horseplay, rather 
than instances of serious harassment and degradation. Despite this ethos, however, the subject 
experiences a degree of anger when she’s subjected to these comments. Jaggar’s view is that 
an emotional experience of this sort bears distinct epistemic value. More specifically, the 
subject’s anger has a high likelihood of being successfully responsive to the evaluative 
property of ‘offensiveness’ instantiated by the remarks (i.e. a high likelihood of accurately 
representing the comments as being offensive) in virtue of her having unique epistemic 
access to the standpoint of victims of harassment.108  
 
Importantly, it is not just Jaggar who maintains this view. Narayan (1988), as further notable 
example, argues that “the emotions play an important role in the knowledge that is part of the 
epistemic privilege of the oppressed” (p. 36), and, moreover, that these epistemically 
valuable emotions are brought about through the individual’s “lived experience of 
oppression” (p. 39). It is a well-received view in feminist philosophy, then, that the emotional 
experiences of oppressed individuals are uniquely epistemically valuable insofar as they can 
reliably represent aspects of their evaluative situation; they can shed light on evaluative facts 
otherwise obscured by the oppressive climate.  
 
In the interest of clarity, we can set out these two important claims as follows: 
 
(a) Certain emotions experienced by members of oppressed groups bear significant 
epistemic value.  
 
108 Later in this section, I clarify and expand upon this claim, and provide my own explanation as to 
why I think that it is in virtue of being oppressed that oppressed individuals have epistemically 





(b) These emotions bear this epistemic value because of the emoter’s social standing, i.e. 
their membership of the oppressed group.  
 
Now, at this point, there is a further question to be addressed. Namely, we must determine 
what the ‘epistemic value’ possessed by emotions experienced by oppressed individuals 
actually amounts to. Here’s one proposal. Borrowing argumentative resources from Brady 
(2013), it might be suggested that the distinct epistemic value of emotions experienced by 
members of oppressed groups is their capacity to prompt reflection and revision of evaluative 
belief through motivating the search for further reasons. Reconsider the case above. We 
might think that what’s epistemically valuable about the subject’s anger towards her 
colleagues and their sexualising comments is that the experience prompts her to closely 
inspect and potentially revise her societally-sustained evaluative belief that remarks of this 
sort constitute good-natured horseplay. That is, what’s valuable about her anger is that it sets 
off a causal chain through which she begins to search for further evidence which bears on her 
anger; to look for further evidence in favour of the comments actually constituting an 
offence, rather than innocuous social banter. Emotions experienced by oppressed individuals 
throw a spanner in the works of the individual’s societally-sustained belief system about their 
oppressive circumstances, so to speak, and in prompting the deconstruction of this belief 
system through motivating the search for further reasons, they have epistemic value.  
 
Now, perhaps this is one of the ways in which emotions experienced by oppressed 
individuals are useful. Having said that, I don’t think that this proposal is a plausible 
explanation of the distinct epistemic value of these emotional experiences as gestured 
towards above by Jaggar and Narayan. The central reason for this is that it’s not clear that 
this proposal captures the idea that emotions experienced by oppressed persons are distinctly 
epistemically valuable. The intuition gleaned from these insights from feminist philosophy, I 
take it, is that emotions act as unique sources of epistemic evidence or information that are 
essential for the formation of true evaluative beliefs about objects and states of affairs in the 
oppressed subject’s surroundings. Indeed, recall Jaggar’s claim that these emotions “are more 
likely to be appropriate than the emotional responses of the dominant class”. This suggests 
that these emotions’ increased likelihood of reliability is part and parcel of their epistemic 
value. The idea that their epistemic value is rooted in their causal ability to initiate processes 






So, if this epistemic value can’t be fully explained in terms of prompting an epistemically 
valuable causal chain of belief-revision, how can we identify this epistemic value? I think 
that the limitation of the above proposal illuminates a more plausible answer. Namely, that 
the epistemic value of emotions experienced by oppressed persons is, in fact, best understood 
in terms of their possessing immediate justificatory power. The proposal that the distinct 
epistemic value of these emotions amounts to their capacity to immediately and defeasibly 
justify evaluative belief fits much better with Jaggar’s remarks, given the relevance of 
reliability and accuracy to the question as to whether an experience can justify belief. Thus, 
from the above, we have the following three claims:  
 
(a) Certain emotions experienced by members of oppressed groups bear significant 
epistemic value.  
(b) These emotions bear this epistemic value because of the emoter’s social standing, i.e. 
their membership of the oppressed group.  
(c) This ‘epistemic value’ possessed by emotions experienced by members of oppressed 
groups amounts to immediate justificatory power.  
 
Let us refer to the conjunction of these three claims as ‘the insight from oppression’. Given 
the philosophical clout that this insight carries in feminist epistemology, and given its 
plausibility, it strikes me that a plausible theory of emotional justification ought to be able to 
accommodate for this insight. That is, a plausible version of the justificatory thesis of 
emotion will be able to explain why certain emotions experienced by oppressed individuals 
are capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying their evaluative beliefs.  
 
Now, interestingly, the views of emotional justification considered earlier in this dissertation 
do not provide a particularly promising explanation of this epistemic value. Take emotional 
reliabilism (ER). ER can only determine that these experiences are capable of justifying the 
relevant evaluative beliefs if and only if forming true evaluative beliefs on the basis of their 
emotional experiences is a reliable process of belief-formation. The problem for ER with 
respect to the case of oppressed individuals, however, is that they plausibly do not reliably 
form true evaluative beliefs on the basis of their emotional experiences.109 We’ve seen that an 
 
109 This effect of an oppressive climate on subordinated individuals strikes me as a plausible instance 





oppressed individual’s social standing can render them more likely to undergo specific 
emotional experiences that are accurately responsive to the presence of evaluative properties 
in specific scenarios, but it strikes me as equally plausible that an oppressive climate can 
distort a subject’s emotional disposition and render them overall more likely to experience 
emotional mistakes in alternative scenarios.110  
 
As an illustrative example, take a member of a racial minority group whose name is 
continually and habitually mispronounced by those in his community. These occasions 
happen frequently across his life, marking not only his interactions and communications in 
the social domain, but also within the sphere of his professional life. He thereby comes to 
identify these mispronunciations not just as harmless or accidental slips of the tongue, but 
rather as token instances of a general type, i.e. systematic devaluing of his culture and 
heritage. As such, he reliably experiences some degree of apt indignation upon hearing his 
name mispronounced while others around him, from non-minority racial groups, fail to 
experience such indignation. However, suppose further that, because of the oppressive 
climate, the agent is also particularly susceptible to inaccurately experiencing guilt when 
correcting or confronting the perpetrators of the microaggressions, or inaccurately 
experiencing admiration towards members of non-minority racial groups who correctly 
pronounce his name. It seems very plausible that, overall, an oppressive climate renders the 
emotional belief-forming process of this individual unreliable, such that ER would be unable 
to bestow justificatory power to emotions experienced by similar individuals. 
 
Likewise, I take it that both Global and Type-Local instantiations of EC will fall foul of a 
similar worry. Specifically, the oppressed subject’s comparative unlikelihood of success with 
respect to many other instances of emotional experience (e.g. their guilt and admiration 
experiences) will unfavourably tip the scale, such that the subject will likely fail to meet the 
requirement specified in the trigger-manifestation conditional (i.e. the Global requirement 
that the subject is overall likely to succeed in experiencing an appropriately responsive 
 
110 This, I take it, provides a motivated answer to a generality-style challenge facing ER. Specifically, 
the idea is that ER ought to construe the relevant belief-forming process narrowly given the 
discrepancy of reliability one can have across different types of emotional experiences and across 
different eliciting scenarios. Of course, even ER qualified in this way will still face troubling 
clairvoyance-type challenges elsewhere, but I take it the reliabilist approach ought not be rejected on 





emotion or the Type-Local requirement that the subject is likely to succeed in experiencing a 
given emotion-type that is appropriately responsive to the presence of evaluative properties).  
 
Emotional dogmatism (ED), on the other hand, likely will be able to bestow justificatory 
power to emotions experienced by oppressed individuals (assuming that these emotional 
experiences meet the phenomenological requirements of the view), but it doesn’t seem to be 
able to explain the epistemic significance of these emotional experiences in a particularly 
compelling way. Recall that all that matters for the dogmatist, epistemically speaking, is that 
the emotional experience in question has the relevant phenomenological character. Moreover, 
recall from Chapter 2 (§2.2.1) and Chapter 3 (§3.2.1) that many emotional experiences which 
we don’t take to be capable of bearing justificatory power (e.g. the biased interviewer’s 
emotional experience) meet the phenomenological requirements of ED. So, although ED may 
be able to accommodate for the epistemic significance of emotions experienced by members 
of oppressed groups, it can’t provide a plausible or discerning explanation of this significance 
given that emotions like those of the biased interviewer will also bear the same significance 
on the account.  
 
In contrast to the shortcomings of the above views, LEC bears the resources to both explain 
and further illuminate the insight from oppression. My view is that LEC is accommodates for 
this insight by neatly fitting into the explanation as to why group membership comes 
alongside the development of epistemically significant emotional experiences. On this note, 
consider the following remarks from Narayan (1988) concerning the difference in epistemic 
perspective between ‘insiders’ of oppressed groups (i.e. oppressed individuals), and the 
privileged ‘outsiders’ (i.e. members of dominant social groups): 
 
An outsider who has not experienced oppression first-hand and has learned about it 
second-hand, is more likely to understand the general and commonplace ways in 
which the oppression is manifested. For instance, if a professor uses openly racist or 
sexist examples…, sympathetic white male students may be able to spot his attitudes 
quite as well as the victims of the attitude. But if his attitudes are expressed more 
covertly, through dismissing their queries, not taking their contributions seriously, 
undervaluing their work, lack of cordiality, etc. outsiders may fail to see what is going 
on. An insider who is sensitised to such prejudiced attitudes will often pick up on cues 





spot and will often also be alerted by her own feelings of unease about the person or 
situation. (p. 39, my italics) 
 
I believe that Narayan’s comments here – particularly the italicised passage – succinctly 
capture what it is about oppressed group membership that enables the development of 
epistemically significant emotional experiences. Oppressed individuals, through time, 
become sensitised to the presence of oppressive attitudes and features of their social situation. 
That is, given the frequency with which oppressed individuals encounter oppressive attitudes, 
and given the significant negative impact that these attitudes have for such individuals, 
oppressed persons come to be sensitised to the presence of these attitudes. What this 
sensitisation amounts to, I propose, is a developed ability to apprehend subtle non-evaluative 
properties in their environment which give rise to particular evaluative properties, and this is 
what causes their emotional experiences to be reliable in being appropriately responsive to 
the presence of evaluative properties. This, of course, is an instance of my characterisation of 
emotional learning.  
 
To illustrate, reconsider the harassment case. The reason that the subject’s experience of 
anger in response to her harassers bears epistemic value (i.e. immediate justificatory power), 
is that, in virtue of her social-political status as a woman, she has, through experience, come 
to be sensitised to the ways in which sexualising comments do constitute an offence. That is, 
through time and experience, she comes to learn that these comments lead to her being 
devalued as a colleague, to her professional contributions being minimised, to her being 
humiliated in front of her peers, and so forth. Assuming, then, that actions and states of 
affairs which instantiate these particular non-evaluative properties consequently instantiate 
the evaluative property of ‘offensiveness’, she emotionally learns that sexualising comments 
instantiate the evaluative property of ‘offensiveness’ through becoming sensitised to the non-
evaluative features of the comments that cause them to instantiate that evaluative property. 
Crucially, this process of sensitisation and learning is tied to her group membership as a 
woman. Outsiders to this group will be less likely to undergo these sensitisation and learning 
processes simply because they do not have the same sustained long-term experience with 
sexualising comments and their consequences. As a result of this, outsiders will likely fail to 







At this point, let me be clear that I do not intend for group membership to be necessary nor 
sufficient for enabling the processes of sensitisation and learning. Taking the case of sexual 
harassment, there will, of course, be individuals who identify as women that do not undergo 
these processes of learning with respect to properties instantiated by instances of sexual 
harassment. Likewise, there may be individuals who do not identify as women that happen to 
undergo these processes themselves. My proposal is only that occupying a particular social 
standing aids in the facilitation of these processes, or puts one in the position such that she is 
more likely to undergo these processes of sensitisation and learning, such that her emotional 
experiences will be more likely to reliably track the presence of particular evaluative 
properties. Indeed, I think that the Pollak case discussed in §6.5.1 illuminates this. Recall 
that, here, we saw that children raised in a hostile environment were typically better 
sensitised to visual information conveyed by anger-expressive facial cues. The proposed 
explanation for this was that, for children raised in these environments, these anger-
expressive facial cues are associated with imminent harm, such that early detection of these 
facial cues could be adaptive insofar as it may facilitate an early response to this threat. Put 
roughly, early detection of these facial cues matters for children in abusive environments in a 
way that it doesn’t tend to for non-abused children. Similarly, I contend, detection of sexual 
harassment and its offensiveness matters for women (as typical victims of such harassment) 
in a way that it doesn’t tend to for non-women, or in the same way that detection of racial 
microaggressions matters for individuals from minority racial groups in a way that it doesn’t 
tend to for white individuals. Plausibly, then, the differential in this dimension of significance 
is what makes occupying a particular social standing capable of increasing or decreasing a 
subject’s likelihood of undergoing the relevant sensitisation and learning processes.  
 
Putting all of this together, then, here’s the proposal: members of oppressed groups develop 
reliably successful emotional dispositions with respect to particular evaluative properties 
instantiated by particular states of affairs (e.g. the offensiveness of sexualising comments) 
because, in virtue of their particular social standing, they are well-placed to undergo the 
processes of emotional learning with respect to those states of affairs and the evaluative 
properties they instantiate. Hence, LEC can both accommodate for and illuminate the insight 
from feminist philosophy that certain emotions experienced by members of oppressed groups 






Finally, note that LEC can also explain why it is not the case that all of an oppressed 
subject’s emotional experiences are capable of bearing immediate justificatory power. 
Reconsider the individual who, as a result of being habitually subject to racial 
microaggressions, is particularly susceptible to inaccurately experiencing guilt when 
correcting or confronting the perpetrators of the microaggressions, or inaccurately 
experiencing admiration towards members of non-minority racial groups who correctly 
pronounce his name. LEC can explain why these guilt and admiration experiences cannot 
justify his corresponding evaluative beliefs, i.e. because they are not produced by the process 
of emotional learning, but instead upon internalised false beliefs about permissibility and 
praiseworthiness respectively in the domain of racial relations. That is, the subject has not 
undergone a long-term process through which he has become sensitive to the non-evaluative 
properties of, say, a person’s pronouncing his name correctly which give rise to the 
evaluative property ‘admirable’. Rather, his false background beliefs about the admirability 
of individuals who pronounce his name correctly have been caused and manipulated by the 
oppressive climate around him. Because of this, LEC does not bestow immediate justificatory 
power to these emotional experiences. LEC, then, seems to be particularly well-equipped for 
generating plausible and compelling results with respect to complex oppression cases. 
 
6.6 The Virtues of The Learned Emotional Competence View 
 
Now, having motivated LEC by spelling out the process of emotional learning in more detail, 
and contextualising it with respect to similar ideas in the literature, let me end this chapter by 
summarising why LEC is, in my view, the most plausible account as to how emotional 
experience can immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief.  
 
We’ve seen already that LEC provides us with a developed and compelling explanation as to 
how emotions experienced by members of oppressed groups are capable of immediately 
justifying their evaluative beliefs. Moreover, we’ve seen that LEC also bears the resources to 
be able to explain why not all of their emotional experiences are capable of bearing 
justificatory power. That is, LEC can both explain the epistemic significance of learned 
emotional experiences and accommodate for the general destructive effects of an oppressive 
climate on the reliability of one’s emotional experiences. Importantly, though, it’s not just 
with respect to oppression cases that LEC prevails. The view also meets the desiderata for a 





desideratum was that our view excludes obvious over-generalisation cases from enjoying the 
epistemic yield. Taking the biased interviewer as an example, LEC is clear that the emotional 
experience of suspicion that arises from sexist bias is not capable of bearing justificatory 
power. Bias is not an instance of emotional learning – the biased subject does not, through 
time, come to be sensitive to the fact that ‘being a woman’ gives rise to the evaluative 
property of ‘duplicitousness’. Rather, the emotion is caused by a network of false beliefs and 
cognitive biases against women.  
 
The second desideratum was that, on the other side of the coin, our view does not veer too far 
in the direction of restraint by excluding emotional experiences that we would ordinarily 
consider to be capable of justifying belief on spurious grounds. I think that LEC meets this 
desideratum. Certainly, LEC will end up being more restrictive than, say, emotional 
dogmatism. Given that emotional learning is a long-term process, and the variety of ways in 
which we can, and often do, form emotional experiences on the basis of other mental states 
and processes, such as bias, false beliefs, and so forth, there will likely be many emotional 
experiences that end up being ruled out of the account. Importantly, however, this exclusion 
does not strike me as spurious. Indeed, ruling out emotional experiences like this from 
bearing justificatory power strikes me as precisely the correct result, as stressed in the 
discussion of the first desideratum. Moreover, as we’ve seen above, plenty of emotional 
experiences that we do ordinarily consider capable of bearing justificatory power will be 
ruled into this account. Basic emotional experiences, such as fear of a snarling dog and 
disgust towards spoiled milk, will be capable of justifying belief given their basis in 
emotional learning processes. Plausibly, complex emotional experiences, such as aesthetic 
appreciation of an artwork or amusement towards a particular situation,111 will also be 
capable of bearing justificatory power. It seems entirely possible that one can emotionally 
learn, say, that works of art which instantiate particular non-evaluative properties are 
aesthetically admirable, even if the subject cannot verbalise or elucidate what these non-
evaluative properties are. Emotional learning does not necessitate any higher-order ability to 
explicitly and consciously identify or articulate the non-evaluative properties which give rise 
to the evaluative property in question. Thus, because both our simple and complex emotional 
 
111 Recall that these emotional experiences were objectionably excluded from an instantiation of 





experiences can enjoy immediate justificatory power on this account, and because any 
exclusions are on epistemically reasonable grounds, LEC meets the second desideratum.  
 
At this point, one might object that there is a class of emotional experiences which LEC 
cannot accommodate for, namely, emotional experiences which seem to be ‘hard-wired’ in 
our psyches. Take a fear of snakes, for instance. It might be argued that such a fear is not 
plausibly ‘learned’ through apprehending and subsequent sensitisation to the fearsome-
making features of snakes, but, rather, fear of snakes is an evolutionary mechanism 
embedded within us. Indeed, one might argue that this hard-wired class of emotional 
experiences extends to the realm of disgust towards contaminated objects, too. If these 
emotional experiences do not arise via processes of emotional learning, then LEC will 
determine that they cannot be capable of bearing justificatory power. However, one might 
object that this seems objectionably restrictive. If this is the case, then LEC fails to meet the 
second desideratum.  
 
Let us focus on the fear of snakes as the illustrative case. The central thing to say in response 
to this point is that such a response requires assuming that a fear of snakes is entirely hard-
wired, such that there is no input from learned processes and associations. If it is the case that 
a fear of snakes is only facilitated by a hard-wired predisposition, but ultimately develops via 
processes of emotional learning, then LEC can determine such fear experiences as capable of 
bearing justificatory power. This is a complex empirical matter, of course, but note that there 
is notable support for the claim that learning processes are at least necessary for the 
development and manifestation of such fear experiences. Take Cook and Mineka’s (1990) 
assertion that “[a]lthough considerable controversy has existed over the extent to which this 
fear of snakes is “innate” as opposed to being based on learning, current evidence suggests 
that learning is necessary for the fear to manifest itself” (p. 373), or the following from 
Stevenson et al. (2014) that “there is a disposition to learn associations between particular 
animals, especially snakes, and the emotion of fear” (p. 326). Both of these remarks seem to 
suggest that, at most, organisms like us are evolutionarily predisposed to easily learn to fear 
snakes. If this is true, then this is consistent with LEC bestowing justificatory power to such 
fear experiences. All that needs to obtain for LEC to include these experiences is that they 
arise via processes of emotional learning, it does not require that there is no biological or 
evolutionary input into the facilitation of these processes. As such, I take it that, in lieu of 





manifestation of emotional experiences such as a fear of snakes, LEC is not rendered unable 
to satisfy the second desideratum by an appeal to ‘hard-wired’ emotional reactions and 
experiences.  
 
Moving on, recall that the third desideratum for a plausible theory of emotional justification 
is that it can explain the necessity but insufficiency of emotional reliability. This desideratum 
is straightforwardly met by LEC. It can account for the necessity of some degree of emotional 
reliability, given the necessity of likely success in experiencing an emotion appropriately 
responsive to the presence of an evaluative property. However, it also explains why reliability 
is not enough. Given that it is rooted in a virtue epistemological framework, it also 
necessitates that the reliability is a result of the subject having emotionally learned that a 
particular object instantiates the relevant evaluative property, i.e. that reliability is the result 
of a learned emotional competence to identify particular evaluative properties. As a result of 
this, LEC generates the right result in the clairvoyance-analogous caffeine case. The reason 
that my caffeine-caused evaluative beliefs are not justified, despite the reliability of my 
belief-forming process, is that my emotional experiences of anxiety do not arise as a result of 
long-term changes to the sensitivity of my emotional system. I don’t experience anxiety as a 
result of having emotionally learned that events of my working day which instantiate 
particular non-evaluative properties are anxiety-meriting, rather, I experience that anxiety as 
a result of having ingested too much caffeine.   
 
For these reasons, then, I take it that LEC is a strong and compelling theory as to how 
emotional experience can immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief. It fares better 
than dogmatism insofar as it does not over-generalise to problematic cases, nor does it 
exclude epistemically viable emotional experiences on spurious grounds. It fares better than 
reliabilism insofar as it can both explain the necessity but insufficiency of emotional 
reliability for justification and generate the right result in the caffeine case. Finally, it fares 
better than unqualified EC insofar as its supplementary learning-based framework allows the 
account to evade the ambiguity facing the unqualified view, and to thereby provide a more 









6.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The goal of this final chapter has been to refine and defend an agent-based view of emotional 
justification grounded in the possession of learned emotional competences. In §6.1, I began 
the chapter by taking stock of our discussion so far, and identifying three central desiderata 
that a plausible account of emotional justification must be able to satisfy. §6.2 then 
introduced agent-based views, and considered two distinct virtue epistemological approaches 
to epistemic justification as potential models for an agent-based view of emotional 
justification. The first of which was virtue responsibilism (§6.2.1), which placed epistemic 
focus on the subject’s possession of intellectually virtuous character traits. I argued that 
virtue responsibilism could not provide a plausible model for an account of emotional 
justification given the incompatibility of the two epistemological projects. In light of this, I 
then suggested that Sosa’s competence-based virtue reliabilist view (§6.2.2) provided us with 
the best starting point for an analogous view of emotional justification.  
 
§6.3 then presented Carter’s Emotional Competence view (EC), according to which S’s 
emotional experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative 
belief e if and only if (i) that experience is formed aptly (i.e. manifests her generative 
emotional competence), and (ii) S forms e via the exercise of her doxastic emotional 
competence. I then argued that, while EC is a promising view insofar as it seems able to 
capture the desiderata identified for a plausible account of emotional justification, it must be 
clarified in order to be sharpened into the most compelling theory it can be. To this end, §6.4 
identified an ambiguity in the success requirement for generative emotional competences. 
Specifically, I argued that EC was silent as to whether generative emotional competence 
required likely success across all emotional experiences (Global), likely success across all 
emotional experiences of a given emotion-type (Type-Local), or all emotional experiences of 
a given emotion-type experienced in response to a particular eliciting scenario (Scenario-
Local). I argued that the Global option ought to be rejected given the complexities of our 
emotional dispositions and the varying degrees of reliable success across different emotion-
types; that generative emotional competence must be accordingly localised. The question 
facing us at the end of this section, then, was how localised generative emotional competence 
ought to be, i.e. whether EC ought to advocate on behalf of a Type-Local or Scenario-Local 






Accordingly, §6.5 endeavoured to provide a motivated answer to the question. Here, I argued 
that the defender of EC should refine their view in terms of Scenario-Local, i.e. that 
generative emotional competences ought to be assessed and localised with respect to 
emotion-types experienced in response to particular eliciting scenarios. In support of this, I 
suggested that the most plausible explanation of the way in which generative emotional 
competence develops is via mechanisms and processes of emotional learning. That is, in a 
way loosely analogous to the case of perceptual learning, subjects can come to be reliably 
successful in experiencing an emotion appropriately responsive to the presence of an 
evaluative property as a result of prolonged exposure to and repeated experience with a 
particular eliciting scenario. In the interest of advocating on behalf of a crystallised version of 
EC supplemented by this notion of emotional learning, I then proposed the Learned 
Emotional Competence view (LEC) of emotional justification, according to which S’s 
emotional experience which attributes evaluative property E to object O is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying her belief that O is E if and only if (i) S has the 
emotion as a result of her having emotionally learned that O is E, and (ii) S forms the belief 
that O is E on the basis of that emotion. §6.5.1 then sought to clarify the processes and 
epistemic significance of emotional learning, while §6.5.2 identified what I take to be a 
powerful selling point for LEC, namely, that it is uniquely capable of both accommodating 
for and providing a novel perspective on a popular insight from feminist philosophy, namely, 
that certain emotions experienced by members of socially and politically oppressed groups 
bear epistemic value. Finally, §6.6 strived to further strengthen LEC by explaining how the 
view meets the various desiderata identified earlier for a plausible theory of emotional 
justification. In what follows, I will conclude this dissertation by briefly summarising the key 








The purpose of this thesis has been to provide a thorough investigation into the question of 
how and when emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible 
epistemic justification to evaluative belief. I have argued that emotional experience is capable 
of performing such an epistemic role when and only when that emotional experience is 
formed via the subject’s learned emotional competences to emotionally identify an object or 
state of affairs as instantiating the relevant evaluative property. In this last section, I will 
provide a brief review of the arguments made, and conclude with some final remarks.  
 
7.1. Review  
 
In Chapter 1, I began by introducing the justificatory thesis of emotion, and identifying 
support for this view within the contemporary philosophical literature. I then set out the 
parameters of the forthcoming discussion by commenting on some preliminary research 
questions concerning topics such as the nature of emotional experience, epistemic 
justification, and evaluative properties and belief. 
 
In Chapter 2, I then presented emotional dogmatism as our first contender for a view of 
emotional justification. According to basic emotional dogmatism (ED), S’s emotional 
experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and 
only if that emotional experience makes it seem to her that e. It was argued that ED cannot be 
a plausible account of emotional justification given that it falls foul of the over-generalisation 
problem, i.e. ED ends up bestowing justificatory power to emotional seemings which cannot 
be capable of justifying the relevant evaluative belief. In light of this failure, then, I suggested 
that a restricted emotional dogmatist view (RED) based on Chudnoff’s presentationalism is 
better placed to provide a plausible account of how emotional experience can justify belief. 
On this view, S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying 
her evaluative belief e if and only if that emotional experience (i) makes it seem to her that e 
and (ii) makes it seem as if she’s emotionally aware of a truth-maker for e. I then attempted 
to bolster this view by defending it against a conspicuous objection facing it, namely, the 
objection concerning the nature of evaluative properties and the limits of emotional 
awareness. To this end, I appealed to a variety of sources and existing views in the literature 





facie plausible accounts as to how evaluative properties can be either direct or indirect 
objects of emotional seeming awareness.  
 
In Chapter 3, I identified what I take to be the real problem facing RED. Namely, that it faces 
a troubling dilemma in what truth-makers for evaluative properties consist in. Either the 
truth-makers are the evaluative properties themselves, in which case RED continues to over-
generalise, or the truth-makers are the non-evaluative properties which give rise to the 
evaluative properties that make the proposition true, in which case RED ends up under-
generalising insofar very few emotional experiences bring the wide-ranging seeming 
awareness of non-evaluative properties required for them to possess justificatory power. In 
the wake of RED’s failure, I then identified two alternative instantiations of a restricted 
emotional dogmatist view: (i) the McGrath-inspired Receptive Seemings Emotional 
Dogmatism (RSED), and (ii) the Markie-inspired Knowledge-How Emotional Dogmatism 
(KHED). I argued that both of these views fail in virtue of being unable to accommodate for 
the immediacy of the justification conferred by emotional experience. The overarching lesson 
of Chapters 2 and 3, I take it, is that emotional phenomenology and awareness are not 
suitable philosophical tools through which emotional experience can deliver immediate and 
defeasible epistemic justification to evaluative belief.  
 
In Chapter 4, I then presented emotional reliabilism (ER) as the second contender for a view 
of emotional justification, according to which S’s emotional experience is capable of 
immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if S’s forming 
evaluative beliefs on the basis of their emotional experiences is a reliable process of belief-
formation. After motivating and defending ER against three preliminary objections, I then 
endeavoured to provide a defence of the view against the unreliability problem, i.e. the 
objection that forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional experience is not a 
sufficiently reliable process of belief-formation. Here, I argued that all three of what I take to 
be the most compelling ways of arguing in favour of the emotions’ systematic unreliability 
fail, such that, in lieu of a plausible alternative argument, we have no convincing theoretical 
support for the conclusion that forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of emotional 
experience is an unreliable process of belief-formation. ER, therefore, cannot be undermined 






In Chapter 5, I identified and presented what I take to be the real problem facing ER, namely, 
that emotional reliability cannot be sufficient for the presence of epistemic justification given 
the intuitive verdict delivered by an emotional analogue to traditional clairvoyance cases. I 
then considered two possible modifications of ER: (i) Evidential Emotional Reliabilism 
(EER) and (ii) Agent Emotional Reliabilism (AER). I rejected each of these in §5.3.1 and 
§5.3.2 respectively. I thereby concluded that ER cannot offer a plausible account as to how 
emotional experience can immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief. The 
overarching lesson of Chapters 4 and 5, I take it, is that emotional reliability, while perhaps 
important for epistemic justification, is not enough by itself to provide us with a satisfactory 
version of the justificatory thesis.  
 
In Chapter 6, I presented the final category of views to be considered in this dissertation, 
namely, agent-based views of emotional justification. These views adopted a virtue 
epistemological framework in order to support the justificatory thesis of emotion, according 
to which features of the emoter herself are centrally relevant to determining whether her 
emotional experiences are capable of bearing justificatory power. Here, in light of virtue 
responsibilism’s incompatibility with the justificatory thesis of emotion, and in light of virtue 
reliabilism’s comparative compatibility, I identified Sosa’s particular brand of virtue 
reliabilism as the most promising epistemological foundation for an agent-based view. I then 
presented Carter’s Emotional Competence view (EC) as a version of the justificatory thesis of 
emotion grounded in Sosa’s competence-based virtue reliabilism, and highlighted the central 
selling points of the account. I then argued, however, that EC must be specified further in 
order to bolster the view into the most compelling and plausible account it can be. To this 
end, I argued that EC is best supplemented with a learning-based framework for narrowly 
individuating emotional competences, such that this refined Learned Emotional Competence 
view (LEC) can capture all of the identified desiderata for a plausible view of emotional 
justification while explaining the distinct epistemic value of emotions experienced by 
members of oppressed social groups.  
 
7.2.  Summing Up 
 
Emotional experience is a significant constituent of our mental lives. This is the claim that we 
began with in the dissertation, and that which initially motivated our investigation into the 





having defended a virtue epistemological account as to how emotional experience can 
immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief, I hope that this significance is clearer 
than it was before we began. The emotions are not just epistemically significant because they 
can immediately and defeasibly justify evaluative belief, rather, more accurately, they are 
significant because of the way in which they are capable of doing it. They are significant 
because they are forged and moulded by long-term processes of learning and association; 
because when our emotional experiences can justify our evaluative beliefs, it is because, 
through time, we have developed learned competences to be reliably successful in 
experiencing emotions that are appropriately responsive to the presence of evaluative 
properties, and to be reliably successful at taking those experiences at face value.  
 
The epistemic significance of emotions, then, is tied to the features of the emoter herself; to 
her history of past experiences and associations, and the ways in which her emotional 
dispositions have been shaped by that history. Views of emotional justification that neglect 
this broad holistic picture, as we’ve seen from the shortcomings of dogmatism and 
reliabilism, struggle to provide a nuanced and compelling theory as to how emotional 
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